Problems of Communism

Book Reviews
Holland Hunter
Paul Marantz
Forrest C. Pogue
Gavin Boyd
Jack H. Harris
Ouseph Varkey

MARCH-APRIL 1979

MOSCOW AND THE PERSIAN GULF

David Lynn Price



Asia's International Patterns
Golam W. Choudhury

Soviet Cadres Policy
Robert E. Blackwell, Jr.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

2

Mar–Apr 1979 VOL XXVIII

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone: (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided on the inside back cover of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index, Social Sciences Citation Index; Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 Moscow and the Persian Gulf
by David Lynn Price

14 New International Patterns in Asia
by Golam W. Choudhury

29 Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era
by Robert E. Blackwell, Jr.

BOOKS

43 The Soviet Economy and the Challenge of Change
by Holland Hunter

49 Probing Moscow's Outlook
by Paul Marantz

55 Germany and the Origins of the Cold War
by Forrest C. Pogue

61 Prospects for the Sino-American Relationship
by Gavin Boyd

64 Politics of National Security in China
by Jack H. Harris

67 The Ultra-Left in India
by Ouseph Varkey

NOTES & VIEWS

72 Correspondence

Cover: Military units bearing arms of Soviet make parade before the late South Yemeni President Salim Rubay'i Ali in the grand stadium of Aden in July 1977. Photo by Gerard Sebag/SYGMA.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.

SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT)
David E. Albright

SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT)
Wayne Hall

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Paul A. Shapiro

PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
Linda Wray

DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow and the Persian Gulf

By David Lynn Price

Turbulence and violent change characterized the Persian Gulf during much of 1978. Each crisis in the area threatened the regional status quo, and most political groups and governments opposed to the status quo felt drawn, for one reason or another, toward closer association with the Soviet Union. In Ethiopia, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam relied heavily on Cuban and Soviet military aid in his counteroffensive against and victory over Somalia's ill-conceived adventure in the Ogaden; and in the second half of the year, he launched a similar Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet tripartite offensive against Eritrean separatist movements in his country's northern coastal province on the Red Sea. Elsewhere, a savage coup d'état in April brought a pronouncedly Marxist regime under Nur Mohammad Taraki to power in Afghanistan. Then, in June and July, the leading political figures of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) to the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) to the south were assassinated, provoking serious border clashes between the two strategically located states and bringing to power in the PDRY radical pro-Soviet elements which made the PDRY the first professed Marxist republic in Arabia. Under the leadership of Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party, and Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, South Yemeni forces penetrated deep inside North Yemen in March 1979 before withdrawing their troops in the aftermath of strong international reaction against their advance. Finally, in Iran, after 18 months of protracted crisis and political violence, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was forced to leave the country in January 1979 by a loose but popular movement—which included some leftist forces—spearheaded by the Shi'ite Muslim leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni.

The cumulative effects of these changes are still being assessed by the states of the region, in particular, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. But it would not strain the evidence currently available to say that the reaction of some states has been close to paranoia. From the regional perspective what has happened indeed seems alarming. The Soviet position appears to have improved spectacularly and with unexpected ease and speed. Conversely, the Western position seems irretrievable. But is this evaluation accurate? The answer depends to a very large degree on how one interprets Soviet behavior in the region.

Mr. Price is Editor of Arab Oil (Kuwait) and *defense correspondent for* Arab Times *(Kuwait). A member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), he is author of* Oil and Middle East Security, *1976. During the winter of 1978–79, he visited Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and all the states of the lower Persian Gulf.*

The Origins of Soviet Behavior

Currently, two theories are popular for explaining Soviet behavior in the Persian Gulf. The first is that Moscow's policy is determined by a "grand design," a classic combination of strategy and tactics in which long-term and short-term aims merge to promote Soviet communism, to establish pro-Soviet regimes, to erode Western and Chinese presence, and to use the Gulf (or any other region, for that matter) as a springboard for later achievements elsewhere.[1] This theory is based on the hypothesis that Soviet foreign policy is evolutionary and

1. For a recent exposition of this theory, see A. Yodfat and M. Abir, *In the Direction of the Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf,* London, Frank Cass and Co., 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

historical, and certainly there is evidence of long-term Soviet interest in the Gulf region. In November 1940, for example, while German-Soviet relations were still determined by the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact signed in August 1939, V. M. Molotov told Hitler's ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet government was prepared ". . . to accept the text of the Four-Power Pact . . . provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."[2] Later, in August 1941, after the German invasion of the USSR, Soviet and British troops occupied Iran and, as in World War I, divided it into Russian and British zones, with the USSR controlling the northern provinces. Iran was an important corridor for the shipment of US supplies to the Soviet Union during the war, and once the war ended, the USSR was extremely reluctant to leave. Soviet forces remained in the country and in December 1945 established the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaydzhan and the Kurdish People's Republic in their zone. When Western allied pressure eventually compelled the USSR to withdraw its troops, however, both republics collapsed.

On the face of things, then, there is some substantive basis for asserting the existence of a Soviet grand design. But if such a design does truly exist, Moscow has not pursued it with any vigor for more than 30 years. Had the USSR carried out a sustained, vigorous, and coherent policy toward the Gulf during the postwar period, political changes in the region would surely have reflected it, for the Soviet Union has had ample opportunities to supplant the West. The destruction in Iraq of one branch of the Hashemite dynasty in 1958 sharply curtailed British influence in the area and damaged the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). But no Soviet-oriented alliance system displaced it, and when the British withdrew entirely from the Gulf between 1968 and 1971, the vacuum they left was filled not by the USSR but by a loose regional security understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Later, in 1975, the Soviet-backed Marxist revolt by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in Oman's Dhofar Province was successfully put down.[3] And even the 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in 1972 by the USSR and Iraq has not deterred the Baghdad government from persecuting local Communists and seeking Western development aid.

In short, few pro-Soviet governments have been installed in the Gulf over the last 30 years, and between 1973 and 1978, the only objective factor favoring the USSR in the region appeared to be the independence exercised by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which, to protect its own interests, was prepared to propose and apply economic policies damaging to the West. Moscow accepts this gain from the oil-producing states without any ideological reservations, despite the fact that the OPEC membership on the whole favors the capitalist system.

That the USSR has missed—or chosen to miss—its opportunities in the Gulf over the last three decades probably explains the popularity and credibility of the second theory which has been proposed to explain Soviet behavior, i.e., the "muddle" theory. According to this hypothesis, the Gulf has been of only peripheral interest to Moscow, coming after Europe, China, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean region on the list of major Soviet concerns. Consequently, the USSR has not had any set policy for dealing with the Gulf and has relied on expedience and opportunism as the basis of its behavior, trying to take advantage of each opportunity for short- or long-term Soviet gain which has presented itself.[4] Soviet policy in the region, in other words, has been essentially reactive.

Up to now, the "muddle" theory has fairly well represented the opinion of this author. Current developments in the Gulf, however, seem to bring this view of Soviet behavior into question. All the events of 1978 weakened the Western position and, as a result, were objective factors which seemed to be fulfilling the Soviet aim of eroding the Western position in the region. But have the changes which have resulted in fact made the grand design theory more tenable? Was 1978 the year in which Soviet policy in the Gulf ceased to be one of expedience and became more calculated?

Soviet Relations in the Gulf

Our answers to these questions can only be tentative, of course. But perhaps some clues to the

2. *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* Washington, DC, Department of State, 1948, p. 257.

3. On the Dhofar rebellion, see D.L. Price, *Oman: Insurgency and Development* (Conflict Studies No. 53), London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, January 1975.

4. This view was expressed by Dr. Shahram Chubin of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, in an interview accorded to the author in March 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



A control station on the Trans-Siberian Gas Main Line in Astara, Iran. The line, opened in 1970, links the Soviet Union and countries farther west to Iran's natural gas fields.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

future pattern of Soviet behavior can be found by looking at current situations in those key countries of the Gulf with which the USSR already interacts.

Iran. Between 1947 and 1978, Soviet relations with Iran were at worst correct, and at best cordial. Iran bought Soviet weapons and supplied 45 percent of the natural gas consumed by three Soviet republics adjacent to the Iran-USSR frontier.[5] The relationship was subjected to strain from time to time—e.g., during the crisis involving Premier Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953, followed by the proscription of the Tudeh (Communist) Party in the same year; later in the 1950's when American electronic monitoring stations were constructed near the Soviet border in northern and eastern Iran; and in the 1970's when the Shah publicly questioned Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean. But on the whole, the two countries coexisted amicably.

Even in 1977, when outspoken public opposition to the Shah began to develop in Iran, Moscow for a time seemed uninterested in involving itself at all in the country's domestic problems. Thus, when the first public anti-Shah protests took place in May of that year, and even later, when the protests escalated into mass street demonstrations and university campus riots (in December), the Soviet media carried no policy statements on the situation and limited their coverage to the reporting of Western comment on what was happening. Nevertheless, by late in the year relations between the two countries were seriously jeopardized by the discovery of a pro-Soviet espionage network in the Iranian armed forces.[6] Boris Kabanov, the Soviet Consul-General in Tehran, was expelled from Iran in September, and while it was not immediately clear what sort of clandestine operation he had controlled, his expulsion coincided with the circulation of rumors in the capital of unrest within the armed forces. By December, the rumors were borne out. A senior army officer, Major-General Ahmed Mogharebi, was for-

5. See interview with Dimitri K. Simes, Director of Soviet Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, in *Time* (New York, NY), Mar. 12, 1979.

6. *Arabia and the Gulf* (London), Nov. 13, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mally accused of passing military secrets to a "foreign embassy," and it was an open secret that the embassy in question was that of the USSR. By the time Mogharebi was executed on December 25, it was clear that the secrets he had divulged had to do with early-warning defense systems along the border between the two countries.

Despite the tension caused by the Mogharebi case, though, the Soviet media continued to be restrained and noncommittal about the Shah, even as the monarch's position deteriorated steadily throughout 1978. The first statement of Soviet concern about Iran—made by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), himself—came in November in reaction to rumors of pending US military intervention in support of the Shah. In the November 19, 1978, issue of *Pravda* (Moscow), Brezhnev sharply criticized such plans and warned that any such action by the US or anyone else would be considered a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. With hindsight, one can take Brezhnev's *Pravda* interview as the first indication that Moscow was preparing a basis from which to deal with a new regime in Iran. It is possible—and perhaps probable, given Soviet reluctance to take a stance during more than a year of crisis—that Moscow would have preferred to see the status quo maintained in Iran and to continue to deal with the Shah, who had good personal relations with the Soviet leadership. The alternative offered by Ayatollah Khomeyni and the possibly destabilizing influence of revived religious extremism in Iran on the Muslim population of the southern republics of the USSR cannot have been reassuring prospects to the Soviet leaders. But whatever the outcome was to be, Brezhnev's statement served notice that the Soviet Union intended to claim a right to participate in any diplomatic activity connected with the Iranian situation.

On January 16, 1979, the Shah and his family departed from Iran and left behind a caretaker government under Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar. In several statements,[7] Bakhtiar bluntly accused the Communists of responsibility for the domestic

7. *Tehran Journal* (Tehran), Jan. 18, 1979.

Islamic commandos protect the Golestan Palace in central Tehran, previously the main residence of the Shah and site of the Peacock Throne. The largest banner bears the symbol of the mujahidin *and proclaims that "the* Mujahidin *Organization Is an Organization That Believes in Islamic Ideology . . ." The small banner above it congratulates the Muslim brothers for having risen to free themselves from oppression.*

—David Burnett/Contact.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Part of a large crowd that gathered for a rally of the fedayin at Tehran University in February 1979. The banner at the upper right reads: "Long Live the Rule of the People [signed] The Progressive Students." The banner in the foreground reads: "The Turkmen People Support the Iranian People in Seeking to Eliminate National, Cultural, and Economic Oppression."

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA.

unrest in the country. The Soviet official news agency TASS reacted angrily, rebuking Bakhtiar and adding that such statements ". . . can darken substantially the development of relations between Iran and the USSR."[8] The TASS release contended that, rather than a Communist takeover, the real threat facing Iran was a military coup backed by the US. Over the next few days the Soviet line hardened still further, and on January 19, *Pravda* carried an 800-word commentary on "the threat of military dictatorships." The piece claimed that the Bakhtiar government had been set up on American advice and, quoting liberally from statements issued by Ayatollah Khomeyni, called on "real Iranian patriots to rally and close ranks."

Significantly, January was also the month when the emergence of the Left in Iran reached nearly phenomenal proportions. Before Iran's protracted crisis began, the number of left-wing sympathizers in the country could not have exceeded 6,000 or 7,000, and the number of activists, drawn mainly from the universities and the artistic community, was only about 1,000. Since the start of 1979, however, a significant number of left-leaning groups have become distinguishable, including about 10 Marxist-Leninist factions.[9] By far the largest of the radical groups are the *Cherikhaye Feda'iye Khalq* (People's Guerrillas), popularly referred to as the *fedayin,* and the *Sazmane Peykar Rah-Azadieh Tabaq Kargan* (Organization Struggling for the Free-

8. TASS (Moscow), Jan. 15, 1979.

9. *Financial Times* (London), Jan. 30, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dom of the Working Class), popularly known as the *mujahidin*.

The *mujahidin* organization was founded in the early 1960's and was suppressed a number of times by the Shah. Later, at the beginning of the 1970's, the *fedayin* emerged, with an apparent early stronghold in the Caspian Sea province of Siakhal. The two movements were responsible for a grand total of some 250 deaths between 1970 and 1976. In 1975, however, a rift developed between the two groups over the compatibility of Marxism and Islam. The *mujahidin*, labeled "Islamic Marxists" by the Shah, clearly rejected at this time the eclectic ideology of the *fedayin* and emphasized the critical importance of the Koran for contemporary Iranian society. The *fedayin* grew correspondingly more secular in their Marxist orientation. Neither of these guerrilla bands grew very much after the split, and at the end of December 1978, neither had more than about 300 members. Of these, however, several had received military training in Lebanon and Syria from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Immediately after the departure of the Shah, both movements began to operate openly, and their banners and recruiting posters were much in evidence in Tehran during this author's visit in January 1979.

The other major party on the Iranian left is the Tudeh Party, but it is a pale shadow of its former self and is largely discredited among its logical constituencies. Its Central Committee, which is in exile in the German Democratic Republic, has remained committed to following the line laid down by Moscow, and its opportunism over the last 18 months has alienated many potential supporters. During that period the party has changed course three times in attempts to capitalize on various twists and turns of the domestic crisis. At first it supported the united front tactic employed against the Shah; then it switched to a call for armed struggle; and since January it has declared itself in favor of the establishment of an Islamic republic. As of this writing, support for the party is still limited and localized among the ethnic minority populations of Kurdistan and Azerbaydzhan. If the Tudeh Party is to become a major force in Iran, it will have to be reorganized, strengthened, and vigorously directed by the USSR itself.[10]

In the past, the Soviet Union has sacrificed local Communists in the interest of maintaining or improving normal state-to-state relations with Iran.

10. On the current situation of the Tudeh Party, see *Le Monde* (Paris), Feb. 21, 1979.



Workers stage a sit-in strike at an Iranian refining plant in October 1978.

—Philippe Ledru/SYGMA.

But the existence of local Communists has also offered the USSR the opportunity to use them for tactical purposes. In this regard, a US Central Intelligence Agency report released in February 1979 detailed "the stealth and hypocrisy" of the Soviets during the Iranian revolution. Clandestine radio stations operating from Soviet territory and clearly Soviet-controlled preached revolution and in the Persian, Kurdish, and Azerbaydzhani tongues urged a national *jihad* (holy war) and offered detailed instructions on how to organize riots and make grenades and gas bombs. There was also evidence, according to the report, that in October 1978 the Soviet Union directed its underground agents in Iranian security forces and religious groups to seize the leadership of major opposition organizations. The report concluded that "a study of the record reveals a hypocritical attempt to pose as a responsible superpower while promoting subversion on a grand scale as a tactic of world revolution."[11]

But if the evidence suggests that a Communist bid for power is conceivable and that objectively Iran is ripe for revolution, the obstacles in the path of revolution are also enormous. There is strong separatist sentiment among the Kurds, Turks, and Azerbaijanis in the country, but it is by no means pro-Soviet. The northern minorities—the Kurds and Azerbaijanis—have been used to achieve Soviet ends in the past, as already discussed, but never with conclusive results. All arrangements

11. *The New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made proved unviable without direct Soviet military support. And while most of the ethnic minorities in the country are conservative, those in the south—the Arabs and Baluchis—are Sunni Muslim as well and pro-Shah.

The Iranian Left is still bitterly divided, and no single group has yet emerged as its dominant force. But if the Left realizes that tactically it has a long way to go before it can fully espouse the Khomeyni line, there is also some evidence to suggest that most of the groups on the left have not yet parted company with the main anti-Shah stream. Much of the pressure on the Left to organize independently came in response to attacks on the Left by Shi'ite religious zealots. All parties with an interest in the situation—inside and outside the country—realize that the struggle for political supremacy in Iran is continuing and that the Left is not the only, nor the strongest, candidate for power. All, including the Left, will have to act accordingly as events unfold.

Iraq. On the surface, Iraq's relationship with the USSR seems much less ambiguous than that of Iran. Since 1972, Iraq and the Soviet Union have enjoyed a treaty of friendship and cooperation intended to remain in force for 15 years. For 20 years, Moscow has supplied 90 percent of Iraq's defense hardware needs, and recent Soviet sales of MIG-23 and TU-22 military aircraft and advanced SA-5 missiles to Iraq have totaled US$2 billion in value. Among Iraq's trading partners, the Soviet Union ranks sixth as supplier and seventh as customer (non-oil).[12] Furthermore, there has been considerable Soviet involvement and assistance in the development of Iraq's northern Rumaila oilfields. The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) is represented in the ruling governmental coalition dominated by the Ba'th Party, and Iraq's radical positions in international affairs—especially its stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its strident anti-American line—coincide with those of Moscow.

But there is no sign that the Soviet Union has been able to convert its position into real economic and political influence. Since 1973, Iraqi imports from the Soviet bloc have dropped from 25 percent to 9 percent of total Iraqi imports.[13] And in May 1978, 21 members of the CPI were hanged for attempting to set up Communist cells within the armed forces.[14] Those executed were all middle-level army officers, and the charges against them related to their activities in 1974-75. This was the largest single group of Communists executed in Baghdad since 1968. As if to underscore the significance of

At the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Iraq on April 9, 1972, in Baghdad: at the left, Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin, and at the right, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Iraq Republic.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the executions, the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) declared, ". . . we do not consider the Communist Party as an adversary. But we will execute anyone who tries to engage in political activity inside the armed forces."[15]

The executions in May were clearly intended as a warning to anti-Ba'thist forces in the country not to attempt to disturb the status quo. But not all dissenting elements were intimidated. Less than a week after release of the first official accounts of the hangings, a bomb for which no one ever claimed responsibility exploded in Baghdad. In November, trouble erupted again between the CPI and the regime when Communists were discovered organizing within the civil service, especially in the education, information, and planning ministries. In late December, ten Arab Communist parties in other countries protested publicly when reports appeared that the Baghdad government had executed another 18 CPI members.[16]

12. The rankings are those of the Moscow Narodny Bank, London, June 1978.
13. Ibid.
14. On the conspiracy, see *Al Seyassah* (Kuwait), May 17, 1978. The executions were not officially confirmed until June.
15. Author's interview with Naim Haddad, Secretary-General of the National Progressive Front, Baghdad, June 1978.
16. *Al Seyassah*, Jan. 3, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The main lock at Lake Tharthar on the Tharthar-Euphrates canal, completed in 1976. Built with Soviet aid, the canal is important for flood control and for modernization of Iraq's agriculture.

—ADN-Zentralbild from Eastfoto.

In fact, the relationship between the CPI and the Ba'thist regime in Iraq has always been one of "blood and vengeance."[17] The Ba'thists do not trust the Communists for three fundamental reasons: (1) because they could be competitors for power; (2) because they represent an alien ideology; and (3) because they are seen as tools of a superpower conspiracy. As a state with considerable regional influence, Iraq wants to preserve a free hand in implementing its own regional policy, and as an integral part of its policy, the government is anxious to turn Iraq into the granary of the Persian Gulf, and has turned to Western agrobusiness consultants for advice. The CPI has deplored this move, however, declaring that ". . . the agrarian revolution cannot make progress without a clear-cut class policy in the countryside expressing the interests of the rural poor and the middle poor."[18] To the extent that CPI aims differ from those of the ruling Ba'thists on this and other matters, the party is vulnerable. Already it is not consulted on major issues, and it is clear that the regime has the oil wealth, the political toughness, and the security system to destroy any incipient Communist plot if the party turns to violence.[19]

For the Soviet Union, the implications of this situation are clear. To the extent that public opposition by the CPI or subversion in the armed forces, in the civil service, and among the Kurds endanger the goals of the Ba'thist regime, they intensify Iraqi distrust and weaken the Soviet position in the country.

Afghanistan. When the *Khalq* (People's) party seized power violently in Afghanistan in April 1978, the party's strongman and the new foreign minister, Hafizullah Amin, stated that the ultimate goal of his party was to create a modern, socialist society, and it soon became evident that the new government was willing to use Soviet aid to achieve that goal. In addition to the party's estimated hard-core membership of about 2,000,[20] the party's leader and the new President of the country, Nur Mohammad Taraki, can now also count on the support of approximately 5,000 Soviet civilian and military advisers. Afghanistan even signed a friendship treaty with the USSR in December 1978.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union faces problems in this country. Although Soviet influence has been present there since the 1950's, and Soviet aid amounting to US$1.5 billion over the last 25 years (more than the USSR has provided to any other country) has given the USSR critical leverage over Afghan development plans, the Soviet advisers in the country are not well regarded by the population. Moreover, the staunchly pro-Soviet party in the country, *Parcham* (Flag), is not in power and is regularly purged by *Khalq*.

The Taraki government itself is fighting Islamic guerrilla movements in the north and east and has provoked violent local clashes with its land reform and literacy policies. In January 1979, the government moved against some of the country's main religious leaders after months of trying to win them over. Since then, about 70 people have been ar-

17. Author's interview with Dr. Abbas Kelidar, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, March 1975.

18. On CPI agricultural policy, see Jasem Muhammed Al Helawi, "Rural Iraq: Changes and Problems," *World Marxist Review* (London), July 1978, p. 83-89.

19. For a fuller account of Iraqi communism, see John K. Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, pp. 34-38.

20. *Financial Times*, Oct. 31, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rested in two coordinated sweeps against the clergy, and the government has emphasized that ". . . those who use religion as a means to serve the enemies of the people will face repercussions."[21] Until recently the opposition was scattered and uncoordinated and an easy target for the government. But even if sullen and passive, it has shared a common discontent with and distrust of the left-wing regime, and in March there were signs that a coordinated Islamic opposition movement was being planned. Three groups—*Hizbe Islami* (Islamic Party), *Mnyn Inqlabe Islami* (Movement for Islamic Revolution), and *Jamatei-Islami* (Islamic Society)—met in exile in Islamabad, Pakistan, and stated that they were ". . . engaged in a struggle to remove the present government."[22] The land reform program seemed well-intentioned at first, but recent reports indicate that the redistribution, which is being handled by 100 separate party committees, has been turned into a reward system for individuals who show the greatest loyalty to the party.

Every recent Afghan government has been extremely protective of Soviet interests in Afghanistan, and the *Khalq* regime has done little to enhance the Soviet position despite the expansion of the Soviet physical presence in the country. The Russians were embarrassed in Afghanistan, in fact, by the murder in February 1979 of US Ambassador to Kabul Adolph Dubs, which brought them into unwelcome conflict with the US and gave the impression that they were supporting a savage and callous Afghan regime. The real potential gains for Moscow, if Taraki can stay in power, lie beyond his country's borders, in the tribal frontier regions of Iran and Pakistan. But all depends on the stability of the *Khalq* regime, and recent turbulence indicates that it may be undone unless concessions are made to the Islamic movement. If they are, though, Soviet freedom of maneuver is likely to be restricted.

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Unlike the *Khalq* party in Iraq, the ruling Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), which declared the PDRY the first Marxist republic on the Arabian peninsula in 1978, is closely modeled on the CPSU and clearly pro-Soviet. In fact, the Soviet-Cuban-East German presence is probably more extensive in the PDRY than anywhere else in the Persian Gulf. Currently, there are 700 Cubans, 116 East Germans, and more than

21. Ibid., Mar. 6, 1979.
22. *Arab Times* (Kuwait), Mar. 4, 1979.

Nur Mohammad Taraki (right), President and then also Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, is welcomed in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev on December 4, 1978, during a visit that resulted in the signing of a friendship treaty between the two countries.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

1,000 Soviet citizens in the country, all serving either as military advisers or as instructors in ideological training centers.

Cuban involvement in the PDRY began in 1973 as a direct result of the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict within the Communist world. Since 1967, the Soviet Union had been losing its revolutionary credibility among Middle Eastern leftist guerrilla movements, especially among those which had come under Chinese influence. In an attempt to stop the ideological shift in the region away from the Moscow line, Moscow arranged for Cuban paramilitary advisers to go to the PDRY. The first 150 arrived in early 1973, and apart from instructing PDRY forces, they were also involved in training Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) guerrillas at Hauf, Mukalla, and al-Gheidha on the Gulf of Aden. Some of the Cubans flew MIG aircraft along the PDRY-Oman border, and in late 1974 the writer, on a visit to Dhofar, could see PDRY/PFLO artillery positions across the border in South Yemen manned and directed by Cubans. Although the PFLO insurgency was defeated in 1975, the Cubans have remained in the PDRY as a result of the increased Soviet commitment generally in southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. In the event of hostilities breaking out in

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the future between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic, or Oman, the Cubans can be expected to play a direct role, as they did in Angola in 1975 and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1978.

As for the Soviet personnel in the PDRY, they are by no means less active than the Cubans militarily, though they may be less visible. They already have port facilities in the country at Aden and on the strategic island of Socotra at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; and they are building a vast harbor in the bay of Turbah on the Bab el Mandeb strait which will compensate them for their loss of facilities at Berbera, Somalia, in late 1977 and give them a strategic advantage in the Bab el Mandeb area.[23] To the north, on the opposite shore of the Red Sea, the Soviet navy may also soon have port facilities at Massawa, Ethiopia; and to the south of the Persian Gulf, they already enjoy them in Mauritius.

Facilities of this sort in and around a strategic area like the Gulf help the navy "vividly demonstrate the economic and military power of a country beyond its own borders," to quote Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.[24] In support of this view, Gorshkov visited

23. Witness the fact that the straits are only 30 miles wide, while the Soviet surface-to-surface STYX missile alone has a range of 26 miles.

24. S. G. Gorshkov, "The Navy in War and Peace," *Morskoy sbornik* (Moscow), No. 12, 1972, p. 16.

Past and present leaders of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, pictured in 1972, from left to right: Salim Rubay'i Ali, then President of the PDRY, who was assassinated in the summer of 1978; Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, now Secretary General of the Yemen Socialist Party; and Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, currently Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PDRY.

—Rosy Rouleau from Gamma/Liaison.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aden, the capital of the PDRY, in May 1978.[25] His visit followed by only two months the signing of a protocol worked out by delegates of the CPSU and YSP ideological sections regarding cadre training and the exchange of party experience. The Soviet delegate at the signing on March 15 and during the working sessions held in March and April related to the protocol was Yevgeniy Tyazhel'nikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and the director of its publicity and information departments.[26]

But the pervasive Soviet presence in the PDRY has not yet turned the country into a monolithic state (though it may have been more successful in creating a police state). For while there is a strong faction within the ruling hierarchy that wants to set ideological purity above economic pragmatism, there have also been repeated indications that Aden is not yet ready to abandon its willingness to maintain close relations with the conservative regimes of the Arabian peninsula. How realistic this willingness is, to be sure, is open to question, for it has seldom been reciprocated. The regime is greatly distrusted by the Yemen Arab Republic to the north, and indeed, between October 1977 and March 1979, leadership assassinations, border clashes, and finally conventional warfare have marred relations between the two.[27] In addition, the mere existence of the Marxist PDRY unsettles countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, which voice their opposition (and fears) in statements such as the following:

. . . the Communist ideology is not a beloved form of government in the area. The Aden ideology may be good for . . . South Yemen, but it cannot be imposed on North Yemenis or Saudis.[28]

Apparently, the "Aden ideology" is not all that good for South Yemen either, as there are continuing signs of serious discontent. In July 1978, a bus carrying Cuban advisers was blown up by a land mine, and nine Cubans died. By October, an unreported full-scale civil war was being fought between supporters of the late President Rubay'i Ali and the Cuban-organized People's Militia, which supports his successors. As a result of the conflict, there have been mass movements of South Yemenis to North Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and according to a recent estimate, some 15,000 of them are currently receiving military training in Saudi Arabia alone.[29]



A new floating dock in South Yemen's capital, Aden. Seen in this photo is Soviet ship Zheleznyakov.

—ADN-Zentralbild from Eastfoto.

In strategic terms, the usefulness of the PDRY to the Soviet Union is as a toehold—it is no more than that at present—at the Bab el Mandeb strait in the northwest segment of the Indian Ocean. The security of the toehold will depend on the Aden regime's ability to stay in power in the face of civil war and the large exile armies currently being marshalled across the PDRY's borders.

Saudi Arabia. It is hardly surprising that one of these armies is being trained in Saudi Arabia. For unlike any of the Gulf states discussed up to now in our survey, the Saudi kingdom is viscerally anti-Communist, and this position is a dynamic moving

25. *Arab Times*, Mar. 13, 1979.
26. Ibid.
27. In April 1979, representatives of the PDRY and the YAR met in Kuwait and agreed to form a federation out of the two states. A pan-Arab mediation committee led by Kuwait and Syria was appointed, but diplomatic observers do not expect rapid progress, given past tensions between North and South Yemen.
28. *Al Seyassah*, Mar. 11, 1978.
29. *Arabia and the Gulf*, Oct. 30, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force of its foreign policy. Saudi media tirelessly carry items warning of the dangers of communism, and it is generally understood that on this point Saudi Arabia means what it says.

Because of this, it was more than surprising when the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Seyassah* reported on January 19, 1979, that Saudi Arabia was considering opening diplomatic relations with the USSR. The fact that the correspondent who wrote the story said that he had received his information while at a reception at the Chinese Embassy in Kuwait suggested that the Chinese might have been behind the report, but Moscow certainly has not seemed averse to the idea of developing closer ties with Riyadh. On January 31, the Soviet journal *Literaturnaya gazeta* carried an article by Middle East commentator Igor Belayev which was sympathetic to the Saudi position in international affairs and downplayed social and ideological factors as barriers to better relations:

. . . the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia have never fought each other and have never had any insoluble conflict. Their social systems are different, but can that really be a basis for mutual hostility?

The article appeared at a time when Oleg Grinyevskiy, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, was making visits to several Arab countries, including neighbors of Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis denied that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were being considered but did not rule out improved trade relations. Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal stated that he recognized the "positive attitude of the Soviet Union on various Arab issues" but excluded any prospect for the forging of diplomatic links.[30] Despite this reaction by the Saudis, the Soviets have not been deterred and have maintained a conciliatory tone. On March 10, 1979, for example, *Izvestiya* praised the Saudis for refusing to go along with proposals for a new Middle Eastern strategic alliance comprising Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.

Saudi Arabia's hostility to communism is apparently not now viewed by the Soviet Union as an obstacle to relations. But the idea that the kingdom might be worth cultivating seems to have occurred to Moscow only in the aftermath of the Camp David agreements signed by Egypt and Israel in September 1978 and the anti-Egyptian Arab summit meeting held in Baghdad in November. It was hardly part of any grand design for increasing Soviet influence in the region.

Soviet hopes regarding the Saudis are based on the belief that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in Washington on March 26, 1979, will further isolate Egypt from its Arab neighbors and create new, more permanent openings for Soviet influence in the area.[31] In fact, though, the level of Saudi responsiveness to Moscow's approaches will probably be determined by *two* main factors: first, the way in which the American-sponsored Middle East peace efforts develop; and second, the degree to which Saudi Arabia and its allies continue to have faith in US promises of ongoing political support for moderates in the Persian Gulf.

Conclusions

Gulf states concerned about increasing Soviet influence in the region theoretically have a variety of options open to them. It has been suggested in some circles that they "play the China card" to offset—or halt—the Soviet advance. China is alarmed at the current level of Soviet activity in the Gulf and at what it sees as a Soviet desire to reach the Indian Ocean and gain direct access to Middle Eastern oilfields. As a result, the Chinese are anxious to revive the regional talks on Gulf security which have been stalled since November 1976.[32] But while Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng could warn during his visit to Iran in August 1978 against "hegemonism and expansionism by big powers,"[33] there is in fact little the Chinese can offer the Gulf states in the way of direct military aid. Consequently, Gulf states are likely to be very circumspect about the China card. China, after all, was unable to deter Soviet-Cuban operations in the

30. *Al Riyadh* (Riyadh), Mar. 5, 1979.

31. The economic boycott voted against Egypt by the Arab states which met in Baghdad in April 1979 following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty will prove impossible to implement in all its parts. There is far too much Gulf-based private investment in Egypt in support of maturing development projects for a complete rupture to materialize. Saudi Arabia has apparently assured Egypt that it will continue to pump oil through the Suez pipeline and that no sanctions will be imposed on Egyptians working in the Gulf. It is unlikely, in the opinion of this author, that the boycott will become a permanent fact of life in the region.

32. Iran promoted the concept of Gulf security as the basis for a regional defense pact, but Arab distrust of Iranian motives worked against the idea. Two rounds of talks in which all Gulf states participated were held before the onset of the Iranian crisis. The first, held in Kuwait in July 1974, was inconclusive because of Kuwaiti-Iraqi border differences. The second, held in Muscat in November 1976, was inconclusive because of Iraqi obstinancy on the subject of intelligence data sharing.

33. *Middle East Reporter* (Beirut), Sept. 2, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Horn of Africa in 1978, and any threat or decision to call in the Chinese might provoke the Soviets rather than frighten them. It could also create a problem for the United States, which might fear being drawn into a conflict with the USSR in the region by the Chinese.

It is more probable that the Gulf states see the US, not China, as the main extraregional counter to continued Soviet advances. What the conservatives in the area regarded as American vacillation and ambivalence in the Ogaden and in Iran frightened them, and for Saudi Arabia especially this fear has been compounded by a perceived American reluctance to force Israel into making greater concessions for Arab-Israeli peace and by Washington's inability (often read as unwillingness) to curb oil imports and end the erosion of the value of the dollar. Sending unarmed US jet fighters on a flag-waving exercise to Saudi Arabia in January 1979 was regarded as misguided by representatives of all shades of opinion in the Gulf. But the speedy dispatch of US military advisers and equipment to North Yemen following the March invasion of the YAR by PDRY forces, combined with deployment of Egyptian troops in Oman to replace Iranians stationed there under the Shah, has been more effective in reestablishing US credibility.

For the future, the Gulf states consider one alternative to be the Western provision of logistical support to a Saudi-financed Moroccan emergency force (such as that sent to Zaire in 1977) which could be transported to any location in the Persian Gulf in less than six hours. For the present, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman have been encouraged since the visit of US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the region by the prospect of seeing an American aircraft carrier and an occasional destroyer in the Gulf. The regional states will look for signs of a determined American policy in the area as they decide what course to follow in their search for security. No doubt they feel that such signs will also serve notice to the USSR to be more circumspect in its policy.

Of course, in the final analysis, Persian Gulf security is likely to depend more on the attitudes of the Gulf states themselves than on extraregional factors, and consequently it is important that the states of the region bear in mind that the pattern of events which unfolded in 1978 is an imperfect guide to Soviet policy in the area. The political changes in Afghanistan and the PDRY did indicate a measure of Soviet foreknowledge and involvement, suggesting that a more hardline policy has predominated in Moscow. Soviet policy in these countries has been aggressive. At the same time, Soviet influence is not fully established in either, and in Saudi Arabia and Iran, where events are still evolving, the Soviets have taken initiatives that do not commit them to act in any way at all. With leadership changes imminent in the USSR, foreign policy may be an area where the struggle for power has already begun, with disagreements existing over what should be done. But whatever the rationale behind Soviet inaction, in Saudi Arabia and Iran the USSR has much to gain and little to lose and can afford to watch and wait.

In Iraq, however, the situation is different, and it is precisely here that Moscow is on the defensive. Now that the Shah has left Iran, Iraq has become the strongest military power in the Persian Gulf. If this power were to become allied to the diplomatic and financial strength of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the combination could provide a regional barrier to outside involvement which the Soviet Union might find it difficult to overcome.

There is no reason to believe that Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf will decline in the future, but it still tends, on the whole, to follow events rather than to direct them. This could change if the left-leaning regimes or factions in the region were able to ensure themselves a few years in power. Security of tenure of the Left within the Gulf area might encourage the USSR to prepare a long-term political strategy for the region. But up to now, there is little sign of Soviet action in this direction.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New International Patterns in Asia

By Golam W. Choudhury

The years 1977–79 have witnessed major changes in the international political system in Asia. By and large, these have stemmed from a decreased emphasis on purely ideological concerns and a corresponding rise in preoccupation with concrete national interests and aspirations. Central to this trend have been Beijing's decision to push for rapid modernization of China through cooperation with the Western industrial nations and Japan, and the heightened Sino-Soviet rivalry throughout the region that this decision sparked. But the smaller countries of Asia—those with Communist governments as well as those of a non-Communist orientation—have also played a role. Taking advantage of Sino-Soviet competition and the flux it has produced, they have sought to diversify their ties in the area. As a consequence, the pattern of Asian alignments has increasingly lost ideological coherence.

This article will explore in depth the factors that have generated change in the Asian system and the nature of the system that has emerged. It will also address the question of the stability of the current system and the prospects for further alteration of that system.

Mr. Choudhury is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies, North Carolina Central University (Durham, NC). He was formerly Professor of Political Science at Dacca University and then a figure in the government of Pakistan (1967–71), serving first as Director-General of Research in the Foreign Office and later as a member of the Cabinet. The most recent of his many works on Asian affairs are Chinese Perception of the World, *1977, and* Sino-American Relations in the Post-Mao Era, *1978.*

The Role of China

China has been the most dynamic element behind the alterations in the Asian international system. In the wake of Mao Zedong's death and especially since the ousting of the Gang of Four in October 1976, the leadership in Beijing has embarked on a more pragmatic and flexible course than characterized Mao's last years. The primary impetus for the new approach has come from Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, who found himself purged twice during the Mao era but has now emerged as the dominant force in the Chinese hierarchy even though Hua Guofeng remains the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Premier.[1] A close associate of Deng, Hu Yaobang, has assumed the re-created post of Secretary General of the CCP,[2] and still another longtime colleague, Chen Yun, the veteran economist and financial expert who fell from grace even prior to the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's, returned to the Politburo as number five in the party hierarchy and vice-chairman of the Central Committee at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978.[3]

A key element in China's revised course has been the drive for all-round modernization of the country

1. See Jay Mathews, *The Washington Post,* Dec. 26, 1978.
2. *The New York Times,* Jan. 5, 1979.
3. See Peking New China News Agency (NCNA), in English, Dec. 23, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Dec. 26, 1978, p. E/1.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the year 2000. The 10-year plan for 1976–85 adopted at the Fifth National People's Congress held in March 1978 set most ambitious targets designed to move China well along the path toward this goal. For example, it called for grain production to increase by 4–5 percent and industrial output to grow by more than 10 percent during each year from 1978 to 1985. Thus, by 1985 the country is supposed to be producing 400 billion kilograms of grain and 60 million metric tons of steel. To achieve the increase in industrial output, the plan envisioned the completion of 120 large-scale projects by 1985. In addition, the plan contemplated substantial efforts to modernize China's armed forces.[4]

This program would appear to have generated considerable enthusiasm in China. When the present author visited China in 1976 on the eve of Mao's death, he found uncertainty and gloom. But the mood had changed greatly by the time the author returned to Beijing in 1977. Zhou Beiyuan, Vice President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, summed up the prevailing perspective by contending that China had just begun the second phase of its revolution. According to Zhou, the first phase had involved the ending of China's national humiliation by foreign powers and the establishment of a powerful and highly centralized Communist order to unify the country, while the second entailed modernization of the country to make China a powerful socialist state by 2000.

A program of such a magnitude, however, has inevitably had certain ramifications, for major undertakings in the realm of economic development and modernization of the armed forces are simply not possible under Mao's concept of "self-reliance." China, in short, needs technology and forms of economic assistance from abroad to carry out its modernization program. Hence, China has moved toward a greater openness toward the outside world, economically and culturally.[5] In this context, Beijing has evinced an inclination not only to adopt Western-style rewards and incentives for its workers but also to seek technology from the capitalist West and Japan to develop "the PRC's vast underlying resources of economic power." It has even gone so far as to consider accepting long-term loans, once an anathema in Chinese thinking, and to send Chinese students to the West for training.[6] This broad policy of seeking closer ties with the capitalist West and Japan received the formal endorsement of the Central Committee at its Third Plenary Session in December 1978.[7]

The increased openness has extended most particularly to the United States. A Chinese university student capsulized Chinese sentiments on this score rather neatly. "In the past," he observed, "China tried to copy the Soviet Union but that was mistaken." Then he went on: "America is the most advanced industrial power in the world. . . . We want to study America's science, its management and its political system."[8]

Such an attitude, of course, represents an extraordinary change from that of the 1950's and 1960's. Soon after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao deemed that American action in Korea threatened his country's security, and the United States remained the main enemy in his eyes well into the 1960's. At one stage, he was even apprehensive about the possibility of joint action by the United States and the USSR against China. He expressed such misgivings to Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan, for example, in 1965 when both the superpowers began to give arms to India in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.[9] But by the spring of 1969, when the Soviet Union and China were engaged in serious armed clashes on the Ussuri River, the USSR had replaced the United States as the chief enemy from Beijing's standpoint. At that juncture, Mao and Zhou Enlai voiced grave concern to Pakistani leaders about the Soviet threat.[10] This concern, in the author's view, convinced them of the desirability of reducing tensions between China and the United States and led ultimately to the Sino-American rapprochement.

Beijing, Moscow, and Peking

The new outward thrust that the domestic modernization program has imparted to China's foreign policy has given fresh impetus to the efforts that Mao and Zhou initiated at the beginning of the

4. See "Requiem for Mao," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Mar. 17, 1978; Hua Guofeng's report to the National People's Congress on Feb. 26, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, pp. 3-39.

5. For more detailed discussion, see Anthony Lewis in *The New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1978.

6. Hobart Rowen, *The Washington Post*, Dec. 28, 1978.

7. See the communiqué adopted on Dec. 22 and issued on the following day, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 26, 1978, pp. E/4-13.

8. Quoted by Fox Butterfield in *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1979.

9. Based on the author's reading of the minutes of the Mao-Ayub talks in Beijing, April 1965.

10. Based on the author's reading of unpublished Pakistani documents and papers.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1970's to strengthen ties with Japan. Japan's possession of the third largest economy in the world and its reemergence as a major political power had impressed these two chief architects of Chinese policy at that time, and they moved to acquire greater access to Japanese technology and economic assistance and to ensure against the development of an entente between Tokyo and Moscow. The Japanese, for their part, were eager to improve their relations with China. In 1972, Tokyo recognized the People's Republic of China, and subsequently Sino-Japanese links grew steadily. Indeed, while Japan and the USSR have a common interest in developing Siberian energy resources, the Japanese government and its leaders for many reasons, including feelings of cultural identity, seemed to prefer closer relations with Beijing than with Moscow.

What prevented things from proceeding altogether smoothly between the two countries was the problems connected with the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship. Negotiations for such a treaty had been provided for in the Sino-Japanese communiquè issued at the time of normalization as a means of getting around differing Chinese and Japanese views with regard to the existence of a legal state of war between the two countries.[11] Although the negotiations began soon after normalization of relations, they quickly ran into difficulties. The biggest issue was China's insistence on including in the treaty a so-called "anti-hegemony" clause, opposing the domination of Asia by any power.

To the Japanese, this kind of clause was objectionable on two grounds. First, it could conceivably be used to try to weaken Japanese-American ties. Second, and more important, the word "hegemony" had acquired special meaning and significance in the Sino-Soviet context. The Chinese always ascribed what they termed the "expansionist designs" of the USSR to its desire for "hegemony." While Tokyo wanted to sign a treaty with Beijing, it did not wish to do so at the cost of offending Moscow.

After the inauguration of China's current modernization drive in 1977, however, Beijing stepped up its wooing of Japan. In February 1978, for example, representatives of the two states signed an eight-year trade pact providing for two-way trade, split equally, of US$20 billion, and laying out a concrete purchasing schedule for the first five years (i.e., to 1982).[12] Such courtship, in combination with the heavyhandedness of Soviet diplomacy, created the environment for the Chinese to persuade the Japanese to cast aside their misgivings about the anti-hegemony clause in the peace and friendship treaty. In August 1978, with American encouragement and blessing, the Japanese signed the document.[13]

The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty constituted Beijing's greatest diplomatic triumph in Asia since the deaths of Mao and Zhou in 1976. During the visit of Vice-Premier Deng to Tokyo in October 1978 at the time of Japanese ratification, both China and Japan declared that the treaty had launched "their countries into a new era of diplomatic relations and economic cooperation."[14] Most Asian states, including India, welcomed it as a stabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region. Only in Moscow did it cause worry and wrath. In Soviet eyes, it amounted to a setback to Soviet interests in an Asian country to which the USSR attaches high priority.

It would be naive to contend that Tokyo has allied itself completely with Beijing or that it has closed all its diplomatic options with respect to Moscow. Japan still seems to be interested, for example, in joint development with the USSR of energy resources in Siberia.

Nonetheless, the Japanese now appear to find the Soviet Union distinctly more threatening than China. They are concerned, for instance, about the strategic implications of Moscow's project to build a second, 2,000-mile trans-Siberian railway slightly north of the existing line. While such a line would facilitate the transportation of oil to the Pacific coast for export to Japan, it could also enhance Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis Japan as well as China.[15]

Moreover, Tokyo is exceedingly sensitive about Soviet military activity near its territory. In early 1979, Japanese intelligence sources disclosed that the USSR had deployed military forces and undertaken military construction on Etorofu and Kumashi, two of the four islands just a few miles off the north-

11. The text of the joint communiqué of Sept. 29, 1972, was released by NCNA on the same date.

12. Tracy Dahlby, "Peking opens the door to Japan," *FEER,* Mar. 3, 1978, pp. 40-41.

13. For the final text of the treaty, see the press release of the People's Republic of China Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Aug. 25, 1978. According to the author's information, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to US President Carter, urged the Japanese to go ahead with the treaty during his visit to Japan after his highly successful tour of China in May 1978.

14. Quoted in Tracy Dahlby, "A great alliance as the lion awakens," *FEER,* Nov. 2, 1978.

15. Based on the author's reading of research materials of the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared in cooperation with the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Commonwealth Division.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ceremonies upon the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship between China and Japan in Tokyo on October 23, 1978. From left to right: Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda, and Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda.

—Kaku Kurita from Gamma/Liaison.

ern coast of Japan that the Soviet Union has occupied since the end of World War II but Japan claims as "historically" part of its territory. While Japan's National Defense Agency stressed the seemingly "defensive nature of the buildup," Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira told the Japanese Diet that the Soviet move was of "grave concern," and the Tokyo government made a formal protest to the USSR on February 5, 1979. The Soviet ambassador, Dimitriy Polyanskiy, rejected the protest, saying it was an attempt to interfere in Soviet domestic affairs.[16]

This incident conforms to a pattern of increased Soviet efforts to demonstrate military clout in the Far East. Although the Soviet fleet in the area still cannot match the US Seventh Fleet, the former does today pose a substantial threat to Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force. According to one commentator, "Tokyo is being told in not too subtle terms that China is not the only Asian power on its doorsteps."[17] Such "geopolitical muscle-flexing" does not sit well with the Japanese. At the time of the furor over the Soviet military buildup in Etorofu and Kumashi, for example, Japanese government sources indicated that this move rendered even less likely the already remote possibility that Japan and the USSR would negotiate a friendship treaty comparable to the Sino-Japanese one.[18]

The US Factor

As it did in the case of Japan, the Chinese modernization drive furnished an additional stimulus to long-standing Chinese attempts to bring about an improvement of relations with the United States. The Carter administration, for its part, evinced a heightened resolve to tackle the problems connected with the normalization of relations with the Beijing government. As a result of this new determination on both sides, the difficulties, especially with regard to Taiwan, proved surmountable, and in December 1978 the two countries announced that the United States would recognize the Beijing government on January 1, 1979, and that they would open formal diplomatic ties shortly thereafter.[19] In late January and early February 1979, Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping paid a visit to

16. See John Lewis, "Power Politics: The Soviets show a mailed hand," *FEER*, Feb. 16, 1979.
17. Ibid.
18. *The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1979.
19. Ibid., Dec. 16, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States. By March, an exchange of ambassadors had taken place.

In commenting on the new links, US President Jimmy Carter said that "we have charted a new and irreversible course toward a firmer, more constructive and a more helpful relationship."[20] But he stressed that the United States had no intention of using a close political relationship with Beijing to the disadvantage of Moscow.[21] According to US Vice President Walter Mondale, Carter "made it clear [to the Chinese] that we want a warm but correct relationship—not one of alliance but of cooperation."[22] As the President himself pointed out publicly, "the security concerns of the United States do not coincide completely, of course, with those of China nor does China share our responsibility."[23]

The Chinese, however, made no secret of their desire for something more grandiose than mere cooperation. On the eve of his visit to the United States, for example, Deng told interviewers from *Time:*

After setting up this relationship between China, Japan and the U.S., we must further develop the relationship in a deepening way. If we really want to be able to place curbs on the polar bear [the USSR], the only realist thing for us is to unite. If we only depend on the strength of the U.S., it is not enough. If we only depend on the strength of Europe, it is not enough. We are an insignificant, poor country, but if we unite, well, it will then carry weight.

He added that "it is not only of interest to China but also of great significance to world peace, world security, world stability that there be friendly relations between China, the U.S., Europe and Japan."[24] During his tour of the United States, he reiterated these arguments for a Sino-Japanese-American alliance against the Soviet Union, and he took every opportunity to denounce the "hegemonic aspirations" of the USSR. On his way back to Beijing, he stopped over in Tokyo for two days of talks with Japanese leaders, during which he delivered the same message to them.

Despite the opposition of Washington and Tokyo to an alliance with China, Moscow viewed the normalization of Sino-American relations, in combination with the earlier signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty, as suspicious in this regard. While it treated the establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China as the culmination of a long process which it had supported, it warned against any efforts to form an entente directed against the USSR.[25]

Thus, the opening of official relations between Washington and Beijing in the wake of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty had the effect of moving both the United States and Japan nearer to China and away from the Soviet Union. Moreover, it exacerbated the already pronouced Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia. This impact was most visible in Indochina.

Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping with US President Jimmy Carter at the White House in Washington, DC, on January 29, 1979.

—Jim Moore from Gamma/Liaison.

War in Indochina

During 1977–78, open fighting developed among the Communist states of Indochina, paving the way for increased involvement of outside powers in the area. Vietnam and Cambodia (or Democratic Kampuchea) were the chief local disputants.

20. *Time* (New York, NY), Feb. 12, 1979.
21. *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Feb. 5, 1979.
22. *Time*, Feb. 12, 1979.
23. *Newsweek*, (New York, NY), Feb. 12, 1979. See also Stephen Barber, "Deng trumps Carter's card," *FEER*, Feb. 9, 1979.
24. *Time*, Feb. 5, 1979.
25. Based on the author's talks with senior Chinese diplomats and foreign policymakers.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodians are deep-seated and have a long history. Within Communist circles, they probably manifested themselves as early as the 1930's and certainly by 1951, when the "Indochina Communist Party" (under Vietnamese domination) passed a resolution advocating an "Indochinese Federation" of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.[26] The difficulties escalated, however, in the wake of the Communist victories in Indochina in 1975. From the Cambodian perspective, Vietnam sought to acquire a "hegemonic role" in the area—i.e., to turn both Cambodia and Laos into "satellites" as the Soviet Union had the East European states after World War II. In conversations with an Asian ambassador in Beijing in 1977, for example, Cambodian Foreign Minister Ieng Sary charged that Vietnam was bent on establishing a "sphere of influence" in Southeast Asia, and he spoke of Hanoi's "big brother chauvinism." The Cambodians also interpreted Hanoi's publication of a 1954 French map showing the 1939 Brevie line as the border between Vietnam and Cambodia to be an effort to put pressure on them to accept the Indochina Federation scheme and hence, from their point of view, "annexation" by Vietnam.[27] Many statements from Hanoi merely heightened their suspicions. The Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1977, for instance, called for a "special relationship between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea" and expressed the hope that the three countries "will forever be bound to one another."[28]

These tensions produced sporadic military clashes along the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border in 1975–77, and large-scale hostilities broke out at the end of 1977. Although the Vietnamese made a successful military thrust some 30–40 kilometers into Cambodia in early January 1978 and then withdrew, the Phnom Penh government refused to retreat from its militant posture. Thus, by the fall of 1978 the fighting between the two countries had stepped up once again and had reached new heights of intensity.[29]

As the conflict escalated in 1977–78, both Hanoi and Phnom Penh sought support from outside the region to bolster their positions. This search came against the backdrop of an increasing polarization of Indochina's relations with foreign powers. From the very beginning of its accession to power in 1975, the Pol Pot regime had maintained a hostile stance toward not only the United States but also the USSR. The Khmer Communists bitterly resented the fact that Moscow had recognized the Lon Nol government and maintained diplomatic ties with it during the 1970–75 civil war. Consequently, they looked essentially to China for political backing. Vietnam, in contrast, moved to strengthen its links with the USSR after 1975. At least initially, this step reflected the limited options confronting Hanoi with regard to economic reconstruction and development. Although China had over the years extended US$10 billion in military and economic aid to Vietnam,[30] Beijing did not have the resources to provide the sorts of credits that the Vietnamese needed after the end of the war—especially in light of growing internal pressure for efforts to modernize China. The United States, for its part, showed an unwillingness to consider bilateral assistance to the Hanoi government because Vietnam had failed to adhere to the 1973 Paris accords in pushing for military victory in the south in 1975. That left the Soviet Union as the primary alternative source of help.

Immediately after the Hanoi and Phnom Penh media began to publicize the border conflict in January 1978, Moscow threw its support openly to Vietnam. China tried briefly to mediate, but by February it had come out firmly on the side of Cambodia. In explaining this decision to the author, Chinese officials stressed the consistency of Chinese opposition to "regional hegemony." They pointed out, for example, that China had supported Pakistan against India, which aspired to a South Asian confederation embracing itself and its smaller neighbors like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, and later Bangladesh. Moreover, they contended that the USSR endorses "regional hegemony" in the context of its drive for global "hegemony" and that it therefore backed Vietnam against the "weaker party."[31] This interpretation of the Indochina conflict, of course, runs directly counter to that of the Soviets and Vietnamese.[32]

26. Information from the author's interviews and research in Beijing in 1977 and 1978.

27. Ibid.

28. Based on the author's reading of a memo dated May 12, 1978, by the Cambodian Embassy in Peking (through the courtesy of the Bangladesh ambassador in Peking).

29. For further discussion, see Sheldon W. Simon, "New Conflict in Indochina," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1978, pp. 20-36.

30. Based on figures given to the author by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.

31. Based on the author's interviews and research in Beijing in 1977 and 1978.

32. Information on their outlooks comes from the author's talks with some East European diplomats in Beijing and with the Bangladesh ambassador to Beijing and Hanoi.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The arrival of a Vietnamese party-state delegation in Moscow on November 1, 1978, for a visit that resulted in the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. From left to right: Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Soviet party chief L. I. Brezhnev, Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Le Duan, and Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

As a consequence of these alignments and perspectives, the Cambodian-Vietnamese imbroglio took on the dimensions of—to use the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to US President Carter—"a Sino-Soviet war by proxy."[33] The emergence in the spring of 1978 of trouble on the Sino-Vietnamese border and strife over Vietnam's alleged harassment of the 1.5 million ethnic Chinese in its population served to underscore the broader implications of the Indochina situation. Beijing held that these developments signaled Hanoi's intention to launch a major war against both Cambodia and China.[34] While disputes over the Paracel and Spratly island groups had generated tension between Vietnam and China as early as 1974–75, the two countries had still managed to maintain a generally cooperative relationship, but now the spirit of cooperation vanished. China quickly canceled its aid projects in Vietnam and ordered the withdrawal of its technicians. Moreover, it shut down three Vietnamese consulates in South China.

It was shortly after this deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations that the Chinese and Japanese concluded their peace and friendship treaty, which was followed a few months later by the announcement of the normalization of Sino-American relations. Faced with such apparent setbacks to its own interests, the USSR sought to recoup by stepping up its courtship of Vietnam. The Vietnamese were swift to respond. Vietnam had already become the 10th full member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in June 1978, and on November 3, 1978, Moscow and Hanoi signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev termed this treaty of "special significance" in view of China's alleged military pressure on Vietnam.[35]

At the time of the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, an Asian diplomat at the United Nations commented that when the USSR "signs a friendship treaty, there is trouble ahead."[36] This observation proved quite prescient. Armed with the friendship pact with the Soviet Union, Vietnam began a full-scale invasion of Cambodia on Christmas Day, December 25, 1978, in ostensible support of an anti-Pol Pot insurgent group. In less than 15 days of concentrated air and ground operations, the Vietnamese and their Kampuchean allies had captured three provincial towns, were besieging a fourth, and were threatening the capital city of Phnom Penh. On January 7, 1979, Phnom Penh fell to the combined Vietnamese and Cambodian forces.[37] The Vietnamese blitzkrieg bore a great deal of resemblance to the operation of India against Pakistan in 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Subsequently, to be sure, the Vietnamese began to encounter unexpected resistance from the remnant military forces of the Pol Pot regime as these had a chance to regroup and mount guerrilla activities. As one analyst has pointed out, the Vietnamese "evidently failed to learn the very lesson they taught the Americans—that weapons and armour count for little in a war against rural guerrillas in an unfriendly environment."[38] Nevertheless, Vietnam, with Soviet arms supplies and Soviet diplomatic support, did succeed in deposing a govern-

33. *The Washington Post*, Jan. 4, 1978.
34. See *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), May 21, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 24, 1978, pp. N/3-5; and the article by the *Renmin Ribao* commentator, June 10, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 12, 1978, pp. A/11-13.
35. *The Washington Post*, Nov. 5, 1978.
36. *The New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1978.
37. Nayan Chanda, "Blitzkrieg on Cambodia," *FEER*, Jan. 12, 1979.
38. Richard Nations, "Vietnam Caught in the American Trap," ibid., Feb. 9, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sino-Vietnamese hostilities in February 1979. At the left, Chinese forces chase survivors after capturing a Vietnamese barracks in the town of Lang Son; at the right, Vietnamese infantry units move north along National Highway One toward the scene of Sino-Vietnamese fighting, as Vietnamese refugees from the conflict move to the rear.

—Photos by China Photo Service from Eastfoto and MacLear from Gamma/Liaison.

ment friendly to China—indeed, a government which was China's sole ally in Indochina.

China's Reaction

In this context, events in Cambodia represented a major diplomatic reversal for China in its bitter struggle with the USSR for power and influence in Asia. Although Beijing representatives, along with those of the United States and Third World countries, condemned the Vietnamese invasion in discussions of the matter in the UN Security Council, a Soviet veto prevented the Security Council from taking any action on the matter.[39] Therefore, the Chinese decided to do something on their own, even at the risk of inviting Soviet retaliation. Apparently, they felt that to sit idly and accept the situation would give China a "paper tiger" image in Asia and enable the USSR to enhance its position in the area. In this connection, they probably were mindful of the consequences of the Soviet-backed invasion of Pakistan by India in 1971. While Beijing had not condoned the Pakistan government's military actions in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and had not given Pakistan any assurance of military intervention against India in the war, the general perception in Asia was that China had been unable to stop the invasion of its ally. Moreover, the USSR, by supporting India, had gained increased influence in South Asia.

During his visit to the United States in late January and early February 1979, Deng Xiaoping signaled Chinese intentions to move against Vietnam. He hinted that China might have to take some "punitive measures" against the Hanoi government. At a meeting with US senators, he was even fairly explicit on the subject. He indicated that "sometimes we may be forced to do something that we do not want to do."[40] By this juncture, US intelligence

39. *Newsweek*, Jan. 22, 1979.

40. *Time*, Feb. 12, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sources were reporting that as many as 150,000–170,000 Chinese troops had massed along Vietnam's northern border.[41]

Despite President Carter's expression of concern about the spread of war in Southeast Asia and despite later warnings by both the United States and the Soviet Union about the dangers of a "punitive" Chinese strike against Vietnam, the Beijing government on February 17, 1979, announced that its troops had struck along much of the 600-mile Sino-Vietnamese border. According to the Vietnamese News Agency report of the same day, Chinese forces had attacked four Vietnamese border provinces, from Quang Ninh in the east to Hoang Lien Son in the west. In justification of this action, the Chinese claimed that "the Vietnamese authorities have of late continually sent armed forces to encroach on Chinese territory" and thereby threatened "seriously the peace and security of China." The Vietnamese, on the other hand, accused China of launching "an aggressive war all along the border of our country," and they appealed to the USSR and "fraternal socialist countries" to "support and defend Vietnam." Hanoi even asked the United States to take "appropriate measures to force Beijing forces to withdraw from Vietnam."[42]

Thus began full-scale Sino-Vietnamese hostilities which were to last for 17 days. Not until March 5 did the Beijing government announce that it was withdrawing Chinese troops from Vietnamese territory. By March 16, it reported that all its forces had returned to Chinese soil.[43]

In many respects, the Chinese operation resembled that of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, in which Beijing, having tired of the "forward policy" of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, mounted a military blitz to defeat and humiliate India.[44] However, the outcome of the recent Chinese undertaking has thus far been much less clear-cut than that in the earlier case. To be sure, China did manage to give Vietnam a real military jolt and thus to demonstrate that any country which signs a friendship treaty with Moscow is not necessarily immune to military actions by other major powers. Despite Moscow's admonitions about the consequences of any punitive measures against Vietnam on Beijing's part, moreover, China succeeded in carrying out its intervention without provoking Soviet retaliation. Indeed, the Soviet Union showed itself to be a "paper tiger" in certain ways. As a result, Beijing proved to any doubters in Southeast Asia that the USSR does not have unlimited capacities to exercise hegemony in the area, even in cooperation with a "proxy." At the same time, the Chinese did not succeed in getting the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea, although the Chinese incursion into Vietnam may have provided the Pol Pot guerrilla forces with a new lease on life. In addition, Beijing seems to have pushed Hanoi's Indochinese clients in Laos and Kampuchea to come out in open opposition to China, thereby reducing their room for maneuver vis-à-vis Vietnam.[45]

From an overall regional perspective, the Chinese invasion would appear to have had two important effects. First, against the backdrop of the Sino-Japanese treaty and the normalization of Sino-American relations, it has heightened the fears of the Soviets as well as the Vietnamese of an emerging Chinese-Japanese-American entente directed against them.[46] Second, it has simultaneously strengthened the tendency of the non-Communist Southeast Asian countries to try to compensate for the reduced American presence in the area by balancing the USSR and China off against one another. (Vietnam's ouster of the Pol Pot government in Cambodia with Soviet backing, it should be noted, had raised questions about the viability of such an approach for the non-Communist Southeast Asian states, for these states are vulnerable to similar military adventures by Vietnam and its Soviet ally.) In some ways this effect may be the more important of the two, so it deserves more detailed discussion.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

With the reduction of US involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1970's and particularly in the wake of the Communist victories in Indochina in 1975,

41. *The Washington Post*, Feb. 10, 1979.

42. For the texts of the Chinese and Vietnamese statements, see *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 18, 1979.

43. See NCNA, Mar. 5 and 16, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 5, 1979, pp. A/7–8, and Mar. 19, 1979, p. E/1.

44. For details of the Sino-Indian border war, see Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, London, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1970. When the author met Chairman Mao Zedong in November 1970, Mao recommended Maxwell's book to the author. It is worth noting, too, that China and Pakistan considered a similar blitz against India during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, but Pakistan became leery and backed away from such a project. For details, see G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, New York, Free Press, 1975.

45. For further discussion, see Nayan Chanda, "End of the battle but not of the war," *FEER*, Mar. 16, 1979, pp. 10–12; and Russell Spurr, "Studying end of term reports," ibid., p. 13.

46. See, for example, Soviet and Vietnamese charges reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many of the non-Communist countries in the region felt concern about their security. The intense competition between Moscow and Beijing to take advantage of the lowered American profile to enhance their own influence merely added to this concern. Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area has manifested itself in a variety of spheres. It has probably been most evident in the propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Beijing. China has warned the Southeast Asian countries against letting "the [Soviet] tiger" in at the back door while driving "the [US] wolf" out at the front.[47] Moreover, it has highlighted Soviet actions which it regards as detrimental to the interests of these states. In the economic realm, for example, it has charged that the USSR has "joined the desperate oil rush by sending oil specialist groups and engaging in oil exploration to greedily exploit the oil resources of the region."[48]

Accusations of economic imperialism have also figured prominently in the Soviet barrage against China. According to Radio Peace and Progress on October 10, 1974, China is "determined to dominate the Southeast Asian market." The broadcast went on to claim that China was using its capacity to provide the oil badly needed by many of the Southeast Asian countries—especially Thailand and the Philippines—to secure its position in the area. Moreover, it contended that Chinese sales of cheap oil to Thailand and Japan were seriously damaging Indonesian oil exports.

The USSR, however, has focused its propaganda on two issues where it apparently believes China is the most vulnerable—support of insurgent movements in Southeast Asia and the role of the Overseas Chinese in the region. On the former question, Southeast Asian governments have displayed unease about Beijing's dual approach. While the Chinese seek to persuade Southeast Asian rulers that China will not interfere with their efforts to quell the rebellions, the Chinese also endeavor to render enough moral support to the rebels to maintain revolutionary credibility and to prevent the movements from falling under Vietnamese or Soviet sway. Attempting to exploit local apprehensions, the Soviets hammer home the theme that "diplomatic relations are no hindrance when it comes to Beijing's great-power meddling in the affairs of Southeast Asia."[49]

With respect to the some 15 million Overseas Chinese, there are still problems of social integration in several countries, and although Beijing has encouraged each individual Chinese community in the area to assume the nationality of its host country and to abide by local laws, Southeast Asian suspicions that Beijing might try to capitalize on the underlying tensions for its own purposes persist. The Soviets have attempted to exploit these suspicions by portraying the Overseas Chinese as rapacious and subversive—in effect, Beijing's fifth column. Radio Peace and Progress commented on January 6, 1976, that the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia "practically control the Indonesian economy and pocket a third of the national income." "The majority of Chinese immigrants," Radio Vladivostok declared on July 2, 1975, "are acquiescent tools in the Maoists' hands, assisting them in pursuing a great-power policy in the countries of Southeast Asia."

Aside from the straightforward propaganda arena, Sino-Soviet rivalry has been evident in the realms of trade and aid, trade fairs, exhibitions, sporting and cultural events, and exchange of official visits. One favorite method whereby the USSR has sought to gain an edge over China in the economic sphere, for instance, has been the establishment of joint shipping companies (e.g., with Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines). These offer freight rates on Soviet vessels below those established by the Far East Freight Conference.[50]

Faced with this competition as well as the further complication of growing Soviet-Vietnamese ties after 1975, the non-Communist leaders of Southeast Asia strove to broaden their relations with the Communist states but to refrain from identifying with any of them. After 1975, for example, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia entered into full diplomatic relations with China, and top-ranking delegations from the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Burma visited China and received red-carpet treatment there. A number of the Southeast Asian states also entertained Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong in the summer of 1978 on his tour of the area to sell his plan for a "zone of peace" in the region.

To be sure, there were important distinctions in attitudes among the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia. In the case of China, these became ob-

47. Radio Peking Domestic Service in Mandarin, Aug. 11, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 16, 1976, pp. A/19-21.

48. Radio Peking in Burmese to Burma, Dec. 9, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 15, 1975, p. A/8.

49. See, for instance, Radio Peace and Progress, May 13, 1975.

50. Based on the author's reading of research materials of the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared in cooperation with the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Commonwealth Division.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China cultivating its neighbors in Southeast Asia: in the photo to the left, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian (left) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua (right) are welcomed to Manila by Imelda Marcos, Mayor of Manila and wife of Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, in March 1978; in the photo to the right, Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping with Thailand's Prime Minister Chamanan Kriangsak at Bangkok's airport on November 5, 1978.

—Photos by David Burnett/Contact and Andre/SYGMA.

vious during the visits that Chinese leaders made to the area in 1978. Vice-Premier Li Xiannian got a warm and enthusiastic welcome in the Philippines, and Deng Xiaoping met with the same sort of response in Burma and Thailand. The last two countries were particularly solicitous in light of their desire for Chinese sympathy and support in dealing with pressing national security problems. Thai rulers were troubled about the threat posed by Vietnam and its Laotian ally, while Burmese President Ne Win wanted Chinese cooperation in ending his country's Communist insurgency. Elsewhere, however, the reception was far more reserved. In Kuala Lumpur, where there is great sensitivity about China's influence on communal problems in Malaysia as well as on the Malaysian insurgency, the government discouraged the presence of spectators at the airport when Deng arrived for a sojourn, and security precautions in the city were strict throughout his stay. During Deng's visit to Singapore, a similar fear of Chinese influence on the local population (mainly ethnic Chinese) was evident.[51] Although Deng did not stop in Indonesia, his travels to other Southeast Asian countries produced commentary that shed light on Jakarta's outlook toward China. Prior to Deng's trip in November 1978, China and Indonesia had appeared to be moving toward the resumption of diplomatic relations, severed in 1967 in the aftermath of the abortive Communist-inspired coup of 1965. But some of Deng's remarks during his tour prompted Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmja to declare that "the issue of Indonesia-China relations has gone back into mothballs."[52]

Nevertheless, the general trend in the area was toward greater openness to the Communist states, with an emphasis on balancing Soviet and Chinese influence. It was this trend that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, with the USSR's endorsement, threatened at least to distort. Because the invasion raised the specter of further Vietnamese-Soviet military adventures in Southeast Asia and thereby caused great concern in the non-Communist states of the area, it seemed to lay the groundwork for the emergence of a *Pax Sovietica* in Southeast Asia.

With the Chinese incursion into Vietnam, however, the non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia appear to be set more firmly than ever on their newly established course. In March 1979, for instance, Malaysia and Indonesia launched ex-

51. David Bonavia and K. Das, "All alone and far from home" *FEER*, Nov. 24, 1978.

52. Rodney Tasker, "Old fears delay friendship," ibid., Dec. 15, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ploratory talks aimed at mediation between China and Vietnam.[53] It should be underscored, though, that there has been a subtle shift in the character of the nonalignment pursued by most of these governments. While they try to avoid being drawn into Sino-Soviet quarrels, they tend to be more favorably inclined toward China than toward the USSR. Indonesia constitutes the one possible exception.

The South Asian Dimension

Perhaps the region that has been least touched by the winds of change sweeping over Asia during recent years is South Asia. By and large, both India and Pakistan, for example, have seemed locked by circumstances into old alignments.

After the Janata party's electoral victory in 1977, India's new prime minister, Morarji Desai, indicated that his government would follow a policy of "genuine" nonalignment, thereby hinting that India would revise its "tilt toward Moscow."[54] Yet security considerations—New Delhi's great dependence on Moscow for defense supplies—appear to have imposed distinct limits on what the Janata government could do in this regard. In November 1978, Desai went to Moscow to reaffirm his country's continued friendly attitude toward the USSR.[55] Similarly, when Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was preparing to undertake a trip to China in 1978 to discuss existing Sino-Indian differences, he traveled to Moscow to assure the Soviets that India's overtures to Beijing would not alter Soviet-Indian ties.[56] As a result, *Pravda* in a survey of 18 months of Janata rule, could say that while the "coming into power of the Janata has introduced serious changes in the country's internal political development . . .there has been a continuity in its foreign policy."[57]

The persistence of India's close ties with the USSR has inevitably impeded any significant improvement of Sino-Indian relations—especially in light of Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Asia generally. After the Janata party's rise to power, Beijing did evince an interest in patching up its differences with New Delhi. However, the Chinese were not prepared to abandon their posture on any of the issues on which the Indians displayed sensitivity. While China has always been willing to settle the border question with respect to the Northeast Frontier Agency, it has showed no willingness to compromise on the matter of the Aksai Chin in the west, for the Aksai Chin is inextricably linked to Chinese defenses in Xinjiang against the USSR. As regards Kashmir, Beijing continues to endorse the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. Finally, China has demonstrated no intention of ceasing to supply arms to India's neighbors. Indeed, Chinese military aid to Pakistan has never stopped, and Beijing has begun to supply arms, on a very modest scale, to Bangladesh as well.

What the Chinese essentially wanted, then, was to attenuate India's links with the USSR. This purpose became crystal clear shortly before Foreign Minister Vajpayee was originally scheduled to visit Beijing in 1978. A New China News Agency article spoke of India's "good neighbor" relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal as "turning the key against superpower intrusion and interference," and it depicted the new trend as "unfavorable to the Soviet Union's strategy of carrying out expansion in South Asia in order to prepare for a drive for an Indian Ocean outlet." It went on to quote with approval the following observation by the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun:* "The trend towards better mutual relations, reconciliation

Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin with Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai in New Delhi in March 1979.

—Dilip Mehta/Contact.

53. K. Das, "Stepping firmly into the breach," ibid., Mar. 16, 1979.
54. *The New York Times,* Mar. 25, 1977.
55. *FEER,* Nov. 10, 1978.
56. See Denzil Peiris, "Change of tune but not tempo," *FEER,* Nov. 10, 1978.
57. Quoted in ibid.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indian Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee talks with Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in Peking in February 1979.

—Camera Press.

and cooperation among the South Asian countries marks a departure from the combination with superpower type of relations which the Soviet Union has been striving to set up with India."[58]

Given the contrast in Indian and Chinese perspectives, it is hardly surprising that the efforts at rapprochement appear to have foundered, at least for the time being. Although Foreign Minister Vajpayee was supposed to visit Beijing in the fall of 1978, his "illness" (presumably diplomatic in nature) forced a postponement of the trip. When he finally arrived in Beijing on February 12, 1979, his talks with Chinese leaders evidently did not go well, and he broke off the discussions on the pretext of China's invasion of Vietnam. Moreover, India subsequently made a strong protest to Beijing about Chinese actions in Vietnam.[59] These developments would seem to foreclose the possibility of an early improvement in Sino-Indian relations.

To the extent that India has modified its basic international posture at all, the changes have come in its attitudes toward the United States. Although the Congress government of Indira Gandhi had prior to its fall in 1977 sought to reduce friction with Washington, the Janata government has pursued this policy with increased vigor. The warming of the US-Indian relationship has been dramatized by the visit of President Carter to India in 1977 and the return visit of Prime Minister Desai to the United States in 1978. China, it should be noted, has apparently welcomed this evolution of Indo-American ties on the grounds that it reduces India's preoccupation with Moscow. In view of the melioration of Sino-American relations, Beijing no longer seems to fear that the two superpowers will pursue a joint policy of containment against China—one of its nightmares during the 1960's after the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war.

Pakistan, for its part, has maintained its fundamental orientation toward China. The explanation for its refusal to introduce greater flexibility into its foreign policy is complex. Pakistani leaders regard the USSR with a great deal of suspicion, not only because of its long-standing ties with India but also because of what they see as a more direct Soviet threat to Pakistan's security. In recent years, Pakistan has been beset by political unrest in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier, where demands for regional autonomy often cloak more ambitious secessionist schemes, and Afghanistan has traditionally encouraged and supported the dissident elements. The 1978 coup in Kabul and the new regime's pro-Soviet views are therefore of great concern in Pakistan. Concern over the implications of the Afghan situation has been heightened by the political instability prevailing in the rest of Pakistan. Since the military's deposal of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 on charges of rigging elections to parliament, there has been almost constant domestic strife with respect to Bhutto's fate. This revolved, first, around whether to bring him to trial for involvement in the attempted assassination of a political opponent that resulted in the death of the man's father; then, after his conviction on the charge, around whether he should be executed; and, finally, around the decision of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, head of the military regime, to carry out the death sentence. Such strife has increased the opportunities for meddling by outside forces.

To be sure, Sino-Pakistani relations have not been totally untroubled. Beijing, for instance, had urged Zia-ul-Haq to commute Bhutto's death sentence, and Bhutto's execution represented something of an embarrassment to the Chinese.

Nevertheless, in the face of US unwillingness to get enmeshed in South Asian quarrels as well as the signs of a certain degree of improvement in US-Indian relations, the Pakistan military government has seen little reason to alter Islamabad's long-standing reliance on China for support. In September 1977, Zia-ul-Haq visited China and re-

58. On the NCNA release, see ibid.
59. *The New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affirmed his country's continued and "unqualified" friendship.[60]

The Chinese, in turn, have taken pains to nurture close ties with Pakistan. In June 1978, Vice-Premier Geng Biao journeyed to Pakistan to open the Chinese-built Karkoram highway, carved through the mountains of northern Pakistan along the ancient silk route.[61] This highway gives China greater influence in the South Asian state and ultimate access to the port of Karachi on the Arabian Sea. In December 1978, about the time of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, Vice-Premier Li Xiannian also made a hasty trip to Islamabad to reassure the Pakistanis of China's unaltered support.[62]

Despite these continuities, South Asia has not been entirely immune to the sorts of changes occurring elsewhere in Asia. Bangladesh affords the best illustration. Capitalizing on the growing competition within the Communist world, and particularly between the USSR and China, the government of President Ziaur Rahman has sought to maintain links with a variety of nations. Having established formal relations with China in 1975, for example, Dacca worked assiduously to strengthen its ties with Beijing. In January 1977, Zia visited China, and he entertained Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannan and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in Bangladesh in March 1978. Li and Huang received a reception in Dacca reminiscent of the ones accorded the late Premier Zhou Enlai during his stays in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1956 and 1966. Moreover, the talks between the Bangladeshi and Chinese leaders went exceedingly well, with both sides expressing satisfaction with their outcome.[63] Outside the straightforward diplomatic realm, Bangladesh has obtained Chinese assistance in the training of its air force personnel, some shipments of Chinese military supplies, and Chinese help with its development projects.

Although President Zia and his armed forces are strong backers of the Sino-Bangladesh connection and although the Sino-Bangladesh ties appear to enjoy popular endorsement, there has been evidence since the fall of 1978 that elements within the civil service—particularly within the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs—and the intelligentsia have reservations about how far the country should move toward China. In December 1978, for instance, Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien was received in Dacca right at the height of Sino-Vietnamese tensions. Such a gesture to China's enemy no. 2 (the USSR being its enemy no. 1) was not calculated to please Beijing. Furthermore, there has been discussion of the desirability of President Zia's paying a visit to Moscow to balance off the trip to Beijing.

Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian is welcomed to Dacca by Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman on March 18, 1978.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 6, 1978 p. 15.

In another direction, President Zia has taken tentative steps to open up contacts with North Korea. He went to Pyongyang in August 1978 to lead the delegations from foreign countries for the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. During his stay, he received a hero's welcome. He also, incidentally, had the opportunity for another fruitful dialogue with Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, who headed the Chinese delegation.

While Nepal has for many years sought to preserve a balance between the two Asian giants on its borders—namely, India and China—it too has endeavored to exploit the new flux in Asia for its own purposes. Specifically, King Birendra has proposed to designate his country a "zone of peace." This proposal has met with somewhat different receptions from Nepal's two large neighbors. During a trip to Kathmandu in December 1977, Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai virtually rejected the idea,

60. *Dawn* (Karachi), Sept. 18, 1977.
61. Ibid., June 20, 1978.
62. Ibid., Dec. 22, 1978.
63. Based on the author's conversations with Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman and the Chinese ambassador in Bangladesh. The author was in Dacca during the visit of Li and Huang.

64. See Kedar Man Singh et al., "Teng triumphs on the frontiers," *FEER*, Feb. 17, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while Deng Xiaoping on his visit to Nepal in February 1978 expressed willingness to undertake "obligations arising from it."[64]

Summary and Prospects

To capsulize the present situation, then, the international political system in Asia looks a good deal different than it did in the early 1970's. The USSR now has treaties of friendship and cooperation with not only India but also Vietnam, and both Laos and Cambodia maintain close links with Vietnam. China, in striving to counter Soviet influence in the area, has effected closer relations with Japan and the United States, although the parallel interests of the three still have distinct limits. With a few exceptions such as Pakistan, most of the smaller states of Asia have endeavored to diversify their links abroad to enhance their room for maneuver; moreover, the variety of their preoccupations in international affairs has brought about distinctions among them in how they deal with individual Communist countries. As a consequence, there is considerable diversity in the nature of their international ties in the region.

But there remains the issue of how lasting the present pattern of relations will be. In trying to assess this matter, it is important to recognize at the outset that the determining considerations concern the largest powers active in Asia. Their relationships provide the parameters within which the smaller countries must operate and limit the degree of flexibility that these countries can exercise in working out their international ties.

What, then, is the outlook with regard to the alignments among the larger powers? In many respects, China constitutes the key factor. As long as Beijing continues to regard the USSR as its principal enemy and to see Vietnam as Moscow's stalking horse, it will probably perceive at least certain parallel interests with Japan and the United States in containing Soviet influence in Asia. The most that the Soviet Union can accomplish under such conditions is to decrease the parallel interests that draw China, Japan, and the United States together, and to solidify its own links with India and Vietnam.

While Beijing has called for border talks with both the USSR and Vietnam, the prospects for major shifts in Chinese attitudes toward either appear dim. As long as China remains committed to its rapid modernization program, its basic orientation will lie toward the Western sources of assistance to that program. This orientation does not preclude an improvement of relations with Moscow, but such a development seems improbable unless Moscow greatly diminishes its support for Vietnam. The Chinese now view their conflict with Vietnam as long-term in nature because of Hanoi's desire for "regional hegemony" in Indochina. Moreover, they appear determined to thwart Vietnamese ambitions and feel confident of their abilities to do so eventually, if not over the short run. They argue, for example, that, just as anti-Indian feelings arose in Bangladesh soon after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, "national uprisings" will take place at some juncture against the Hanoi-dominated regimes in Cambodia and Laos. In this connection, they concede that the Pol Pot regime has likely disappeared forever (and shed no tears at that fact), but they hold that a national hero whom they can support, like Prince Norodom Sihanouk, will ultimately emerge in Cambodia.[65] Given the USSR's past eagerness to promote Leonid Brezhnev's Asian security plan, however, it is not very probable that Moscow would be amenable to lessening its backing of the Vietnamese.

Within the general framework created by continued Sino-Soviet tension and rivalry, some marginal changes in the contours of the existing pattern of relationships could conceivably occur. India, for instance, could seek to further strengthen its links with the United States as a means of expanding its room for maneuver vis-à-vis the USSR. Soviet-American relations could take a turn for the better—especially if a SALT II agreement gets ratified by the US Senate—and there might thus be a narrowing of parallel American-Chinese interests. By the same token, heightened Soviet military activity in Asia could push China, Japan, and the United States closer together. It is even possible that Vietnam, deciding to deemphasize its ambitions in Indochina, could make new overtures to Japan and the United States as a means of decreasing its dependence on the USSR.

Of these possible developments, the first is perhaps the most likely, with the others arranging themselves at various lower levels on a ladder of probabilities. Yet none would dramatically alter current alignments in Asia. Thus, the chances are that the broad outlines of today's international political system in Asia will persist for the foreseeable future.

65. Based on the author's discussions with senior Chinese diplomats in the United States, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era

By Robert E. Blackwell, Jr.

During each of the last two successions in the USSR, the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has sought to swing the political balance toward collective leadership and away from personal rule.[1] After Yosif Stalin's death, the Soviet security apparatus was almost immediately brought under joint leadership control and eliminated as a weapon in the political struggle. Following N.S. Khrushchev's overthrow, his heirs replaced their patron's freewheeling cadres policies with a far less politicized approach in making personnel decisions.[2] These changes—perhaps one should call them reforms—have considerably narrowed the tactical options in the leadership struggle and thereby strengthened the institutional restraints against abuses of power by the more ambitious members of the Politburo.[3]

Neither party leader since Stalin has been entirely able to overcome these constraints in his pursuit of power. Khrushchev's demise would almost certainly not have been possible had he been able to suppress his opponents by nonpolitical means. While he held a preeminent position among his colleagues, he still required their acquiescence to maintain his position.[4] L.I. Brezhnev, too, has adapted his leadership style and policies to these limitations. He has apparently concluded that his own political fortunes are best served by identifying his administration with cadres stability and by avoiding controversial policies that would require him to struggle against the bonds of oligarchic control.

The constraints on the use of terror and repression as a weapon in political infighting have become deeply ingrained in the Soviet system, and it is difficult to foresee circumstances under which the USSR is likely to return to the dark days of Stalinist repression. By contrast, the durability of the controls on use of cadres policy in the political struggle remains uncertain. Although such depoliticization of cadres policy provides considerable political protection against abuses of power by a party chief, it has led to a significant decline in elite turnover during the last 14 years and has greatly reduced the entrance of younger elites into the leadership. There likely exist opposition and resentment among some lower-level officials with respect to policies that make advancement so slow. It is conceivable that an aspirant to the post of CPSU General Secretary might try to enlist the support of such officials in a future succession struggle.

Nevertheless, most of the party and government leaders in the CPSU Central Committee have a

Mr. Blackwell is an analyst with the Office of Political Analysis, US Central Intelligence Agency (Langley, VA), and a former Associate Professor of Political Science at Emory University (Atlanta, GA). His studies of the Soviet party elite have appeared in Journal of Politics, Soviet Studies, Comparative Politics, *and the* American Journal of Political Science. *The views in this article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency or the US government.*

1. Western scholars disagree, however, about the extent to which the Soviet political system now exhibits oligarchic tendencies. See T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership: Towards a Self-Stabilizing Oligarchy?" *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1970, pp. 167-91; Grey Hodnett, "The Pattern of Leadership Politics," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy,* forthcoming, Chap. 5; Myron Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR,* 2nd ed., New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1968; Robert G. Wesson, "Monarchy or Oligarchy: Problems of Leadership," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Sept. 5, 1972.

(For fns. 2-4, see page 30.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party leader L. I. Brezhnev addresses the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 29, 1966. At this congress the CPSU eased requirements for turnover in its leading organs. Seated to the left is party secretary M. A. Suslov; and to the right, Premier A. N. Kosygin.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

strong interest in supporting rules that guarantee cadres stability. These provisions have given them political security and extended their tenure at the top. Their support, therefore, will most probably go to a leader perceived to be in much the same mold as Brezhnev, not a man who has strong policy views, is outspoken, and displays great ambition. This need not prevent the emergence of a powerful leader, but would-be general secretaries will in all likelihood follow a strategy similar to Brezhnev's in advancing their cause. Thus, the trend insulating personnel questions from the political struggle will probably persist in the post-Brezhnev era, and institutional support for collective leadership thereby will be strengthened.

In what follows, I will explore in detail the stability

2. This change has been observed by several students of Soviet politics. See the articles by Jerry Hough, "Soviet Elite: II. In Whose Hands the Future?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1967, pp. 18-25; "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" ibid., March-April 1972, pp. 25-45; and "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," ibid., March-April 1976, pp. 1-17. See also Christian Duevel, "The Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission Elected at the 24th CPSU Congress," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), No. 46, 1972; Seweryn Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite and Internal Developments in the USSR," in William E. Griffith, Ed., *The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Détente*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976, pp. 25-55; T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership. . ."; and Richard Topping, "The CPSU Under Brezhnev: Trends in Administration and Recruitment," paper presented to the Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, DC, Oct. 13-16, 1977.

3. The post-Khrushchev leadership likewise sought to prevent the party chief from assuming a government role in addition to his party position. Although this decision has never been officially announced, P. A. Rodionov, currently the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, asserts that the October 1964 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that ousted Khrushchev decided that it would be "inexpedient" to allow anyone to simultaneously hold the offices of CPSU First Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers as Khrushchev had. See P. A. Rodionov, *Kollektivnost'—vyshiy printsip partiynogo rukovodstva* (Collectivity—The Highest Principle of Party Leadership), Moscow, Politizdat, 1967, p. 219. While this injunction has not been breached directly, the current CPSU leader L. I. Brezhnev, following East European practice, in June 1977 assumed the chairmanship of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

4. Commenting on this development, Seweryn Bialer has noted that "the absence of terror and the disappearance of the institution of the absolute leader transformed divisions within the elite from a secondary phenomenon in the Soviet political process. . .into a primary fact of Soviet political life." Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite. . .," p. 34.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of cadres policy in the Brezhnev period (contrasting it to Khrushchev's policy) and the implications of this tendency for the Soviet political system and a post-Brezhnev succession.

Stability of Cadres at the Top

Notwithstanding a party rule that still mandates a steady level of turnover within the elite, this objective has not been attained, nor for that matter has it even been aggressively pursued.[5] Party officials at virtually all levels of the political system have enjoyed increased security in office. The decreasing probability of political demotion has been especially evident in the party's national organs, the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission.[6] In contrast to the situation in the Khrushchev era, members have had a very good chance of retaining their leadership status within the central elite during the Brezhnev years (see Figure 1). Cadres stability—marked by the percent of members reelected to these bodies—has been higher at each of the three party congresses since Khrushchev's removal than it was in either 1956 or 1961. Leadership continuity, moreover, has steadily increased throughout the Brezhnev period, advancing from a reelection rate of 73 percent in 1966 to 83 percent in 1976.

While this increased political security is evident for virtually all segments of the party elite, some groups have benefited more than others, as can be seen in Figure 1. The higher one's status within the central elite, the greater the likelihood of retaining a seat at the next party congress has been.

5. As originally adopted at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, this rule required fixed levels of turnover of cadres in party organizations at all levels of the political system. See Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow, Eds., *Current Soviet Policies IV*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 36.

That this statute had provoked a negative reaction in the top party elite became clear during the 18 months prior to the 23rd CPSU Congress (held in March-April 1966). For example, M.S. Solomentsev, then First Secretary of the Rostov Oblast Committee (obkom), dramatically noted at the March 1965 CPSU Central Committee plenum that the statute created too much fluctuation among party cadres, and he asserted that Communists "demand a change to this stipulation." *Plenum tsentral'nogo komiteta kommunisticheskogo partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, stenograficheskiy otchët, 24-26 marta 1965*

(continued on page 32, with fn. 6)

Figure 1. Reelection Rates for Members of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) and Central Auditing Commission (CAC), 1956–76[a]



[a] In each congress year, the rates are calculated as the percentage of those members elected at the previous congress who were reelected in the given year (in the case of 1956, the percentage relates to members elected at the 1952 congress).

Figure 2. Reelection Rates of Members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission by Job Profile[a]



[a] In each congress year, calculated as the percent of those elected at the previous congress who are reelected in given year (in the case of the congress in 1956, relates to members elected in 1952).

[b] Workers, peasants, or members of the intelligentsia not representing specific institutions.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Almost 90 percent of those elected full members of the Central Committee in 1971 were reelected in 1976; only about three quarters of the members of the Central Auditing Commission retained their elite status. This differentiation contrasts with the situation under Khrushchev. The late leader's purge of the central elite in 1961 did not give preferential treatment to those with higher status within the elite; Central Committee members were only slightly less likely to be replaced than members of the Central Auditing Commission.

It is equally obvious that representatives of the party apparatus have received the most favorable treatment under Brezhnev (see Figure 2). Throughout the period, they have consistently been more likely than their government counterparts to maintain their places within the leadership. Government officials, in turn, have been retained at a higher rate than either representatives of the military or what might be termed "symbolic elites"—workers, peasants, or the members of the intelligentsia. What this means, of course, is that even the meager rates of turnover registered in the top elite during the Brezhnev period are inflated by disproportionately high turnover in those elements not close to day-to-day political administration. That party and government apparatchiks have benefited most from the policy of cadres stability is not surprising, since their pressure for it was a major factor in its adoption.

While insuring greater job protection for existing members of the CPSU's highest organs, the party leadership has opened the way for some additions to the top elite by increasing the size of these bodies. The combined membership of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission in 1976 totaled 511, almost 30 percent more than the 395 members elected in 1961 under Khrushchev, and the full membership of the Central Committee has risen about 65 percent in this period (from 175 to 287).[7] Despite this expansion, however, previous incumbents have constituted a growing proportion of the members of the two top party bodies, increas-

Table 1. Continuity of Cadres in CPSU Central Organs, 1956–76[a]

(in percent)

Elite status at time of election	Year of party congress at which elected				
	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976
Elected from within	54.8	40.3	63.1	66.9	72.0
Of which:					
Reelected	43.4	29.4	54.2	53.8	58.5
Promoted to full or candidate CC membership	6.9	9.9	8.0	12.4	13.5
Demoted to CC candidate or CAC membership	4.4	1.0	0.9	0.6	—
Newly elected	45.2	59.7	36.9	33.1	28.0
Total number of members	318	395	439	477	511

[a]CPSU Central Committee (CC) and Central Auditing Commission (CAC).

(Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Report. March 24–26 1965), Moscow, Politizdat, 1965, pp. 119–20. Such views had been expressed earlier in the CPSU journal *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 20, 1964, pp. 3–7, and were soon echoed by Leningrad City First Secretary G. Popov, Lipetsk City Committee First Secretary A. Putrya, Uzbek Republic Secretary V. Lomonosov, Komsomol Secretary B. Pastukov, and Georgian First Party Secretary V.P. Mzhavanadze. See *Pravda* (Moscow), May 30, 1965; ibid., May 25, 1965; *Sel'skaya zhizn* (Moscow), Aug. 11, 1965; *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 16, 1965, pp. 7–15; and *Zarya vostoka* (Tbilisi), June 29, 1965.

In his speech to the 23rd CPSU Congress, Brezhnev agreed with most of the criticism, although he did acknowledge the need for some general provision requiring renewal of cadres and promotion of young and energetic workers in party committees. The revised statute adopted at this congress deleted reference to required rates of turnover, while continuing to call for renewal of cadres. For Brezhnev's comments, see Saikowski and Gruliow, Eds., *Current Soviet Policies V*, Columbus, OH, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1973, p. 28; and for the new statute, see ibid., p. 159. In all subsequent commentary, the party leaders have continued to pay lip service to renewal of cadres while in practice maintaining a high degree of stability in cadres assignments.

6. The Central Committee has been a traditional focus of elite analysis for students of Soviet politics. The CC's membership reflects the party's functional, geographic, and ethnic divisions. See Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), December 1968, pp. 1232–41; Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1972, pp. 382–409; Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation to Change," *Polity* (Amherst, MA), Winter 1969, pp. 176–201; Duevel, "The Central Committee . . ."; Robert V. Daniels, "Office Holding and Elite Status: The Central Committee of the CPSU," in Paul Cocks et al., Eds., *Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976, Chap. 5.

In deriving the data presented in the present article, the author has drawn extensively upon the 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, and 1974 volumes of *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR"; the 1961, 1966, 1971, and 1977 editions of *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya; and his personal files. In the figures and tables, the data are calculated through the end of 1978, except in Table 8, which includes appointments made in January 1979.

7. For more on the significance of the expansion of the Central Committee, see Daniels, "Office Holding and Elite Status . . .," pp. 79–80; and Duevel, "The Central Committee . . . ."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2. Generation of Party Entry of Those Elected to CPSU Central Organs Since 1961[a]

(in percent)

Year entered party	Year of party congress at which elected			
	1961	1966	1971	1976
Before 1936	43.4	32.8	20.5	12.9
1936–40	33.7	31.0	26.4	23.5
1941–45	16.5	23.2	27.3	29.2
1946–52	4.6	7.7	14.5	17.4
1953–	1.8	5.3	11.3	17.0
Total number of members	395	439	477	511

[a]Covers members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission.

ing from only 40 percent in 1961 to 72 percent in 1976 (see Table 1).

The net result is that the Soviet elite has aged considerably, and the average length of service in top positions has grown.[8] Perhaps more significant, there has not been sufficient room to infuse large numbers of the post-Stalin group of party members into the leadership.[9] As a consequence, this political group remains vastly underrepresented among top elite cadres. While approximately 70 percent of all current party members joined after 1952,[10] only 17 percent of the combined membership of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission comes from this generation (see Table 2). Moreover, even this figure overrepresents their true significance in the leadership. People from this group are much more likely to be found within the ranks of the less powerful Central Auditing Commission than within the Central Committee and to serve as "symbolic" representatives rather than to occupy party or government managerial slots. Demonstrative of this last point, 38 percent of the post-1952 generation of leaders now in the Central Committee or the Central Auditing Commission do not hold key party or government posts.

Stability at Lower Levels

The continuity observed in the membership of central elite organs during the Brezhnev years can also be discerned in similar institutions at lower levels of the party apparatus. Turnover of political leadership in the 14 republic politburos in the Brezhnev era has been roughly half what it was in the Khrushchev period (see Table 3).[11] Although turnover does vary considerably by region, cadres stability has been greater under Brezhnev in each region and in 12 of the 14 republics. Fully 10 of the 14 republics averaged over two removals a year from their politburos under Khrushchev, but no republic has averaged more than 1.7 during the post-Khrushchev years.

This same trend is apparent in republic party secretariats, although the turnover rates are uniformly lower for both periods (see Table 4).[12] Overall, turnover in republic secretariats has been 26 percent lower under Brezhnev than it was under Khrushchev. In 10 of the 14 individual republic secretariats, the average yearly turnover rate has decreased under Brezhnev. In this period, not one of the republic secretariats has experienced a turnover rate greater than one change a year, whereas in the Khrushchev years eight fell into this category.

Finally, the post-Khrushchev leadership has opted for unprecedented continuity in positions constituting the backbone of the party and government administrative hierarchy—ministers in the USSR Council of Ministers and first secretaries of party obkoms. Khrushchev used structural reorganizations as well as cadres changes to shake up the composition of these two groups. The creation

8. In 1961, members of the party's central elite on the average were 51.7 years old and had served a combined total of 3.9 years in the Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission. By 1976, these averages had risen to 57.4 and 8.3. For full members of the Central Committee, the change was even greater, going from 52.2 and 5.8 in 1961 to 59.4 and 11.0 in 1976. For a more extensive discussion of these trends in the Central Committee, see Joseph P. Mastro and Vincent E. McHale, "Age Patterns and Apprenticeships in the Central Committee of the CPSU: Some Comments on the Emergent Gerontocracy," paper presented to the Ninth World Congress, International Political Science Association, Montreal, Canada, Aug. 19-25, 1973.

9. According to Borys Lewytzkyj, "the real significance of the 23rd Party Congress is that it demonstrated the determination of the Party leaders—the war generation—to keep the younger generation out of power." See Borys Lewytzkyj, "Generations in Conflict," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1967, p. 39.

10. This estimate is based on official Soviet data published in 1977, which showed that about 67 percent of all party members had less than 20 years of party seniority. Another 15 percent had 21-30 years of seniority. See *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 21, 1977, pp. 25-43.

11. Grey Hodnett's book on recruitment trends within republic party organizations provides a detailed analysis of turnover in key positions in the republic hierarchies. See *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, 1978.

There are, of course, no data for the largest Soviet republic, the RSFSR, which has no politburo.

12. Ibid. See also John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, January 1977, pp. 3-36.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 3. Turnover of Republic Politburos, 1955–78

(average number of personnel changes per year)

Republic cluster	Republic[a]	Under Krushchev (1955 to Oct. 1964)	Under Brezhnev (Nov. 1964 thru 1978)
Baltic		**6.7**	**1.7[b]**
	Estonia	1.9	.4
	Latvia	2.6	.6
	Lithuania	2.2	.6
Western republics		**4.6**	**3.2**
	Belorussia	1.2	1.1
	Moldavia	2.2	.9
	Ukraine	1.2	1.4
Caucasus		**6.2**	**4.7**
	Armenia	1.6	1.7
	Azerbaydzhan	2.5	1.3
	Georgia	2.1	1.7
Central Asia		**13.3**	**6.0**
	Kazakhstan	2.1	1.6
	Kirgiziya	2.5	1.1
	Tadzhikistan	2.6	1.1
	Turkmenistan	2.8	1.1
	Uzbekistan	3.2	1.1
TOTAL		30.8	16.6

[a]The Russian republic has no politburo.

[b]The inconsistency of the figure for total changes in this region is a result of rounding down of the figures for each of the republics.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: The data were computed by determining the total removals from candidate or full membership for each republic politburo during the two indicated periods and by dividing these totals by 10 for the 10 years of the Khrushchev period and by 14 for the 14 years of the Brezhnev period. Since Khrushchev did not fully emerge as the most important Soviet leader until 1955, post-Stalin changes from 1953 through 1954 were not included.

Table 4. Turnover of Republic Secretariats, 1955–78

(average number of personnel changes per year)

Republic cluster	Republic[a]	Under Krushchev (1955 to Oct. 1964)	Under Brezhnev (Nov. 1964 thru 1978)
Baltic		**1.2**	**1.4**
	Estonia	.1	.4
	Latvia	.7	.6
	Lithuania	.4	.4
Western republics		**2.5**	**1.9**
	Belorussia	.6	.6
	Moldavia	.9	.6
	Ukraine	1.0	.7
Caucasus		**3.0**	**2.4**
	Armenia	.7	.6
	Azerbaydzhan	1.2	.8
	Georgia	1.1	1.0
Central Asia		**5.5**	**3.3**
	Kazakhstan	1.3	1.0
	Kirgiziya	1.1	.7
	Tadzhikistan	.5	.6
	Turkmenistan	1.1	.6
	Uzbekistan	1.5	.4
TOTAL		12.2	9.0

[a]The Russian republic has no politburo.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: Same as in Table 3, except applied to changes in republic party secretariats.

of the *sovnarkhozy* (regional economic councils) in 1957 abolished many of the central ministries and in the process deposited many of their chief tenants in far less important posts in the provinces. The bifurcation of the party apparatus in 1962 also could have led to the systematic turnover of cadres, but Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 prevented full completion of the process.[13] With the post-Khrushchev reinstitution of traditional organizational forms, cadres stability returned. The Brezhnev administration has been loathe to push jobholders from office. Only 42 ministers have left the USSR Council of Ministers in the last 14 years, and of these 19 died in office, while an additional 10 retired on pension.[14]

The turnover rate for obkom and kraykom (kray committee) first secretaries has also been much lower under Brezhnev, roughly half what it was under Khrushchev.[15] If we look at figures for the five most populous Soviet republics (see Table 5), we see that on the average there were only 13 removals from obkom leadership positions a year under Brezhnev, as compared to 27 removals a year in the Khrushchev years. While the degree of decline in obkom leadership turnover varies by region, each republic shows a lower rate in the post-Khrushchev period. For the RSFSR, this change has been particularly dramatic. Roughly 28 percent of the oblasts in the RSFSR have not had a leadership change since Brezhnev took office, and another 50 percent have changed only once. During the Khrushchev period, the figures were 5 and 28 percent respectively. Such stability in the RSFSR is especially significant inasmuch as there is no

13. John Armstrong makes this point in "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interest," ibid., April 1966, pp. 417-30.

14. In large part, this calculation is based on data in T.H. Rigby, "The Soviet Government since Khrushchev," *Politics* (Bedford Park, N.S.W., Australia), No. 12, May 1977, pp. 5-22.

15. See T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," for a discussion of obkom recruitment trends in the RSFSR since 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 5. Turnover of Obkom First Secretaries in the Major Republics, 1955–78[a]

(average number of changes per year)

Republic	Under Khrushchev (1955 to Oct. 1964)	Under Brezhnev (Nov. 1964 thru 1978)
RSFSR	14.2	5.9
Of which:		
Ethnic oblasts[b]	3.1	1.2
All others	11.1	4.7
Ukraine	4.5	3.1
Belorussia	1.3	1.0
Kazakhstan	4.6	2.1
Uzbekistan	2.0	1.1
TOTAL	26.6	13.2

[a]For purposes of this study, the term "obkom first secretaries" includes first secretaries of party committees of krays, oblasts, autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts.

[b]Includes autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: Removal of an obkom first secretary was considered a case of turnover even if the individual was assigned to another comparable position in another oblast, kray, autonomous republic, or autonomous oblast.

republic party organization there. Thus, the vast majority of the 76 oblast-level party first secretaries are directly under the control and *nomenklatura* (appointment power) of the party center. More important, the party leaders of most of these oblast-level jurisdictions have ex-officio status in the party's central leadership.[16] In effect, then, stability in the RSFSR obkom leadership relates directly to stability in the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission.

Limiting the Effect of Turnover

Despite the high level of cadres stability since 1964, the current leadership is not the same as the one Brezhnev inherited. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, over the 14 and a half years since the coup against Khrushchev, the leadership in the USSR Council of Ministers and in the oblast, republic, and central party organizations has substantially changed. However, this evolution has generally not had an unsettling effect on the leadership. This is largely because there has been a marked decline in politically motivated removals and an increase in regularized promotion opportunities.

For example, under Khrushchev it was relatively rare for individual obkom first secretaries to die in office or to retire. Instead, political demotion was the most common cause of turnover, accounting for almost 50 percent of all transfers from this position (see Table 6). The situation has changed dramatically since 1964. Under Brezhnev, the share of those leaving obkom first secretaryships for reasons of death or retirement has increased sharply, while the share of those leaving because they were demoted has declined markedly. Of the five republics examined in Table 6, only the Ukraine is at variance with this pattern. This is explained by the numerous shifts occasioned by the factional dispute between Brezhnev and Ukrainian party chief P. Ye. Shelest within the national leadership and the latter's eventual purge from the Ukrainian leadership and replacement by Brezhnev's associate, V.V. Shcherbitskiy.

Even more important, reliance on "natural" processes for the removal of cadres from the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission has also been increasing during the Brezhnev years (see Table 7). Although death and retirement accounted for only 27 percent of the removals of party and government officials from these organizations at the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 (the first following Khrushchev's removal), 60 percent of the turnover in this category at the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976 was attributable to these causes. Consequently, not only has the rate of removal from the central leadership declined, but so too has the importance of political factors as a reason for those departures that do occur. Elites who have attained Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission status, therefore, can confidently expect to maintain their status until they reach retirement age—barring a serious political miscalculation.

The leadership has also deemphasized partisan politics in filling vacant posts in the central elite, effectively providing an institutional barrier against exploitation of gradual leadership turnover for political advantage. This is particularly evident in appointments to the USSR Council of Ministers and to obkom first secretaryships. Since many

16. See Daniels, "Office Holding and Elite Status . . ."; Peter Frank, "Constructing a Classified Ranking of CPSU Provincial Committees," *British Journal of Political Science* (London), No. 4, 1974, pp. 217-30; and Mary McAuley, "The Hunting of the Hierarchy: RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries and the Central Committee," *Soviet Studies,* October 1974, pp. 473-501.

Of the RSFSR's 76 obkoms, those in the 6 krays, 49 oblasts, and 16 autonomous republics are directly subordinate to Moscow. The obkoms in the 5 autonomous oblasts are subordinated to the party committee of the respective krays in which the autonomous oblasts are located.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 6. Reasons for Removal of Obkom First Secretaries under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, in Major Republics[a]

(in percent)

Cause of removal	RSFSR K[b]	RSFSR B[b]	Ukraine K	Ukraine B	Kazakhstan K	Kazakhstan B	Uzbekistan K	Uzbekistan B	Belorussia K	Belorussia B	Total K	Total B
Death or retirement	7.8	27.7	13.3	11.4	4.4	16.6	–	20.0	–	7.7	7.1	20.0
Demotion	54.2	36.1	20.0	45.5	63.0	30.0	45.0	33.3	38.5	30.7	48.5	36.8
Lateral move	26.8	24.1	42.2	22.7	10.9	33.3	25.0	26.7	7.7	23.1	25.6	25.4
Promotion	11.3	12.1	24.4	20.5	21.7	20.0	30.0	20.0	53.8	38.5	18.8	17.8
Number of removals	142	83	45	44	46	30	20	15	13	13	266	185

[a]The term "obkom" here includes party committees of krays, oblasts, autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts. Only obkoms that existed during both administrations were used in these calculations.

[b]K refers to appointments made under Khrushchev from the demotion of G.M. Malenkov in 1955 to October 1964; B refers to appointments made since October 1964.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: The concepts of demotion, lateral move, and promotion clearly involve subjective analytical judgments. In general, an assignment was considered a demotion if any of the following occurred: (1) the individual transferred to other work with no further specification of assignment; (2) the individual lost central elite status after being reassigned; or (3) the individual was assigned to lower-level republic duties in the party or comparatively lower-level slots in the government bureaucracy—e.g., as a deputy minister or a deputy head of a Central Committee department. An assignment was considered to be a lateral move if the individual's political status was not substantially affected. Assignment to another obkom first secretaryship, to an ambassadorship, or to ministerial rank within the USSR Council of Ministers would fit this category. An assignment was considered a promotion if the individual's status was improved. Assignments such as to the Central Committee or as a republic party secretary, as deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, or as chairman of a republic council of ministers were defined as meeting the definition of promotion.

such posts afford the incumbent ex-officio membership or candidate membership in the CPSU Central Committee, manipulation of appointments to vacancies in these positions could ultimately allow an ambitious leader to alter the composition of the Central Committee and create a strong base of factional support. However, the evidence clearly suggests that for the most part such manipulation has not occurred in the Brezhnev years.

If we look at new appointments to the USSR Council of Ministers in this period (see Table 8), we find that a clear preference has been given to those in secondary positions in the respective ministries or closely related ones.[17] Over the period from 1966 through January 1979, nearly 72 percent of those appointed had held a post within the government bureaucracy prior to their ministerial assignment, and 62 percent came from positions closely related to the post they filled. Moreover, almost 50 percent of all top ministerial assignments made since 1972 have gone to individuals in leading positions within the ministries they were selected to head, and eight of the nine new ministers appointed since the 25th CPSU Congress had served as deputies to the ministers they replaced. By contrast, leading work in the party apparatus has become less relevant as a prior experience for new ministers, accounting for only slightly more than one fifth of all replacements since 1972.

A similar pattern of increasing "in-house" replacement has been apparent for appointments to those obkom first secretaryships where the incumbent is virtually assured of election to the Central Committee at the next party congress. Thus, as can be seen in Table 9, under Brezhnev some 72 percent of obkom first secretaries appointed in the RSFSR—where almost all obkom first secretaries are granted Central Committee status—came from among the subordinates of the previous incumbents (as compared with only 41 percent under Khrushchev).[18] This rise paralleled the virtual abandonment of the Khrushchevite practice of cross-posting first secretaries from one obkom to another in the RSFSR and a sharp reduction in the selection of obkom first secretaries from within the ranks of the Central Committee apparatus.

This tendency to promote from within in the case of obkoms where the first secretary is normally accorded Central Committee status is also observable in the other four republics examined here—the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Belorussia—although far fewer obkoms in these republics enjoy this status. The likelihood of a new first secretary coming from among the subordinates of the previous incumbent is greater for such obkoms (37

17. See also Rigby, "The Soviet Government. . .," for a discussion of the pattern used to fill ministerial vacanies since 1964.

18. Rigby's comparison of incumbent obkom first secretaries in the USSR in 1965 and 1976 reaches a similar conclusion. See Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership. . .," pp. 13–14.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percent of the time) than for obkoms not so honored (27 percent of the time).[19]

In other respects, i.e., when the appointment is not of significance to the composition of national party organs, staffing patterns in these four republics in the Brezhnev period have differed markedly from those in the RSFSR. Overall, the practice of recruitment from within has not increased noticeably in any of these republics, and in Belorussia and the Ukraine it has substantially declined. Cross-posting of obkom first secretaries rose in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine, while Belorussia drew primarily on cadres at the republic level for its obkom replacements. These variations probably stem from the greater autonomy enjoyed by republic leaders since 1964, as well as from the factional struggle that rocked the Ukraine during this period.

Peaceful Coexistence with the Apparat

Clearly, there has been a change in the regime's approach to cadres selection, promotion, and demotion. High-level officeholders have been virtually guaranteed a considerable degree of continuity in office. Death and retirement have become the normal patterns for removal from such positions, and the filling of vacancies has taken place in a more regularized and predictable manner.

The security enjoyed by apparatchiks over the last 14 years presents us with a paradox, however. Unlike his predecessors, Brezhnev has achieved great political authority and even a dominant political position without making extensive use of the manipulation of cadres in the process. Moreover, having obtained this power, he has apparently not sought to consolidate his position by creating an elite loyal only to him.[20] To the contrary, Brezhnev has, in practical terms, linked his administration with cadres stability, turning a potential weakness into a source of strength.

Does this development mean that the powers of the General Secretary have been limited? Put another way, could Brezhnev change the policy if he wanted to do so, and if he could, why is it he has not? These questions, of course, go to the heart of the matter. If, indeed, barriers have been erected, then collegial rule—in spite of Brezhnev's obvious authority—has become more institutionalized in the Soviet Union. If, however, the pattern we have observed has resulted more from the present General Secretary's method of operation than the collective's intent, this practice may not be very enduring or significant.

Table 7. Reasons for Removal of Party and Government Officials from Central Party Organs, 1966–76[a]

(in percent)

	Party congress year		
Reason for removal	1966	1971	1976
Death	14.0	21.7	30.4
Retirement	12.9	18.5	29.1
Demotion	73.1	59.4	40.5
Number of cases	93	92	79

[a]From the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission. The category "government officials" used here excludes representatives of the military.

19. The importance of the promotion of local officials into key positions has been emphasized since 1967. A CPSU Central Committee decree in March of that year criticized the Estonian leadership for promoting into central republican organs party officials who lacked sufficient local experience. *Partiynaya zhizn',* No. 6, March 1967, pp. 8–12. At the same time, Leningrad obkom leader V.S. Tolstikov found fault with district-level committees in his region for not promoting their local talent. *Pravda,* Mar. 29, 1967, pp. 2–3.

Brezhnev, much as he did with the issue of cadres stability, endorsed the priority given at the 24th Party Congress (1971) to local promotions, noting that the center sends cadres to the provinces "only in exceptional circumstances." *Current Soviet Policies V,* p. 37.

Most recently, Yu. Razumov, deputy head of the Central Committee's Organizational and Party Work Department, reported that "the overwhelming majority of secretaries of oblast, kray, and republic CPSU committees. . . were local personnel." He further observed that this was understandable, "for everywhere numerous cadres of well-trained workers . . . have been trained." *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 14, September 1977, p. 55. The implication was that there was little objective need to fill key vacancies with outsiders.

20. This does not mean that Brezhnev has not maneuvered a number of protégés into posts at te highest levels. He has, in fact, had considerable success in gradually transforming the membership of the Politburo and Secretariat into groups more supportive of his position. Of the seven Politburo members forced from office in the 1970's—V. P. Mzhavanadze, P. Ye. Shelest, G. I. Voronov, A. N. Shelepin, D. S. Polyanskiy, N. V. Podgornyy, and K.T. Mazurov—none could be described as close to Brezhnev. On the other hand, of the ten appointees to full Politburo membership in the 1970's, three (K. U. Chernenko, D. A. Kunayev, and V. V. Shcherbitskiy) were protégés, and five others (Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Grechko, F. D. Kulakov, and D. F. Ustinov) appear to have had good relations with him. Of the four appointees to candidate membership in the Politburo, three (G. A. Aliyev, Chernenko, and V. V. Kuznetsov) also are strong supporters. In addition, Brezhnev in the mid-1960's maneuvered his chief competitors—Podgornyy and Shelepin—out of the Secretariat, and during the 1970's he promoted two close associates (Chernenko and K. V. Rusakov) to this body.

It has also been observed that officials from Dnepropetrovsk (Brezhnev's home area) have enjoyed preferential treatment in the competition for key vacancies. See Joel C. Moses, "The Case of Dnepropetrovsk: Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh, PA), No. 3, 1976, pp. 63–91.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Promotion from within: five ministers in the USSR Council of Ministers promoted from the rank of deputy minister or deputy chief in the mid–1970's and then elected to full or candidate membership in the Central Committee shortly thereafter at the 25th CPSU Congress in March 1976. From left to right: B. V. Bakin, Minister of Installation and Specialized Construction Work, promoted from deputy minister in May 1975, full CC member; L. M. Volodarskiy, Chief of the Central Statistical Administration, promoted from first deputy chief in August 1975, CC candidate member; I. D. Sosnov, Minister of Transport Construction, promoted from first deputy minister in March 1975, CC candidate member; N. V. Talyzin, Minister of Communications, promoted from first deputy minister in September 1975, CC candidate member; and V. N. Polyakov, Minister of the Automotive Industry, promoted from deputy minister in July 1975, CC candidate member.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

In my view, the policy followed during the Brezhnev era reflects both collegial restraints and personal preferences of the General Secretary. There was clearly strong sentiment within the Soviet political establishment at the time of Khrushchev's fall to curtail arbitrary abuses of power and observe the forms of collective leadership. Brezhnev obviously chose to swim with this tide rather than resist it. He probably recognized that if he opposed efforts by the rank and file to increase their political security, his own position would be endangered. In light of Khrushchev's fate, he may well have concluded that in the absence of terror, reliance on the traditional methods of building one's power was not a good long-term strategy. Such manipulative tactics could, at best, achieve only momentary gains, while they ran the risk of heightening the latent opposition to him.

We may also ask whether Brezhnev has really wanted such power. Jerry Hough, for example, has observed that Brezhnev's party colleagues do not in their speeches give the impression that he "is engaged in some struggle against the bonds of oligarchical control."[21] Moreover, the Soviet leader's policy objectives, unlike those of Stalin and Khrushchev, have not been so dramatic, innovative, or controversial that he needed to accumulate power to overcome the resistance. He has sought primarily to balance competing interests rather than to challenge key institutional groups, to reach consensus rather than promote discord.[22] This middle-of-the-road course has in turn inhibited the emergence of significant opposition within the elite and any corresponding need for systematic replacement of personnel.

Cadre Politics and the Succession

Even though cadres policy has not been a major weapon of political combat since Khrushchev, one cannot view this development as an indicator of a constitutional limitation on the use of leadership power. The Soviet system falls far short of achieving such formal restraints. Political strategy is still dictated more by personal choice than by rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the trend discussed above does suggest what might be called a "creeping institutionalization" of the political struggle.[23]

Whether such an approach to cadres policy be-

21. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era . . .," p. 6.

22. Hough and Bialer also make this point. See ibid., p. 5; and Bialer, "The Soviet Elite . . . ."

23. See Hodnett, "The Patterns of Leadership Politics," for a brief discussion of the difference between constitutionalization and institutionalization.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comes permanent may well rest largely on the character of the next Soviet succession. Whatever the varieties of succession that might occur (and there are many), one can discern certain underlying forces encouraging stability and others working for change. The relative strength and balance of these contending forces during a succession will significantly affect not only whether cadres policy becomes more or less institutionalized, but also the character of the succession itself. What then are these factors, and how might they influence succession developments?

The CPSU elite, of course, with its various divergent interests and perspectives, will be a major force in shaping the succession. Barring an unforeseen shakeup in Brezhnev's last years, this elite is already in place. It has been shaped and developed by policies of the current administration. Since stability has not benefited all equally, however, it is very likely that there exist groups opposed to the current approach which could be mobilized in a succession struggle.

With respect to current cadres policy and the effect it has had on careers, the party elite may be divided into three distinct constituencies. First, there are the obvious beneficiaries of the current policy: senior party and government officials who occupy top managerial positions in their respective bureaucracies. This group, although the smallest of the three, is naturally the most politically significant and powerful. Largely born between 1910 and 1920 and recruited into the party's ranks from 1938 to 1945, these men dominate the party's Central Committee. Cadres stability has significantly assisted their elevation to elite status and extended the length of their service at the pinnacle of the Soviet political system. Any decision to increase the rate of cadres turnover, not to mention reactivation of the use of personnel assignments as a tool in the political struggle, would substantially increase the probability of their removal from the elite. As a result, they clearly have a stake in perpetuating the status quo and during the succession period will probably support the leadership faction most clearly identified with this goal.

The second, and by far the largest constituency within the elite establishment, is formed by party officials who, for the most part, entered the party after Stalin's death and now hold leadership positions below the central and republic levels. The high degree of stability engendered by the current approach to cadres policy has limited their advancement opportunities and increased the competition for those slots that have opened up. While such competition may be potentially healthy, the result probably has been frustration, resentment, and perhaps even alienation within the ranks. This group, therefore, represents a natural ally for leaders who believe that the USSR is suffering from "hardening of the arteries" and needs new approaches to some of its systemic problems. Such a leader might be Leningrad party chief G.V. Romanov, who has publicly argued that "an excessively long stay in the party apparat in the same position can frequently cause loss of interest in the work" and that attention should be given to how such individuals "can best be used in the future."[24]

There is a third constituency, however, that is neither totally swayed by power and privilege nor completely frustrated by inability to advance quickly, and it will probably play a key role in determining

Table 8. Career Origin of Appointees to the USSR Council of Ministers, 1966–78[a]

(in percent)

Previous position	Year of appointment 1966–72	1973–78	1966–78
Government bureaucracy	62.5	79.3	71.7
Of which:			
Same ministry	12.5	48.3	34.0
Related ministry[b]	41.7	17.2	28.3
Other	8.3	13.8	9.4
Party apparatus	37.5	20.7	28.3
Of which:			
National post	12.5	6.9	9.4
Regional post	25.0	13.8	18.9
Number of cases	24	29	53

[a]These data cover new appointments to the Council after restoration to its pre-Khrushchev form in 1965. Given the substantial alterations in the size and structure of the Council during the Khrushchev period, any comparisons of changes in that period with those in the Brezhnev era would be misleading.

[b]In the period 1966–72, there were 8 new ministries created, which accounted for 33 percent of all new appointments to the Council. Since then, only 3 new ministries have been created, which accounts for the sharp decline in appointments from "related ministries."

24. Grigoriy Romanov, *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1972, p. 57. Romanov has actively implemented this philosophy during his tenure as party leader in Leningrad Oblast. Since 1970, he has appointed four new obkom second secretaries, eight obkom secretaries, two gorkom (city committee) first secretaries, three gorkom second secretaries, and nine gorkom secretaries.

By and large, however, these changes have not occurred at the expense of departing incumbent officials. None of the total of nine obkom officials who have changed jobs since 1970 has been clearly demoted, and only six of the fifteen city officials have suffered as a result of personnel shifts. Just three of these six, moreover, had initially received their appointments during Romanov's tenure.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether the relatively depoliticized approach to cadres policy becomes a permanent feature of Soviet politics. Individuals in this group, recruited mainly from the post-World War II generation of party members, have already reached the career takeoff stage and hold key subordinate positions to the ministers and obkom first secretaries who now form the core element of the Soviet political elite. Since this group will profit the most from existing procedures, they have a strong reason to support the current system. On the other hand, in view of the lengthy apprenticeship they must endure as well as the concern among younger functionaries generally about the lack of fresh ideas and the stagnation at the top, members of this group might be sympathetic to the need for leadership turnover.[25] A Politburo faction committed to reinvigorating Soviet policy, therefore, might be able to draw on this constituency for backing during a succession as its members obtain senior elite status.

On the whole, the political balance that is reflected in the career objectives of these three elite constituencies favors stability. Only if an overwhelming Politburo majority believed that change and rejuvenation of the elite was essential to the health of the system would the status quo bias of the senior elements in the Central Committee be overridden. This degree of unity, however, is not very likely in the context of succession politicking.

25. Although leadership age and health are obviously a sensitive subject, recent articles in the Soviet press have strongly hinted that it is time for some senior leaders to step down. For example, an unsigned article in a party journal called for the movement of young workers into leading positions because "older cadres" are no longer in sufficiently good health to perform their duties "with the necessary energy and activity." See "Some Questions of CPSU Cadres Work in Current Conditions," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), August 1978, p. 66. Even earlier, on Mar. 5, 1977, *Pravda* printed a story urging elderly and infirm leaders—probably including Brezhnev—to retire.

Smolny, headquarters of the Great October Socialist Revolution, now houses the Leningrad Oblast and City Party Committees. In the insert is G. V. Romanov, Leningrad Obkom First Secretary, and a Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CPSU.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 9. Location of Previous Position for First Secretaries Appointed by Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Obkoms in Major Republics[a]

(in percent)

Location of last previous position	RSFSR		Ukraine		Kazakhstan		Uzbekistan		Belorussia		Total	
	K[b]	B[b]	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B
Same oblast	41.0	72.2	60.9	44.2	19.5	22.2	27.3	28.6	50.0	33.3	40.5	49.2
Different oblast	36.7	13.9	26.1	41.9	46.3	63.9	36.4	47.6	28.6	25.0	35.9	34.0
(first secretary in former oblast)[c]	(70.1)	(18.2)	(17.4)	(26.2)	(9.8)	(31.4)	(13.6)	(26.3)	(7.1)	(27.3)	(16.8)	(19.4)
Republic post	5.0	5.1	13.1	14.0	31.7	11.1	36.4	23.8	21.4	41.7	14.1	12.6
National post	17.3	8.9	–	–	2.4	2.7	–	–	–	–	9.5	4.2
Number of cases	139	79	46	43	41	36	22	21	14	12	262	191

[a]The term "obkoms" here includes party committees of krays, oblasts, autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts. Only obkoms that existed during both administrations were used in these calculations.

[b]K refers to appointments made under Khrushchev from the demotion of G.M. Malenkov in 1955 to October 1964; B refers to appointments made since October 1964.

[c]As a percent of those assigned from different oblasts.

The sensitivity of cadres questions alone would make development of a consensus difficult. However persuasive the logic for developing a better method of circulating elites, no Soviet leader is likely to accept such changes in view of their likely consequences on his own political future. Moreover, those in the leadership who are not so ambitious and powerful have an obvious interest in constraining their more aggressive associates and will almost certainly resist an attempt by anyone to obtain a general mandate for change; where replacements become unavoidable, they probably will seek to narrow the choice to generally acceptable candidates from within the established elite.

Despite this built-in elite bias for stability, serious reexamination of present practices could occur given the right circumstances. One such setting might be a coup. While the potential for such an event is slight, it cannot be entirely discounted. Due to the considerable authority Brezhnev possesses, his leadership is crucial to the evolution of Soviet policy on important foreign and domestic questions. Yet his health is frail, and his ability to exercise such leadership may be questionable in the future.[26] If some of his colleagues come to believe this is a problem, the probability of a coup against him will rise. Such a coup would involve, as it did in 1964, a rather broad coalition with diverse viewpoints. A conspiracy against Brezhnev would also necessarily require extensive planning. The conspirators would have to reallocate leadership positions among themselves and determine the policy course they wished to pursue. In this context, some plotters might make the argument that excessive cadres stability has led to a reduction of initiative, creativity, and productivity within the party leadership and that an effort to rejuvenate the elite is essential. Furthermore, the removal of at least some Brezhnev supporters along with him might further weaken the forces favoring stability.

Second, and perhaps more probable than a coup, cadres policy could be affected by increasingly heated debate within the leadership over how to deal with a number of serious and difficult economic problems—namely, sagging economic growth rates, insufficient agricultural production, looming energy shortages, and growing consumer demand.[27] Although these problems and others are already evident, there is at present no indication that the current leadership is willing to tackle them head on. Potential solutions are too controversial and the prospects for success too uncertain for Brezhnev to risk much political capital at this stage.

This passivity, however, is not likely to continue after Brezhnev leaves. A decade of partial neglect has already complicated the prospects of corrective measures, and the implications of further delay should be evident to many members of the Soviet elite. Nevertheless, considerable controversy over what needs to be done is likely. For some—older and more senior—leaders, the present priorities, organizational forms, and managerial techniques have virtually become enshrined as dogma. These

26. Over the last two years, numerous Western press reports have noted a marked change in Brezhnev's appearance and speech. See *The Washington Post*, Jan. 21, 1977, p. 14, and Mar. 31, 1977, p. 31; *The New York Times*, May 5, 1978, p. 1, and Mar. 28, 1979, p. 4.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders are likely to argue that change should be directed primarily toward making the existing system more efficient through administrative tinkering, rather than toward rejuvenating it in terms of both policies and elites.

But younger and less senior leaders may feel no particular loyalty to the conventional way of doing business; instead, they would probably prefer to define the issue in terms of correcting ills and stimulating development through major policy departures. Clearly, the proponents of radical change have the more onerous task. Proposals to shift priorities and revamp organizations—with an implicit shifting of cadres—would stimulate considerable controversy and threaten the existing institutional and political distribution of power. The ensuing debate, moreover, would force party officials to make choices that could endanger their own political futures as well as violate their sense of the proper way of running things.

Finally, the prospects for a more politicized approach to personnel policy in the post-Brezhnev era would grow if a particularly ambitious and clever leader who believed change was essential became General Secretary. The office's power might be exploited to curtail the collective's control over policy in general and cadres matters in particular. As head of the Secretariat, the General Secretary is in a unique position to direct the verification of fulfillment of party directives and the assignment of party cadres to key positions throughout the Soviet bureaucracy. He presumably has some control over the agenda and timing of Secretariat meetings and, perhaps, even the flow of information to its members. In addition, as the party's administrative head, he is "first among equals" within the Politburo, and he might be able to exploit such status to effect changes that further enhance his position.

Although it would be a mistake to underestimate the power potential of this office, it is important to recognize that the new General Secretary is likely to inherit the post with diluted authority. Succession has tended to bring at least an initial degradation in the power of the General (or First) Secretary's role relative to that of his predecessor. Moreover, in the post-Stalin era each successor has been more limited than his predecessor in choosing tactics for expanding his power vis-à-vis the collective. Khrushchev, for example, gained power in part on the premise that he would not use it to terrorize his colleagues. Besides this limitation, Brezhnev has apparently not had a free hand in manipulation of cadres assignments. Quite conceivably, a new General Secretary's colleagues, guided by the lessons learned from Brezhnev's use of the position, will attempt to add new restrictions, further limiting his tactical options.

Prognosis

Against the background of conflicting pressures for continuity and change, "stability of cadres" will be one of the more difficult issues that a new leadership must face in the post-Brezhnev era. Moreover, there is a high degree of political sensitivity attached to this question since it is closely related to the ability of any leader to acquire greater political power. Debate on this issue will therefore probably intensify the political cleavages within the new leadership. As a result, policy formulation in other areas may become a more contentious process.

Nevertheless, while the future character of cadres policy remains uncertain, political forces favoring an approach emphasizing continued stability seem to have the upper hand. The hopes of anyone who aspires to the top leadership would thus appear dim unless he is able to garner the support of the entrenched establishment in the succession infighting. Consequently, it seems likely that the present approach to cadres assignment will survive Brezhnev.

At a minimum, such a development would be a significant step toward the institutionalization of power relationships within the regime, for it would strengthen the collegial aspects of leadership decision-making. It would make the surmounting of oligarchic barriers to greater personal rule difficult. Hence, policy formulation would continue to reflect leadership consensus more than individual dictate. In this environment, the leadership style pioneered by Brezhnev would become the model for ambitious leaders to follow. Although such a situation would not prevent the emergence of a strong General Secretary—indeed, Brezhnev has skillfully demonstrated the potential for acquiring personal power in this kind of an environment—future party leaders would, like Brezhnev, find the political system much less subject to their control or domination than either Stalin or Khrushchev did.

27. See US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects," ER 77-10326U, July 1977, and "Prospects for Soviet Oil Production," ER 77-10270, April 1977, both available through DOCEX, US Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books

The Soviet Economy and the Challenge of Change

By Holland Hunter

FREDERIC L. PRYOR. *Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1973.

FREDERIC J. FLERON, JR., Ed. *Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology Under Socialism.* New York, NY, and London, Praeger, 1977.

JOHN R. THOMAS and URSULA M. KRUSE-VAUCIENNE, Eds. *Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives.* Washington, DC, The George Washington University, 1977.

T. H. RIGBY and R. F. MILLER. *Political and Administrative Aspects of the Scientific and Technical Revolution in the USSR.* Occasional Paper No. 11, Canberra, Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1976.

ZHORES A. MEDVEDEV. *Soviet Science.* New York, NY, W. W. Norton, 1978.

JOSEPH S. BERLINER. *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry.* Cambridge, MA, and London, The MIT Press, 1976.

DAVID GRANICK. *Enterprise Guidance in Eastern Europe: A Comparison of Four Socialist Economies.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975.

AMONG THE PROBLEMS confronting Communist societies today, some of the most important are those provoked by pervasive economic change. Managing a large economy, whether by central planning or through the market mechanism, would be fairly easy if only the basic forces at work remained stable. If changes were limited in scope, information needs would be modest, and minor adjustments could be made by trial and error. Currently, however, many basic forces are in motion, dislocating economic structures all over the world. Competition between economic systems now focuses critically, therefore, on their ability to deal with ongoing structural change.[1]

As the largest of the socialist economies, the Soviet Union has not been immune to these major changes. Nor, as we shall see, has it yet found adequate ways of responding to them. The methods that built the present economy served Soviet purposes well for a generation, but now they are proving stubbornly resistant to the challenge of change.

One area in which fundamental and problematic changes have been occurring is in the substance of economic property and property rights. Men have traditionally thought of property in concrete, physical terms, taking the form of land, houses, factories, etc. However, in the law, in economics, and in political theory, the concept of property takes on an intangible dimension, involving a bundle of rights relating property to its owners. Over the long term, as the scale of economic organizations has grown, ownership has been separated from control. In the West, the separation has freed corporate management from detailed supervision by stockholders. In the USSR, centralized ministerial supervision has circumscribed the operational authority of enterprise management. More-

1. The present essay attempts to link a rather disparate set of studies; I am grateful to Morris Bornstein for helping me trace the connections.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over, as Frederic Pryor's admirable treatise on property and industrial organization shows, the distribution of control of industrial property in eight Western nations is also becoming more unequal even as inequality in the distribution of ownership of wealth has been decreasing. Extending his analysis from wealth to income, Pryor observes that in both East and West nations in which economic control is centralized tend to display a more nearly equal distribution of income. "In other words," he states, "there appears to be an inverse relationship between income equality and equality of control rights" (p. 334).

Stressing the complexity of forces at work and the intricacy of the implications flowing from these trends, Pryor is cautious in drawing conclusions. It seems increasingly evident, however, as will be argued below, that the present locus of control rights in the USSR is far from optimal.

A second area of long-run change relates to mastering modern technology. Specifically, it involves moving from the employment of existing methods to the generation of new methods. In the Soviet case, from the late 1920's through the middle 1950's, capital expansion centered on the former approach—the building of an enormous stock of fixed capital embodying the technology of the late 1920's. A prominent example was the automobile works at Gorkiy, where the Ford Motor company was called on to help build a very large integrated plant for producing Model AA trucks and Model A passenger cars. As John Hardt and George Holliday note in their contribution to the collection of essays about the impact of technology on Communist societies edited by Frederic Fleron, mastery of this technology required the whole of the 1930's, and Soviet authorities deliberately chose not to complicate the learning process by incorporating improvements like the V-8 engine that Ford introduced in 1932 (Fleron, p. 197). Under Stalin, managers and workers throughout heavy industry and transportation were pressed to bring new facilities up to their designed operating levels or beyond and to build duplicate plants incorporating existing technology without significant changes. Outside of defense-related industries, there was very little technological progress in the USSR from the mid-1930's to the mid-1950's.

Meanwhile, in the West, a renewed industrial revolution spread throughout industry and also brought substantial changes in agriculture, transportation, and construction. Major new processes and products—the digital computer, petrochemicals and plastics, a wide range of electronic devices, numerically controlled machine tools (to name a few)—transformed most Western economic activity. Since the mid-1950's, the USSR has been introducing these new processes and products gradually into its high-priority sectors, but not without major problems of high costs, poor quality, and delays.

In a third major global development, limitations on resources and environmental constraints are inducing a shift toward stress on the quality rather than the quantity of growth, a search for materials-conserving methods, and a desire for cost-effective production methods. These pressures have begun to be felt in the Soviet economy. Until the 1960's, expansion of Soviet output could be founded primarily on additional labor working with addi-

Reviewers in this Issue

HOLLAND HUNTER—Professor of Economics, Haverford College (Haverford, PA); editor of *The Future of the Soviet Economy: 1978–1985*, 1978.

PAUL MARANTZ—Associate Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia (Vancouver, B.C., Canada); author of articles appearing in this and other scholarly journals and of a forthcoming book, *Soviet Doctrine and East-West Relations, 1917–1978*.

FORREST C. POGUE—Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research, Smithsonian Institution (Washington, DC); author of *The Supreme Command*, 1956, and three volumes of a biography of George C. Marshall, published in 1963, 1966, and 1973; coauthor of *The Meaning of Yalta*, 1956.

GAVIN BOYD—Professor of Politics, St. Mary's University (Halifax, N.S., Canada); coeditor of *Asia and the International System*, 1972, *World Politics*, 1976, and of *Issues in Global Politics* and *Comparative Regional Systems*, both forthcoming.

JACK H. HARRIS—Senior Associate in the Booz, Allen and Hamilton consulting firm (Bethesda, MD), responsible for international political-military affairs; author of numerous studies on China, Sino-Soviet-US relations, and arms control.

OUSEPH VARKEY—Assistant Professor of Political Science, East Stroudsburg State College (East Stroudsburg, PA); author of *At the Crossroads: The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Communist Party of India*; 1974; currently researching a book on the activities of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in his native state of Kerala.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional fixed capital, i.e., from increasing inputs rather than from making all inputs more productive. Though population growth was modest, many millions were drawn into the labor force, and great efforts went into multiplying the stock of capital plant and equipment, especially in industry. That era has come to an end. Extensive growth must now give way to intensive growth, since marked additions to the labor force are no longer in sight and increased capital no longer yields high returns.

Thus, as the Soviet Union seeks to sustain its economic expansion in competition with capitalist societies, it faces a set of interrelated challenges. Growing internal constraints—stemming from both demographic factors and limitations on natural resources—argue for the development or application of the latest production techniques and of new institutional arrangements that will permit the Soviet economy to shift to an intensive, productivity-oriented pattern of growth. How is the USSR responding to these challenges? Which aspects of the Soviet system need to change? Will the needed changes fundamentally alter the character of the system? Clearly it is too early for conclusive answers to such questions. However, some useful insights into these matters emerge from the studies under review.

TURNING FIRST TO the problem of technological innovation, we find that the Soviet system poses certain inherent obstacles to it. Successful technological innovation comes only at the end of a series of stages beginning with a finding in pure science and moving through research laboratories, pilot projects, test and evaluation procedures, initial limited production, and finally full integration into ongoing large-scale production. The Soviet system has been seriously deficient, especially in the late stages of this long sequence.

Even in pure science, the way has not been smooth. As Leopold Labedz notes in his contribution to the collection edited by John Thomas and Ursula Kruse-Vaucienne, central authority in Russia ever since Peter the Great founded the Academy of Sciences in 1724 has sought periodically to foster pure science and direct its applications toward solving practical problems. Yet as Robert Miller points out in his portion of the joint study with T. H. Rigby, the Academy under the Tsars was an alien body staffed primarily by foreign scientists; its work rarely contributed to improving domestic technology. During the years 1922–28—the "golden years" as Zhores Medvedev calls them in his volume *Soviet Science*—pure science flourished in the USSR, but thereafter in most fields it was distorted or suppressed under Stalin. Since Stalin's death, the pure sciences have had ample financial support. For example, N. S. Khrushchev launched a program of "duplication" (Medvedev, pp. 62–68) under which Soviet science was to catch up with and surpass the West through the creative duplication of Western scientific feats. In nuclear physics and space technology, impressive results were indeed achieved. Nevertheless, the Communist Party has remained unwilling to let Soviet scientists participate freely in the reciprocal exchange and international communication that appear to be essential for genuinely creative work at the frontiers of knowledge.

The USSR puts enormous efforts into the intermediate stages of the innovation process, devoting some 3.5 million scientists and technicians and about 20 billion rubles (perhaps 4 percent of Soviet GNP) annually to research and development activities.[2] Yet here too there are problems. In selecting applied science projects for funding, the USSR is reluctant to rely on such mechanisms as individual proposals and peer-group review, preferring instead to assign funds to institutes with rigid annual research plans. As Thane Gustafson's comparative analysis shows (Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne, pp. 83–94), the USSR thus loses a good deal of the flexibility and alertness required to speed and spread the process of applying scientific knowledge.

Even when a promising innovation emerges from research and development, it is not readily accepted by industrial enterprises. The system's directors bring great pressure on plant managers to introduce process and product innovations, but this pressure is outweighed by other pressures that militate against change. Joseph Berliner's major treatise on *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* examines these interactions in exhaustive and fascinating detail. He shows how key aspects of the organizational structure of Soviet industry work against innovation. The system was designed to maximize the output of a limited range of high-priority products under centralized direction and by known methods. Therefore, the whole set of incentives and decision rules shaping managerial be-

2. See the late Rush V. Greenslade's estimates in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 277.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

havior also continues to work against enthusiastic acceptance of innovations, despite recent remedial efforts. This makes it risky for plant managers and their staff to give up existing methods in favor of new ones. Moreover, prices—to the minor extent that they play a role in Soviet production decisions—tend to make innovation unprofitable. Soviet authorities are still unwilling to let market forces play a significant role in allocating resources, so high initial prices—adequate to tempt innovators and recoup initial outlays—are not permitted.

Soviet technology for use in defense and space has, of course, advanced very impressively, thus constituting an exception to the general picture. Berliner shows how this can be so and why the progress in defense-related industry has had so little spillover into civilian branches. Rapid innovation and high-quality production can be obtained through priority allocation of first-rate inputs to some sectors of the economy as long as other sectors of the economy can be forced to make do with lower-grade resources and slower progress.

While it is thus clearly possible for the USSR to keep up with the West in a few high-priority areas, international competition now proceeds on many fronts. Much of the current thrust of technology in advanced Western economies runs toward low-cost, resource-saving production methods, miniaturization, and economizing techniques that are the antithesis of the approach by which the USSR has advanced in the past. It is embarrassing for a self-proclaimed leading economic system to lag behind in these and other important aspects of contemporary life. Indeed, informed and perceptive Soviet citizens, especially those with talents frustrated by the present framework of institutions, plainly appreciate the unsatisfactory nature of Soviet undertakings to date.

The notion that technology transfer can help the USSR catch up—and keep up—with the West in a broad range of nonmilitary activities appears to motivate Soviet interest in détente and trade with the West. But, as the studies under review here vividly testify, there are many difficulties involved in this solution.[3] It is not enough to import a few prototypes and copy them. The very process of imitation takes time, and then construction of facilities to manufacture the new product adds several more years before domestic production is achieved. This route guarantees something like a 10-year lag behind the Western pioneer. Furthermore, an isolated product or process cannot be effective if put down in a surrounding economy that is incapable of supplying inputs of adequate quality and reliability. The typical high-technology product today achieves maximum effectiveness only as part of a complex network of suppliers, servicing facilities, distributors, and customers. Backward and forward linkages extend in many directions.

Hardt and Holliday add the further point (Fleron, pp. 187–92) that effective technological transfer requires a systems approach covering managerial aspects of production organization along with the narrow physical aspects. Berliner observes that these less tangible dimensions of productive activity are most effectively conveyed through personal contacts, a channel for transfer that continues to be the least acceptable to Soviet authorities. He suggests that Soviet restrictions on the movement of persons are "perhaps the major reason that the Soviets are not members of the international high-technology club" (p. 515).

It is evident that keeping up with steadily advancing world technology requires ongoing adaptability and flexibility. As Japan has shown, bringing applied scientific innovations into regular production through alert and flexible adoption of new methods can yield very impressive results, even if the original advances occur elsewhere. However, the Soviet civilian economy continues to lack such flexibility and hence is ill-fitted for absorbing technological change. Several economic reform efforts since 1965 have foundered with little impact on the rate of innovation. Instead, the regime appears to be pinning its hopes on cybernetics as a system for managing socialist property "scientifically" without diminishing centralized control by the party.

This is but another example of the proclivity of Marxist-Leninists to drape the mantle of "science" over their laws and political programs. As Julian Cooper observes in his chapter in the Fleron volume, the scientific and technical revolution (NTR) that has quickened Western economic growth was officially noted at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 and built into the new party program as an attribute of Soviet socialism allegedly giving this system an inherent advantage over the capitalist West. By definition and doctrinal elucidation, it was held that socialism facilitates technological innovation, while capitalism by its very

3. See also Philip Hanson's "Western Technology in the Soviet Economy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1978, pp. 20–30.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nature represses it. Historical experience suggests that the opposite is true.

Soviet authorities have launched a concrete attempt to realize their vision of scientific controls. Blueprints for a nationwide "automated system of management" (ASU) have been widely circulated and discussed. The system would use computers at district data-collecting stations, regional compilation centers, republic processing agencies, and national evaluation headquarters to control the whole economy (see the diagram in Rigby and Miller, p. 95). Evidently, organizational arrangements for this system are now under way, and in a few more years the planners will at the very least have fresh masses of data to work with. Traditionalist Soviet defenders of central planning hope that ASU will outperform a decentralized market mechanism.

Perhaps ASU will show itself capable of coordinating supplies and demands in order to assign resources efficiently or even to approach optimal achievement of planners' preferences. Indeed, computer-aided management systems may be able to supervise a national economy under stable conditions. But as argued above, rapid technological progress abroad puts great pressure on the USSR to master new products and processes through new organizations and procedures, thus disrupting whatever balance has been achieved. In this light, ASU looks more like a ponderous nationwide system for maintaining party control than a vigorous mechanism for stimulating creative innovation.

THUS THE QUESTION of *kto-kogo* posed by V.I. Lenin in 1921 has reappeared in a new form. Which force will win out—the party or the NTR, the *dirigiste* apparatus of the CPSU or the universal pressures of late 20th century science and technology?

In the volume on *Technology and Communist Culture*, a number of analytic possibilities are considered. Fleron's afterword identifies five ways of viewing the impact of technology on society. First, one may hold that technology is neutral—that each society can use technology in pursuit of its own goals. At the other extreme, technological determinists argue that modern industrial technology carries imperatives that reshape society toward similar outcomes no matter what the initial institutional setting. Those who anticipate convergence between Soviet society and the West are usually technological determinists. As Fleron notes, Soviet theorists tend to favor a third approach, holding that the scientific and technical revolution involves both objective elements like large-scale production and subjective elements like the profit motive. According to this view, the NTR under capitalism is constrained from reaching its objective potential by inherent contradictions associated with its subjective elements; only under socialism can the NTR's full potentialities be realized. A fourth, less determinist, approach (advanced by Andrew Feenberg) suggests that the NTR is ambivalent, containing both repressive and liberating elements, with the former predominating under capitalism and the latter potentially realizable under socialism. Fleron himself offers a fifth approach, a "mediation theory" that stresses the impact of society and culture on the very evolution of technology itself. As he puts it, ". . . . technology as one of the artifacts of culture embodies the dominant values contained in that culture" (p. 472).

The alternatives can be tested by considering the way computers are likely to fit into the Soviet system. In the West, computers have revolutionized information processing, made large organizations more feasible, and created a new technical elite. They have not, however, altered the basic political and social characteristics of Western society in any fundamental way. Instead, the West has used computers to enhance existing institutions and extend prevailing trends. Erik Hoffmann, in his illuminating essay (Fleron, pp. 397–436), suggests similar prospects for the computer in the USSR:

. . . imported information technology is not likely to alter the fundamental characteristics of the Soviet political system and the central values of the national Communist Party leaders. Rather, computerized information systems are among the important new means of pursuing traditional values and goals under contemporary scientific, technological, economic, social, and international conditions. (p. 429)

Further evidence in support of the general proposition that societies put their own mark on the economic institutions that embody science and technology comes from the work of David Granick. As many readers will know, Granick's penetrating comparative studies of industrial management in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States have afforded a detached and critical perspective on the effectiveness of a wide spectrum of arrangements for managing industrial

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

property under a variety of political systems. In the volume at hand, Granick looks at four East European economies: those of Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Besides providing a great deal of descriptive material on industrial organization and management in these four countries, Granick offers important new observations on the factors that determine the effectiveness of planning and management.

The four countries treated by Granick differ in many interesting ways. Yugoslavia has far less central control of industry and far more reliance on "market socialism" than Romania, the GDR, and Hungary. At the other extreme, Romania—at least ostensibly—affords very little decision-making authority to the individual firm, retaining authority at the ministerial level. Hungary and the GDR have both experimented (not very successfully) with interesting combinations of centralized control and market socialism. In effect, then, Eastern Europe is an experimental laboratory in which the performance of organizational variants can be evaluated. While conclusive verdicts may never be possible given the number of significant forces at work, the advantages and disadvantages of specific structures and procedures surely deserve attention, and this book provides case study evidence on a number of fundamental matters.

Granick stresses, for example, the way that overriding political constraints can dominate economic performance. Socialist criticism of unemployment under capitalism has meant that in Eastern Europe workers can only be dismissed with great difficulty. Granick reviews the adverse economic consequences of this state of affairs in considerable detail, especially for Hungary (pp. 245–50) and Yugoslavia (pp. 343, 393–94, and 474–75). In Yugoslavia another constraint is powerful: ethnic diversity has meant that the national government is severely limited in exercising normal fiscal controls. The result has been serious inflation, balance of payments deficits, and major duplication of investment. In fact, the powers of the central government are so restricted that Granick likens the Yugoslav system to "an unregenerate 19th century market economy" (p. 460), at the same time quoting a Yugoslav official to the effect that this "withering away" of the state means that Yugoslavia has made a major step toward communism!

Though in formal terms the management of nationalized industrial property in Romania appears to follow orthodox Soviet lines, actual Romanian practice has been startlingly different. The Romanian system is relatively relaxed. Annual production targets are not very demanding. The broad targets established at the ministerial level seldom require adjustment, while the more detailed targets in annual enterprise plans are adjusted toward the end of the year so that final results seldom differ very much from amended targets. Bonuses for enterprise officials are not closely tied to achievement of strenuous goals, nor are managers under great pressure to achieve targets given high priority by the center at the expense of others. The Romanians appear to have accepted the orthodox Soviet planning system and, without trying to reform it the way several of their neighbors have done, are operating it in a calm and effective manner. Enterprises have little autonomy, and industrial decision-making is highly centralized at the ministry level; yet the reins are loosely held, with little of the pressure and tension endemic to the Soviet system. (It should be noted that Granick's observations relate to the early 1970's. More recently, there is some evidence that Romania has tightened controls.[4])

THE ADAPTIVE aspects of developments in the four economies studied by Granick only serve to highlight the inflexibility of the Soviet system in the face of major requirements for change. Berliner's analysis shows that chronic Soviet pressure on producers for more output paradoxically continues to stymie the acceptance of innovations that would increase output by lowering costs and/or raising quality. Medvedev shows that Soviet restrictions on scientific interchange hamper the efforts of Soviet scientists to reach and stay at the frontiers of knowledge. Yet in the world around the USSR, ongoing change is being forced on all countries, from the most advanced to the least developed. The capacity to adapt and innovate is essential to prevent falling behind. Thus, if pressure and secrecy are permanent features of the Soviet system, the USSR will continue to lag behind and adapt clumsily to changes originating elsewhere. How, then, can the Soviet system achieve the high levels of production it posits as necessary for evolution into "full communism"?

4. See dispatches in *The New York Times*, Nov. 6 and Dec. 13, 1978. The tightening seemed linked to the regime's pressure for rapid domestic industrial growth.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Probing Moscow's Outlook

By Paul Marantz

STEPHEN P. GIBERT. *Soviet Images of America*. New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Co., 1977.

ALBERT L. WEEKS. *The Troubled Détente*. New York, NY, New York University Press, 1976.

RICHARD J. BARNET. *The Giants: Russia and America*. New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1977.

PAUL HOLLANDER. *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison*. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978.

EDY KAUFMAN. *The Superpowers and Their Spheres of Influence: The United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1976.

THOMAS B. LARSON. *Soviet-American Rivalry*. New York, NY, W. W. Norton and Co., 1978.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, Ed. *The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Détente*. Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath and Co., 1976.

ROBERT F. BYRNES. *Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958–1975*. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1976.

HERBERT KUPFERBERG. *The Raised Curtain: A Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges*. New York, NY, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1977.

ASKED ABOUT the widespread American perception that the Soviet Union has taken one-sided advantage of détente to make far-reaching gains throughout Africa and Asia, Georgiy Arbatov—the Soviet Union's most influential expert on the United States—replied, "I can promise you, we don't feel like winners."[1] Since it obviously remains very much in the Soviet Union's interest to soothe American public opinion and put the best possible face on Soviet actions, Arbatov could conceivably have been dissimulating. Nonetheless, one wonders whether, in this particular instance, he may not have been accurately reflecting the inner concerns and true anxieties of the Soviet leadership.

It is undeniable that the Soviet Union has made some very significant gains in recent years—notably, the expulsion of the United States from Indochina and the installation of pro-Soviet regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen. The expanded global reach of Soviet military and political power is symbolized by that nation's successful negotiation of treaties of friendship with seven far-flung nations, from Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in Africa to Iraq, Afghanistan, India, and Vietnam in Asia.

However, the Soviet Union has also experienced some stunning setbacks. In country after country, Soviet hopes of just a few years ago have been cruelly disappointed. The long-awaited death of Mao Zedong did not result in an improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Instead, Sino-Soviet tensions have increased, and Beijing has strengthened its relations with the West (culminating in the establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States) and thereby opened the door to Western economic assistance and military equipment which could make China a vastly more formidable rival to the Soviet Union.

The USSR has fared little better with Japan. Soviet hopes of obtaining massive Japanese economic assistance in the development of Siberia, of resolving the two countries' territorial dispute so that a peace treaty could be signed, of blocking a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, and of weaning Japan from the United States have all come to naught.

1. Joseph Kraft, "Letter From Moscow," *The New Yorker* (New York, NY), Oct. 16, 1978, p. 124.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet-Japanese relations have stagnated while Moscow has been powerless to prevent the growing solidification of a long-dreaded apparition: a Sino-Japanese-American partnership.

In the Middle East, the break with Egypt deprived the Soviet Union of important naval facilities, and American successes in mediating between Egypt and Israel have reduced the Soviet Union to the position of a nervous and frustrated spectator. Elsewhere in the Third World, the Soviet Union has found itself expelled from Somalia and the Sudan, has suffered a humiliating defeat in Chile with the overthrow of Salvador Allende, and has experienced a significant loss of influence in India with the electoral collapse of Indira Gandhi.

In Eastern Europe, Romania and Yugoslavia have continued their independent policies, popular dissatisfaction with poor economic performance can easily trigger unrest (as happened in Poland in 1970 and 1976), and the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act unexpectedly gave rise to increased dissent and calls for human rights rather than to greater acceptance of Soviet domination. In Western Europe, the growth of Eurocommunism is a double-edged sword. While the increased strength of the Communist parties of Western Europe may advance some Soviet interests, such developments as the growing independence of these parties, their willingness to criticize Soviet policies, and the possible establishment of rival models of communism attractive to the peoples of Eastern Europe ("socialism with a human face" all over again) are highly disturbing to the Kremlin.

If all the Soviet foreign policy gains and losses in the 1970's could be fed into some sort of impartial, objective geostrategic computer, what would the final reckoning be: a Soviet advance, a Soviet decline, or a rough balance between gains and losses for both the Soviet Union and the West? Perhaps even more important is the question: How are these recent events and trends *perceived* and *interpreted* by the Soviet leadership?

The dominant tendency in the West is to assume either that Soviet perceptions are an undistorted mirror of "reality" or that Soviet policymakers are dangerously susceptible to wishful thinking which causes them to exaggerate both the weaknesses of the West and the degree to which the "correlation of forces" is tilting in Moscow's favor. However, there is a third possibility. Various factors (such as historical experiences, ideological influences, and bureaucratic competition over budgetary allocations) may cause Soviet policymakers to make an assessment of the world which errs not on the side of overoptimism, but in the direction of caution, defensiveness, and the overestimation of potential dangers.

Logically, one might expect Western pessimism concerning recent events to go hand in hand with Soviet optimism. But throughout the history of the cold war, there have been frequent periods when feelings of insecurity prevailed simultaneously on both sides, and each felt itself to be confronted by a more powerful opponent who was dealing from "positions of strength." In addition, there are good reasons for surmising that Soviet leaders may be no less inclined toward worst-case analysis than their Western counterparts. We should not forget that feelings of inferiority and fears of Western "subversion," "ideological contamination," and "encirclement" by anti-Soviet alliances are deeply embedded in Soviet political culture. All the talk in the Soviet press of favorable shifts in the world "correlation of forces" often sounds suspiciously like a brave attempt at whistling in the dark. If in the United States there has been much concern about Cuba, a small nation situated 90 miles from the American coast, imagine the field day that Soviet alarmists can have over China, a nation 100 times as populous as Cuba, sharing with the USSR a common border of more than 4,000 miles, claiming thousands of square miles of Soviet territory, possessing a growing nuclear arsenal, manifesting implacable hostility to the Soviet Union, and seeking massive amounts of economic aid and military equipment from the Soviet Union's major rivals.

Confronted with a disappointing record in its policies via-à-vis each of the major centers of world power—the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and China—does the Soviet leadership derive much satisfaction from its victories in such hubs of global influence as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola? In its view, does the road to Paris and Berlin really run through Kabul, Addis Ababa, and Luanda? In short, are Moscow's perspectives on current world trends any more sanguine than those of Washington?

There are, to be sure, many barriers that impede our efforts to ascertain how Soviet policymakers perceive the world and the Soviet-American rivalry in particular. Indeed, the volumes reviewed here provide only bits and pieces of the puzzle. However, by discussing where we can look for evidence of Soviet

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perceptions, the pitfalls involved in interpreting the evidence, the systemic factors that underlie and shape perceptions, and the objective circumstance of great-power rivalry, these books do advance our understanding.

THE INTRODUCTORY chapter of Stephen Gibert's *Soviet Images of America* perceptively explores the methodological problems that make it so difficult for a Western observer to reliably and confidently deduce the actual perceptions of Soviet policymakers from their carefully orchestrated public pronouncements. Gibert argues that these pronouncements must be treated in much the same way as the oratory of politicians in other societies, i.e., as statements made, first and foremost, in order to promote specific political objectives. Rather than assuming a one-to-one correspondence between the private views of the leadership and a particular public utterance, we must ask: For what audience is the utterance meant? Is the same thing being said to other audiences? What purposes is it meant to serve (e.g., socialization, mobilization, legitimization, or communication)? Are there differences within the ruling elite on the given question? Have elite perspectives changed over time? In short, Soviet rhetoric should be deciphered through the same kind of hard-nosed political analysis that is customarily applied in interpreting such rhetoric in other political systems. Since "there is no infallible way of discriminating with complete confidence between true perceptions and other pronouncements," Gibert suggests that the best way to get a reliable sense of the thinking of the Soviet leadership on a particular subject is to consider fully the entire range of authoritative Soviet statements pertaining to it (p. 11).

Had Gibert heeded his own caveats and followed his own guidelines in the subsequent chapters, his study would have made a major contribution to our understanding of Soviet perceptions of world politics. Unfortunately, he covers so much so quickly (e.g., Soviet views of Sino-American relations in three pages, perspectives on "the general crisis of capitalism" in four pages, Soviet discussion of the economic factors influencing détente in one page) that the reader is given little sense of the depth and range of Soviet commentaries on a particular issue.[2]

Even more serious is the author's willingness, on the basis of this limited sampling of public commentary, to draw far-reaching and alarming conclusions. To cite just one example, there is the matter of Soviet assertions that the United States has come to accept peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union because it was "forced" to do so by Soviet power. In his opening chapter, Gibert lists such statements among those which are "apparently intended to serve propagandistic or other purposes and which appear *not* to represent true perceptions" (p. 9, emphasis added). Yet he repeatedly cites such statements and in the final chapter arrives at the ominous judgment that "especially damaging to viable Soviet-American peaceful coexistence is the *firm Soviet conviction* that it was a change in the *correlation of forces* that *compelled* the United States to adopt the policy of détente" (p. 142, emphasis added).

Gibert's discussion of this subject gives no hint of the Soviet leadership's awareness of the many complex changes in the policies of several of the world's leading powers (the Soviet Union included) that influenced the shift toward détente at the beginning of the 1970's. Similarly, he fails to explore the explanatory hypothesis that Soviet assertions that the USSR "forced" the United States to accept détente should not be taken at face value, but should be viewed as serving an obvious Soviet need to rebut charges (from the Chinese and others) that it was the USSR—and not the United States—which had altered its policies and that Moscow was muting the international class struggle in order to obtain political and economic concessions. In sum, while usefully assembling many of the authoritative statements that constitute the official Soviet image of the United States and reminding us of the strident anti-Americanism which still remains so depressingly evident in the Soviet press, Gibert's study is of only limited value in helping us gauge the nature of elite views and the extent to which they may or may not have become more realistic and sophisticated in recent years.

If Gibert ignores his own advice to view Soviet public statements in their full political context, Albert Weeks seems to ignore the issue completely and to assume that we can reliably and effortlessly deduce the thinking of the Soviet elite from its public pronouncements. For example, in *The Troubled Détente,* Weeks informs us

2. By way of contrast, see the richness and diversity of the materials quoted in Morton Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978; and Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behavior Toward the United States," unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1972.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the tract *Marksizm-Leninizm o voyne i armii* (Marxism-Leninism on War and Army)—a manual published by the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces (an institution specifically responsible for maintaining ideological rectitude and troop morale)—is "one of the more valuable sources of information on the Kremlin's present thinking about the use of arms to reach its aims in the thermonuclear age" (p. 22). Furthermore, Weeks considers Soviet publication of such tracts a major threat to the chances of turning détente into "a serious constructive partnership between the largest nations of the world" (p. 163). Without pushing the analogy too far, this is a bit like a Soviet analyst arguing that the thinking of US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and other American policymakers can be deduced from US Army training manuals, and that as long as these manuals seek to rally the forces by speaking of a "Communist threat to the free world," détente will be impossible. In sum, *The Troubled Détente,* with its hasty generalizations, poor organization, and total absence of footnotes, falls disappointingly short of the high standards of perceptive analysis set by Weeks in his previous work, *The Other Side of Coexistence*.[3]

IF THE STUDIES by Gibert and Weeks illustrate the danger of ignoring similarities in the political processes of the Soviet Union and the United States, Richard Barnet's *The Giants* goes to the opposite extreme. It is Barnet's explicit thesis (though one which is categorically and repetitively asserted rather than carefully argued) that the Soviet Union and the United States are virtually identical. He sees power in each society as concentrated in "half a dozen or so individuals," "a roomful of men," "the managers of the two expanding empires," who are at liberty to do what they will (pp. 9, 10, 15). With constant recourse to a mirror-image view, Barnet contends: "The problem of communication is complicated by the wish of each elite to reveal itself and to remain mysterious at the same time" (p. 74); ". . . it was the image, not the reality that sustained fear on both sides" (p. 13); "The madness of one [military] bureaucracy sustains the other" (p. 173); and "Scholars at Moscow's Institute of the USA and Canada are in much the same position as scholars studying the Soviet Union at Harvard or Columbia Universities" (pp. 92–93).

In Barnet's view, to say that the Soviet Union is now a status quo power is "by and large . . . an accurate characterization of the role to which the men in the Kremlin aspired and which, given a chance, they were prepared to play" (p. 28). He ringingly declares that Stalin was a Russian nationalist and that the Soviet Union has constantly been concerned with holding on to the territorial gains it has already made. He seems to have forgotten that fervent nationalism is hardly incompatible with territorial aggrandizement and that a nation's determination to maintain its recent acquisitions scarcely rules out a desire for further expansion. Whether it be Angola (which Barnet attributes to exceptional circumstances) or the 1962 Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba (a gamble that "was meant as a prelude to a grand negotiation on Berlin and on limiting arms"), there is, in his view, little for the West to fear (p. 112).

Barnet does not deny all differences between the Soviet and American systems—only those that might cast the United States in a favorable light. Thus we read: "For much of the last generation the United States had clearer and larger ambitions than did the Soviet Union, a *Pax Americana* backed by a preponderance of military might and economic power" (p. 170). Similarly, he claims that "if the Soviet elite has been quite content to wait a long time for a political conversion in the United States, the American elite has been less patient about changes in Russia" (p. 76), and he asserts that in recent years, "the Soviet elite has probably changed more ideas about how the contemporary world works than has the US national security establishment" (pp. 73–74).

Barnet is a master of the succinct phrase and the concise characterization, but this is his undoing. Despite occasional evidence that he really knows better, he cannot resist describing the world in stark "either/or" terms. To be sure, Barnet does effectively criticize some of the imbalance prevalent in Western comparisons of Soviet and Western policies, but his penchant for undifferentiated comparison and sweeping generalization robs *The Giants* of the impact it might otherwise have had on the present debate over détente.

HAPPILY, the three other works of comparative analysis reviewed here (by Paul Hollander, Edy Kaufman, and Thomas Larson) are vastly more successful. Although the reader will inevitably disagree with one part or another of these ambitious and path-breaking works, he will recognize

3. New York, NY, Pitman, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them as serious, sustained efforts to come to terms with both similarities and differences in the politics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Hollander's far-ranging work, first published in 1973, is a vigorously argued examination of the societies of these two nations. This new edition is a paperback version of the first edition with the addition of an admirable introductory chapter in which the author, in an all too rare example of scholarly humility, shares with the reader his candid thoughts on which of his earlier interpretations have or have not been called into question by subsequent events. While it does not deal with the specifics of Moscow's foreign policy, the work nevertheless offers some insight into the context in which Soviet foreign policy perceptions arise. In particular, Hollander stresses that "both the official image of and the policies toward the United States are colored by hostility, apprehension, suspicion, and caution" combined with the view that American society and policies are based on an "unjust" and "doomed" socio-economic system (p. 24).

Kaufman's monograph is carefully and systematically focused on a single problem, the rigorous testing of a series of explicit hypotheses dealing with the conduct of the two superpowers in their respective spheres of influence (the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Latin America). Kaufman finds that the behavior of the two superpowers does differ and in ways that reflect differences in their internal political structure and ideology (p. 195).

Thomas Larson's thought-provoking volume also looks at the differences between Soviet and American societies and seeks to gauge the consequences of the rivalry between these markedly different systems over the last 30 years not only in international politics, but in armaments, economics, and ideology. Although some of Larson's arguments are more questionable than others (e.g., his discussion of the Soviet-American ideological struggle seems to me to be marred by a double-jointed attempt to bend over backwards to be fair to the Soviet point of view), on the whole *Soviet-American Rivalry* is an impressive and imaginative attempt to grapple with the complexities of Soviet-American interactions. Larson predicts further incremental advances in the Soviet Union's long-term struggle to catch up with its American rival. At the same time, the author notes that such gains may be partially offset (in Moscow's thinking) by the increased threat emanating from China.

If William Griffith, in his introduction to the collection *The Soviet Empire,* attributes a dangerously optimistic outlook to the Soviet leadership, this may reflect the book's publication in 1976, i.e., before a number of the USSR foreign policy setbacks noted above. For the most part, the other contributions to this volume, all originally prepared for the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, avoid such broad evaluations and instead present solid, focused studies of Soviet foreign policy (region by region) or of aspects of Soviet internal politics (the economy, dissent, and the evolution of the Soviet elite itself) which are increasingly affecting it. This nuts-and-bolts approach clearly contributes to the collection's success. The authors are leading experts in their respective fields, and they have been given ample space to explore their subjects (some of the articles exceed 50 pages).

THE LAST TWO BOOKS under review (those by Robert Byrnes and Herbert Kupferberg), despite their focus on the seemingly narrow topic of US-Soviet cultural exchanges, provide particularly compelling insight into differences between the two societies and into the particular mind-set with which Soviet policymakers approach international relations. These accounts provide a convincing refutation of Barnet's simplistic equating in mirror-image terms of the "suspicion on both sides that human contact can corrupt and confuse political judgment" (p. 11). Indeed, one finds few parallels between the Soviet system, with its rigid centralization and its rejection of inquiry into sensitive issues by American social scientists participating in academic exchanges, and the American system, with its receptivity to Soviet research into even its most painful social problems and with its pluralistic delegation of broad responsibility for Soviet-American academic exchanges to a nongovernmental body, the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants. Upon reading these illuminating studies, one is left with the thought: If Soviet officialdom manifests in its internal policies a fear of foreign influences, a lack of confidence in the attractive force of Soviet achievements, a dread of a genuine competition of ideas, and such a high degree of general insecurity, how probable is it that the Soviet perception of the outside world is characterized by overconfidence, the minimization of setbacks, the downplaying of potentially hostile alliances,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the underestimation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and the overestimation of Soviet gains?

None of the books looked at here gives a definitive picture of current Soviet perceptions regarding the world in general or the USSR-US rivalry in particular. Nevertheless, on balance they tend to reinforce the reviewer's own impression—shaped by his reading of recent developments—that Moscow may not consider its recent foreign policies to be as successful as Western observers tend to believe. If this is the case, it could have important ramifications for how the Soviet Union views the costs and benefits of détente and improved relations with the West.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany and the Origins of the Cold War

By Forrest C. Pogue

DANIEL YERGIN. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State.* New York, NY, Houghton Mifflin, 1977.

THOMAS G. PATERSON. *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974.

RALPH B. LEVERING. *American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939–1945.* Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1976.

GEORGE C. HERRING. *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1973.

JOHN H. BACKER. *Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies, 1945–1948.* Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1971.

JOHN H. BACKER. *The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition.* Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1978.

STUDIES OF CONFLICT—whether hot or cold—delve into questions of historical origins, and few such studies have occasioned more dogmatic answers and more consequent revisionism than that of the origins of the cold war. The first accounts which appeared tended to be of the "white book" variety of official accusations and explanations. More recently, however, a battle of books and articles—much like the debates over the responsibility for Adolf Hitler's rise and the causes of World War II—has raged on the subject.

For a long time, Poland was viewed as the main focus of East-West hostility in the immediate postwar period, with the composition of the country's government and the holding of open elections the main points of contention. Later, other roots of conflict and other guilty parties in other countries were found. And in recent years, several writers, including some whose works are under review here, have suggested that Germany may, after all, have been an important source of disagreement.

It would have been difficult to imagine in 1945 or early 1946 that either the Soviet Union or the United States would see Germany as a center of conflict. Since the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, both the Soviet Union and the Western allies had agreed that Germany had to be punished and her recovery restricted in a way to prevent her return to European dominance. Yet within two years after the war's end, both the Eastern and Western occupying powers were on the way toward lifting punitive clauses imposed on the Germans, opposing further division of Germany, and looking toward defensive partnerships with their respective occupied zones, in opposition to their former allies. In time, instead of being denied military resources, East and West Germans were urged to assume armed roles in security or containment policies, and instead of having further fines or payments of reparations imposed upon them, they were beneficiaries of economic support from their former enemies.

Historians intrigued with the relative influence of "will" and "fate" in determining national policies may ask if Germany was chosen by one side or the other as the location for an East-West showdown, or conversely, if the friction that arose between the occupying forces led inevitably to a worsening of East-West relations. In the last days of the Third Reich, some German military and political leaders, unwilling to follow Hitler in a suicidal last-ditch fight on two fronts against advancing allied armies, suggested that the Germans surrender in the West, with the hope that the Western powers might use them against the Russians. The British and Americans rejected such proposals, but Stalin knew enough of their existence

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that he saw in the secret negotiations in Italy for a German surrender to the Western allies just such an anti-Soviet move. Winston Churchill's insistence on beating the Russians to Berlin and Prague was viewed as the opening of a new battle for Central Europe. But Yosif Stalin seriously misread American purpose and design, and it seems likely that the British Prime Minister aimed at nothing more than gaining the best possible bargaining position for a postwar settlement.

Nevertheless, within a few weeks of the comradely meeting of Soviet and Western armies at Torgau, where a spirit of friendship prevailed, mutual suspicions bubbled to the surface. The Soviet forces from the outset were overly possessive about Berlin and Prague and were disinclined to be flexible in joint occupation operations. But this was not the result of any careful design.

Nor were the ensuing events that led to an escalation of mutual suspicions. The commanders sent to occupy and disarm the enemy, to reconstitute the machinery of government, and to purge former Nazis from positions of responsibility went about these duties in good faith. Indeed, the early phases of the occupation saw no disposition for either the Western allies or the USSR to spare the conquered the consequences of defeat. However, once the Nazi elements of society were dealt with, there was a tendency on the part of both to show sympathy toward the people of their respective zones of occupation. Military commanders charged with getting occupied zones ready for self-government as soon as possible quickly became more interested in rehabilitation and reconstruction than in revenge.

It was at this stage that the division of Germany into four occupied zones and the measures designed to punish the former enemy became elements of disagreement instead of peace. If reparations were required from the American or British zones to fill the reparations quotas allocated to the USSR, for example, the resulting delay in economic reconstruction of these zones heightened the likelihood of confrontation between Eastern and Western occupiers. The former allies had planned for the punishment and containment of Germany; the course of events, however, led to something much different.

TO BE SURE, as most of the books under review here indicate, Germany was not the sole—nor perhaps even the chief—cause of the cold war. Many factors contributed to the rapid decline in East-West relations which followed joint victory. These ranged from controversy over the Polish elections to the abrupt American cancellation of Lend-Lease; to US failure to extend credits to the USSR; to Soviet policy in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe; to US reactions to Soviet moves in Iran, Turkey, and Greece.

All of these issues and more are considered in the wide-ranging studies of Professors Daniel Yergin and Thomas G. Paterson. Shying away from the neo-Marxist interpretations of some of the early revisionists, the two authors list the faults of the Russians during the period under examination (brutality, terrorism, suppression of democratic rights, repression, deep suspicion) and contrast the US policy of opening its postwar records to scholars with the Soviet policy of permitting no access to official archives. Paterson was one of the first scholars to tap newly opened material on the period in the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. Based on this and extensive other research, he finds, in his detailed treatment, many diverse elements that made for conflict.

Equally diligent in his research, Yergin offers a more lively account of the way in which divisions developed between East and West in Central Europe. Unfortunately, Yergin allows his analysis to become tied to a journalistic gimmick in which he finds American postwar leaders split between the "Riga" and the "Yalta" axioms, i.e., between the school of inevitable confrontation and that of possible détente.

Had Professor Yergin been content to base his study on the investigation of contrasting stands in favor of hardline policies and of negotiation, there might be fewer problems with his interpretations. Instead, by focusing at the outset on the views of men who served at the Western observation post in the American Mission at Riga, Latvia, in the years between the Bolshevik Revolution and the recognition of the Soviet Union by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934, he attributes to a number of able Foreign Service officers a degree of influence on US policy far beyond that which they actually exercised. "If [Loy] Henderson was the dominant member of the group, George Kennan was its chief ideologue," Yergin declares (p. 27), as if Henderson and Kennan were somehow equivalent to Stalin and V.N. Molotov, and as if they and their associates somehow constituted a policy-determining American "politburo." In the absence of Russian primary sources, one can-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not be certain how diverse the influences on Soviet policymaking were, but certainly American attitudes and policy cannot be reduced to such simple formulae.

One corrective for Yergin's *Shattered Peace* is Professor Ralph B. Levering's careful examination of US public opinion regarding the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945. *American Opinion and the Russian Alliance* appeared too late for Yergin to use, but Levering demonstrates that, completely apart from any Foreign Service reports emanating from Riga, there existed an American opinion that hated and feared communism. Levering cites the views of the Hearst press, the *Chicago Tribune,* and, in fact, much of the press of the country; powerful Catholic and Protestant leaders fearful of "red atheism"; labor leaders who detested Soviet labor policies; ethnic groups whose relatives suffered under Soviet repression; veterans' organizations; the Daughters of the American Revolution; and conservative business groups who saw potential danger in Soviet support of radical organizations in the United States. Furthermore, there were liberals who preferred Leon Trotskiy to Stalin; who disapproved of the ferocious purge trials of the 1930's; who reacted angrily to Soviet policy in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39; and who condemned the Soviet Union for its 1939 nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany, its invasion of Poland, and its attack on Finland. In the face of all of this opposition, Levering concludes, only the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 made the Russian cause acceptable in many sections of American society.

The "honeymoon" in Soviet-Western relations occasioned by Nazi aggression was short-lived, however. As the German tide began to ebb and Soviet forces drove westward, there were repeated charges of bad faith by Stalin against his allies and angry rejoinders from Britain and the United States. The belief that the Soviets were reverting to form brought a resurgence of anti-Soviet feeling from former opponents of communism. President Truman himself needed no nudges from his close adviser, Admiral William D. Leahy, nor from Henderson or Kennan, to reawaken his own earlier mistrust of the Russians. Thus, while it is a tempting scenario for a historian to picture Truman as an innocent falling into the clutches of the old Riga hands, the President's hard-line speeches owed less to the Foreign Service than Yergin would lead us to believe and more, in the opinion of this reviewer, to the desire of Truman's defense and political adviser Clark Clifford to improve Truman's image as a decisive leader in preparation for the next presidential election campaign.

According to George C. Herring's perceptive and well-researched study of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, practical political factors rather than ideological ones were similarly responsible for the prompt cancellation of this aid at the end of the war. Conservative, cost-conscious congressmen, who had looked on anxiously as Roosevelt pushed for ever greater expenditures, feared higher taxes and debts and the possibility that Uncle Sam was once more playing "Uncle Sucker." Critics after the fact blamed Truman's precipitate action for increased Soviet recalcitrance and increased demands for German reparations; and Truman, in response, credited bad advice for his abrupt decision. But clearly the President had sensed the public will.

THE PRECEDENCE of immediate practical problems over the issue of ideological struggle against Soviet communism was clear in the early days of the occupation of Germany also. As John Backer, who was on the occupation staff of General Lucius Clay, commander of the US zone, makes clear in his two excellent studies under consideration here, the American focus remained on Germany during the immediate postwar period. East-West disagreements over German reparations, the dismantling of war plants, the economic and political unity of Germany, and the establishment of a sound fiscal base for the German Mark reflected differing opinions on the major issues of the day, i.e., how far the victors should go in reducing German war-making capabilities and the degree to which punitive measures should be imposed on the German people. But they did not signal irreconcilable ideological conflict. Indeed, General Clay could speak of the Soviets early in the occupation as more cooperative partners than the French, and the Russians actually attempted to outdo the Americans in statements designed to reassure the defeated enemy.

Long-term American planning for postwar Germany began late. President Roosevelt had said that he did not intend to keep US forces in Germany more than two years, and then in numbers not to exceed one million. But Roosevelt's preference for the postponement of a decision ultimately resulted in the absence of definitive instructions from Washington. Under these circumstances,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Allied Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower's staff decided in the late spring of 1944 to outline instructions for occupation activities which would have to be instituted as soon as Western allied forces entered Germany. The *Handbook* designed for guidance in case of sudden German collapse or surrender at once drew criticism from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who complained to the White House of a policy of softness toward the Nazis. Morgenthau drew up his own suggestions, in which punitive and preventive measures dominated, for creation of a pastoral Germany incapable of making war, and he believed for a time that he had sold this concept to Roosevelt and Churchill at the second Quebec conference in September 1944. However, under a barrage of protests from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, joined by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Roosevelt disowned what he apparently had initially encouraged.

Even so, the punitive philosophy of the Morgenthau plan influenced the provisions of JCS 1067, finally issued by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in the spring of 1945 to guide early occupation leaders. It was too late to throw out the Eisenhower staff *Handbook,* but its distribution was accompanied by stern warnings against pampering the former enemy or permitting a standard of living for Germany higher than that of its neighbors. While the provision of some food to areas which suffered from shortages or from lack of adequate transportation was authorized, the directive to the military government to "insure production and maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would endanger the occupying forces" clearly was initially intended to limit aid. It became an escape clause only later, when leaders in the military government decided to improve western Germany's situation.

The most radical of preventive measures considered, the splitting of Germany into several separate states, was discussed at both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, though with a definite decline in interest evident between the first meeting and the second. Men such as Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had long argued that an economically healthy Germany was essential to European recovery. The Secretary of War in the spring of 1945 urged Eisenhower to spare the industrial facilities of the Ruhr as much damage as possible, but this was not sufficient to convince the German people to forget the draconian proposals which had been made by Morgenthau.

Abandoning earlier allied threats, the Soviets gained some propaganda advantage in their zone by saying they had no desire to destroy the German people or to create more than one state on German territory. They sought a power advantage also, by acting to draw the interests of the eastern zone into line with those of the USSR. By leaving intact some of the zone's industrial potential, the Russians provided themselves with an outpost against the West; and by choosing trusted German Communists, often trained in Moscow, to organize the new German government in eastern Germany, they could be certain not only that denazification would be carefully carried out, but also that a government closely tied to Moscow would result.

THE USSR could gain no advantage with the Germans by means of its reparations policy, though. Mindful of the costs of reparations after World War I and the international tensions which the reparations payments had engendered, the US had agreed with Great Britain not to press reparations claims after World War II. France, which had belatedly been put in charge of part of the Western sector of Germany, was not so sure, and the Soviet Union insisted on faithful execution of a "firm pledge" allegedly made at Yalta to impose reparations. At Yalta, the Soviet Union demanded US$10 billion in reparations from Germany. Britain declined to agree to any specific sum. Roosevelt, in a more lenient mood, agreed to have the sum demanded by the Soviets used as a basis of discussion at a later meeting of the Allied Commission on Reparations. At the meeting of that group in Moscow in March, the US delegate insisted that there had been no firm agreement at Yalta, while the Soviet delegate argued that there had been a final commitment. A certain fuzziness which arose from the President's efforts to be agreeable thus contributed to later controversy.

A final agreement at Potsdam, expressed in percentages rather than dollars, permitted the Soviet Union to take reparations via the dismantling of war plants and other industrial equipment in its own sector and to receive from the Western zones 15 percent "of such usable and complete industrial equipment . . . as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western zones of Germany" in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, and other scarce products. An addi-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional 10 percent of such equipment was to be transferred to the Soviet Union without payment or exchange of any kind.

General Clay and his British counterpart, Sir Brian Robertson, initially sought to aid the Soviets in collecting reparations in their zones. But once they concluded that a truly unified economic system in Germany was required for recovery, they realized that if extensive reparations payments were taken out of current production in their zones, as the Soviets wanted, or if industrial equipment was removed in great quantities, the Western occupation forces would have to import food to their sectors to stave off starvation.

To Robertson, such a policy meant making heavy drains on a British economy already near the end of its resources. To Clay, it meant delaying his high-priority program to increase German production of items that could be traded for food and other supplies. Feeling that the directives he had received required him to terminate the occupation as soon as possible and promote a speedy return of American troops to the US (already demobilization was proceeding at a dizzying rate, a fact that does not lend credence to charges of an aggressive American stance in Germany), Clay questioned the wisdom of the further dismantling or removal of industrial plants, and he finally stopped both in his zone pending clarification of the situation.

Clay's earlier commitment to carry out a strong policy against the enemy had been partly fulfilled by the dismantling of numerous war plants, the singling out of others for demolition, and the listing of still others for removal to the Soviet Union. Now, in the Allied Control Council, he sought Four-Power agreement to establish a unified basis for German recovery. When the French (in his anger, Clay called them less cooperative than the Russians) and the Soviets balked, the American occupation commander began to discuss with Robertson the creation of a bizonal economic unit. Ultimately concluding that the Soviets were intent on prolonging economic chaos, the two proclaimed Bizonia in December 1946.

According to Yergin and Paterson, Clay's action led the Russians to press harder to gain a firm hold on eastern Germany and Eastern Europe and to view with suspicion other Western overtures for cooperation. The two authors see Russian insistence on full reparations—no matter what the cost to other occupation zones—as the result of the American refusal to extend credits to the Soviet Union after the end of the war. In fact, as Professor Herring points out, in view of increased congressional opposition to further loans to West European countries, it would have been hopeless for the President to propose loans to the USSR.

Although Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Clay in various conferences in 1946 sought repeatedly to get Four-Power understanding on an arrangement for German economic unity, Soviet delay favored division. A further complication arose when Ernest Bevin and Molotov bickered at meetings of allied foreign ministers in the course of the same year. As a result, Byrnes found it difficult to continue his search for an understanding among the allies.

Despairing of Russian agreement, Clay pressed for the restoration of his own zone of occupation to economic order and for an expansion of production sufficient to serve as the basis of a viable national economy. He also suggested that the Secretary of State, in this new situation, give assurances to the German people for their future. Byrnes, who had often used his gifts as a compromiser to seek agreement, now sounded a different note. On September 6, 1946, in the Opera House at Stuttgart, he issued a full-dress pronouncement, designed to reach both Washington and Moscow. He repeated that the US intended to remove the vestiges of Nazism in Germany, but added that it likewise intended to restore Germany's economic ability to play an integral role in the European economy. At a time when the movement of American troops homeward promised to drastically reduce the size of the US Army in Europe, he declared that US forces would remain in Germany as long as those of any other country.

Of course, speeches were nothing new where Germany was concerned. Earlier Stalin had reminded his own people and those of the rest of the world that the Soviet Union had been saved by its own exertions and had in being the forces necessary to safeguard the victory which had been won.

Unsettled German problems, among many others, remained the order of the day when in March 1947 a new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, journeyed to Moscow as had Byrnes before him to seek a settlement of outstanding questions. Yergin describes Marshall as exhausted by his year-long mission to China (which had ended in December 1946) and at the end of his patience. But the minutes show him as active in these discussions as

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he had been in China. Unfortunately, he saw a familiar pattern develop. The negotiations led not to agreement or understanding but to unending delay.

To a considerable degree reparations remained the most immediate problem. There were disagreeable sessions about what had been settled at Yalta and Potsdam and what the Americans and British had failed to deliver. The Western allies countered by pointing to the Soviet refusal to agree on a unified economic policy for Germany as the root of many misunderstandings. The conference ended without settling these matters. Marshall later declared that his conversations in Moscow had opened his eyes to Stalin's lack of interest in coming to terms with the defeated countries in order to put an end to the chaos that threatened Western Europe and Germany with economic disaster. The Secretary of State returned home to explore ways in which the US could help those countries in Europe willing to join together to try to curb the economic confusion which had followed the war.

In a detailed analysis of the reparations problem, John Backer concludes in the second of his books under consideration here that the conference need not have ended in failure. He postulates that a totally different state of affairs might have ensued if the Western allies had conceded that several of their estimates showed the Germans could have borne a larger reparations bill, that in view of her war losses the USSR had not made exorbitant demands, and that payments from current production could have been managed. But he balances his judgment by admitting that numerous factors in East-West relations might have made any agreement unworkable. The key to settlement lay in acceptance of Soviet demands, and by this time there was no atmosphere in which this flower of agreement could flourish.

AFTER THE MOSCOW conference ended in stalemate and the United States embarked on a unilateral plan to aid cooperative countries in Europe, the Russians pulled the countries in their sphere of influence into tighter economic union with the USSR and forced Czechoslovakia and Poland to disavow their acceptances of Anglo-French invitations to take part in discussions of economic reconstruction proposals. Once the Marshall Plan was implemented, Germany—and with it all of Europe—was divided into East and West.

Thus, even two years after the end of the war in Europe, acute German problems still remained, with the Soviet Union less ready than ever to negotiate. General Clay firmly believed that Germany's economic recovery required a reformed monetary system. The growing rate of inflation, reminiscent of the spiral that wrecked the German economy after World War I, almost paralyzed production and trade. Workers realized that, with the constant decline in the value of money, they could do better trading on the black market than working on a farm or in a factory for a salary whose buying power could never be recaptured even by the swiftest messenger from pay window to food store. Only when a sound currency had been provided would it be possible to turn the people of Germany to useful production.

The Americans would have liked Four-Power agreement on any new currency, but negotiations with the USSR broke down when Clay insisted that the money be printed in the US zone. The Russians wanted at least part of the currency to be produced in their sector, an arrangement that would have put them in custody of one set of plates. This was unacceptable to the Americans because of the embarrassing situation created at the close of the World War II when the Russians had used American plates to print occupation money in Germany for Soviet troops but had declined to convert the notes into rubles, leaving unredeemed several million units of the currency with which the US had to deal. The confrontation which arose over the new currency issue in 1948, accompanied by the Berlin blockade and Western airlift, ended for a long season the possibility of return to a spirit of East-West détente.

What does the record show, then, regarding the roles of "will" and "fate" in the origins of the cold war? Yergin's Riga axioms suggest the careful building of a frightening stalemate by ideologues who ruled out the existence of any basis for negotiation. But one can find in the study of developments in Germany that men like Clay and Byrnes, by no means wed to confrontation from the outset, at last found it impossible to carry out directives for the rebuilding of a national German economy and the establishment of a unified democratic German state. The growing friction between the superpowers, whose presence filled the power vacuum of Central Europe almost without design, proved as deadly to détente as any carefully woven philosophy which might have been spun in Riga or in Washington.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prospects for the Sino-American Relationship

By Gavin Boyd

WILLIAM J. BARNDS, Ed. *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship.* New York, NY, New York University Press, 1977.

A. DOAK BARNETT. *China Policy—Old Problems and New Challenges.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1977.

MICHEL OKSENBERG and ROBERT B. OXNAM, Eds. *Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations: Past and Future.* New York, NY, Basic Books, 1978.

ROBERT G. SUTTER. *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation.* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK. *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Sino-American Relations.* New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.

KENNETH W. REA, Ed. *Early Sino-American Relations, 1841-1912: The Collected Articles of Earl Swisher.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

STANLEY D. BACHRACK. *The Committee of One Million—"China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1976.

J.H. KALICKI. *The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950's.* London and New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

RELATIONS BETWEEN the United States and China took a major turn at the end of 1978 with announcement of a concrete schedule for normalization of relations and exchange of ambassadors between the two countries. The realization of this schedule has tended to generate euphoric assessments of the future of the bilateral relationship. One senses in this optimism a lack of sober analysis of the extent of the congruence of the partners' respective political interests, on which the relationship must ultimately rest.

The volumes considered here provide some useful insight into the past history and recent development of Sino-American relations. They are of particular interest for what they tell us about the perceptions that contributed to developing American policy in this area. At the same time, they demonstrate some of the limitations of the analysis underlying such perceptions.

THE BULK of these works are policy-oriented studies, some of them of largely historical interest because they were contributions to the debate—now resolved—on whether the United States should establish full diplomatic relations with Peking and accept the Chinese Communist condition that Washington derecognize the government on Taiwan. For the most part, the audience addressed is the informed public rather than the academic community, and the presentations tend to be similar in structure, quality of analysis, and style of advocacy. Descriptive treatments of Sino-American relations in the past few decades are followed by largely intuitive judgments concerning each side's interests, and these support rather uncritically formulated policy recommendations.

The principal message of the collection *China and America* is strategic. Editor William Barnds argued that the US must establish full diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist administration, because failure to do so would cause Beijing to improve relations with Moscow and because a cordial Sino-American relationship would contribute to the development of a "stable

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

four power equilibrium in East Asia." While this latter concept is not clarified, it seems to be envisaged that a loose US-China-Japan coalition will "counterbalance" the Soviet Union. Barnds adds the caveat that active support for China as an adversary of the USSR would be a high-risk policy for the US. Barnds' case is argued on the basis of a rather superficial chronicle of Sino-US relations, which covers much of the ground of Akira Iriye's contribution to the same volume. In making its recommendations, this collection is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for Sino-American trade and cultural exchanges. The late Alexander Eckstein's contribution warns that serious economic and political constraints limit Peking's capacity to expand its foreign trade, and Lucian Pye stresses that cultural exchanges will probably have little effect on Chinese society, because of the regime's pervasive controls.

A. Doak Barnett's study is subtler, more sophisticated, and more sensitive to the uncertainties in Chinese policy. Attributing Beijing's new American policy mainly to fears of Soviet military power, Barnett argues for a cautious and discriminating but persistent US strategy of interdependence through which Sino-American relations would gradually be strengthened, on the basis of carefully identified common interests, yet without any compromises by the US. Washington would accept China's assertion of larger regional and global roles, but not the expansion of such roles by conflictual methods. A four-power equilibrium in East Asia would be sought, with emphasis, however, on close US-Japanese ties, which, together with the improving Sino-US relationship, would serve to offset the USSR. On the issue of Taiwan, Barnett's proposals were quite close to the terms of the normalization agreement announced in December 1978. He proposed that the US maintain an unofficial presence on Taiwan, continue to sell arms to Taipei, and oppose any move to change Taiwan's status by force. Peking's claim that Taiwan is part of China would not be opposed, but neither would it be explicitly accepted.

The symposium edited by Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam is focused largely on the US-China relationship and pays less attention to regional or global considerations. An exception is Steven Levine's contribution, which suggests that an improved Sino-Soviet relationship could help stabilize the regional balance, even though a restoration of the Sino-Soviet alliance is not viewed as likely. Oksenberg's chapters, the most significant in the book, argue for the development of a stable and broadly cooperative US relationship with Beijing, although the argument is less thoughtfully developed than in the author's contribution to an earlier volume, *China and Japan*, edited by Donald C. Hellmann.[1]

Robert Sutter's work is a chronicle with very little analysis and some unsophisticated policy recommendations. However, the descriptive treatment—unlike much of the material in the volumes just dealt with—is rather carefully documented, and it presents more of the drama of recent Sino-American history than John Fairbank's impressionistic volume, *China Perceived*. Nevertheless, one should not discount Fairbank's sensing that China still views the US as "profoundly imperialistic" (as indeed can be discerned in Peking's media output). Some worthwhile historical perspectives on the relationship between the two countries can be found in Kenneth Rea's volume, and—for the period 1953–71—can be usefully supplemented by reading Stanley Bachrack's investigatory journalism in *The Committee of One Million*.

The most scholarly work in the assemblage is unquestionably J. H. Kalicki's study of the Sino-American crises of the 1950's—in Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait. Kalicki concludes that in these events each side developed a more sophisticated understanding of the other and became willing to accept the other's determination to protect its vital interests. He suggests that although no political differences were resolved, a relatively stable balance-of-power system was established in the Far East.

Although published in 1975, Kalicki's work does not discuss the evolution of the Sino-American power balance in the 1960's and early 1970's, nor does it speculate about possible future crises between China and the US. Yet the topic may well become more relevant as the enthusiasm surrounding the normalization of relations declines and conflicts of Sino-American interests become more evident. For example, some of the material in the work could be used as a basis for discussing problems that might arise should Beijing insist on enforcing its claim to sovereignty over the Nationalist-held offshore islands and Taiwan.

While Kalicki does draw on international relations literature concerning crisis management, he pays little specific attention to

1. Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath, 1976.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese conflict behavior. For an example of the interesting work being done in this area, see Steve Chan's article in the April 1978 issue of *World Politics*.

IN ATTEMPTING to assess the likely future course of relations between Washington and Beijing, one must confront a somewhat disturbing inadequacy in many Americans' perceptions regarding this important matter. Indeed, several of the authors of the policy volumes in the present assemblage show a surprising lack of breadth in their examinations of the issues involved in Sino-American relations. Only Barnett shows some awareness that there exist alternative views concerning this relationship, that Chinese policy is not that predictable, and that trying to manage a relationship based on only a limited congruence of interests is a complex matter.

Particularly noticeable in the Barnds and Oksenberg/Oxnam volumes—and, for that matter, in most public discussion in the US concerning relations with Beijing—is the absence of an adequate analysis of *China's policy toward the US*.[2] Fortunately, some attempts in this direction have been made elsewhere—in Chalmers Johnson's scholarly article in the October 1978 issue of *Foreign Affairs* and in some of Michael Yahuda's ideologically very different but insightful, if less rigorous, writings.[3] Both Johnson and Yahuda illuminate the blend of manipulative and conflictual elements that go into China's foreign policy.

Equally surprising in these recent books about policy is the lack of thorough treatment of the character of the post-Mao regime. Information is presented about China's drive for modernization under Deng Xiaoping and its repudiation of aspects of Maoism, but other dimensions of the system which have undergone little change, such as the high degree of closure to outside influence, do not receive attention from the authors.

In sum, one comes away from these books with the impression that behind the prescriptions for US actions lies an outlook toward China that was not particularly well grounded in analysis. The implications of this shortcoming for the future become evident if one looks at the authors' preference for a balance of power in East Asia as the final answer to quests for a desirable environment in that part of the world. This concept is introduced with only the scantiest examination of its viability and without the presentation of any evidence that Chinese (or Soviet) foreign policymakers envisage or would be open to such a balance. At best, it is more or less implied that a balance in terms of capabilities and degrees of resolution could be made stable through US strategies of interdependence. Perhaps a balance of power will emerge in East Asia. But there are major obstacles to such a development, and these could well lead to a good deal of Sino-American friction.

2. The same is even true of Richard H. Solomon's otherwise quite comprehensive article, "Thinking Through the China Problem," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), January 1978. Solomon, it might be noted, writes from the vantage point of one who served on the US National Security Council from 1971 to 1976.

3. See for example, his *China's Role in World Affairs*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politics of National Security in China

By Jack H. Harris

RALPH N. CLOUGH et al. *The United States, China and Arms Control*. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1975.

HARISH KAPUR. *China in World Politics*. New Delhi, India International Center, 1975.

ALLEN S. WHITING. *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina*. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1975.

WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, Ed. *Asia's Nuclear Future*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

SINOLOGY is surely the last frontier for social science *qua* science, and most Sinologists would consider their profession to be better for that. But there is one concession to the empiricists that the profession ought long ago to have made—namely, to discard the unitary rational actor model of the Chinese political system and treat that system in terms of the factional conflict which is its essence.

"Factional conflict" is not simply another way of looking at political behavior, an alternative approach to be democratically considered alongside the rational actor approach. It is, on the contrary, *the* fundamental dynamic of Chinese politics. The Chinese political system is a system of interest group competition, with the intensity of that competition ranging from symbolic bloodletting in the media to real bloodletting in the streets.

The "rational actor model" assumes that nations act as rational individuals in their own best interests, and do so without significant differences of opinion within the polity or among decision-makers. This model is a defensible shorthand for the historian who treats the broad trends of centuries in terms of "Athens," "Sparta," and "the Persians," and is a forgivable intellectual simplification for the novice. But the authors of the works reviewed here are neither broad-brush historians nor novices—they are some of the most highly regarded Sinologists in the field.

The discussion which follows focuses upon the unhappy consequences of the rational actor analysis employed by the authors of three of the volumes. If such a harsh judgment seems unwarranted or irreverent, the reader should be reminded that the present writer is viewing these works narrowly—specifically, in terms of their contribution to our understanding of *how the Chinese political system works*, and not in terms of their overall contribution to our knowledge.

THE ATTEMPT by Ralph Clough et al. to explain China's policy on arms control issues demonstrates well the weaknesses of rational actor analysis. Admittedly, *The United States, China and Arms Control* was not written to educate the specialist but rather to popularize the idea of "China and arms control" among a wider audience. However, the book's reliance on a rational actor approach renders its argument wholly unconvincing. The authors posit a stream of strategic logic on the part of the Chinese which leads the authors to conclude that the Chinese would *surely* endorse certain arms control initiatives (despite all Chinese statements to the contrary) because they are the only "rational" means by which to achieve stability. Wishful thinking often substitutes for reality where the rational actor model is concerned.

Harish Kapur's collection of lectures on Chinese politics employs an even less convincing variation on the rational actor model. His action-reaction model portrays The People's Republic not only as a unitary actor but also as a hapless disadvantaged one.

Allen Whiting, in *The Chinese Calculus*, treats the reader to a good deal more scholarship, yet to the same single-minded China one finds in Clough et al. While the latter at least ask the reader to indulge them in their oversimplification, Whiting claims to be building a "science" of Chinese

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political analysis. A similarly constructed "science" of American politics might well find that US policy in Vietnam was a consistent progression of rational choices and did not reflect either political contrasts among the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations or struggles between the White House and Congress. If science is to be pursued through models, these models ought to display a measure of isomorphism with the reality they are meant to simplify. When Whiting assumed a Chinese policymaking process based upon rational consensus rather than upon factional conflict, he assumed away the essential dynamic of Chinese politics.

William Overholt's *Asia's Nuclear Future* is a mixture of analytical and informational contributions. The editor's own contribution to the volume, "Nuclear Proliferation in Eastern Asia," is a particularly good presentation of critical issues around which debate must center in the near-nuclear nations of Asia. Overholt has for at least three or four years been the best publishing analyst on that topic.

Jonathan Pollack's contribution to Overholt's volume is particularly interesting as a contrast to the works of Whiting and Clough et al. His chapter, "China as a Nuclear Power," comes *so close* to identifying the essential dynamics of Chinese policymaking that the reader's tension rises steadily in the expectation (sadly, unfulfilled) that Pollack will surely solve the elusive mystery on the next page. Pollack correctly notes the restrained nature of the Chinese strategic weapons program and repeats the now familiar claim that "China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage" (p. 53)—but all without recognizing these as distinguishing features of a controversial, politically vulnerable weapons program. As discussed below, issues of strategic nuclear force structure were at the very heart of the contention-collusion debate of the early 1970's and the later debates over whether superpower war is inevitable and whether the superpowers possess "few" or "many" nuclear weapons. It is those Chinese who interpret the superpower relationship as one of *contention* whose force structure preferences have prevailed. Indeed, China's development of the global delivery systems associated with the collusion perception—systems such as the CSS-X-4—actually *retrogressed* during the early 1970's when the "contentionists" (e.g., Zhou Enlai) prevailed over the "collusionists" (e.g., Lin Biao). Nonetheless, while Pollack fails to interpret the domestic political aspects of China's nuclear weapons program correctly from this reviewer's perspective, he at least acknowledges "lines of cleavage on issues of resource allocation not only between specific defense interests and those associated with more general industrialization policies, but also within various military sectors" (p. 60).

THE ALTERNATIVE to rational actor explanations need not be something so complex as to surpass human understanding. In work carried out from 1974 to 1977, Peter L. Sargent and the present author demonstrated the utility and dependability of a simple model of Chinese factional conflict. Designed to explore and illuminate Chinese behavior regarding arms control and military modernization, the model took as its starting point a phenomenon labeled the "central issue of conflict" in Chinese political debate. Factional conflict was recognized as a loosely (but consistently) *structured* process. At any given time, conflict centers upon an issue of overriding importance—*the central issue of conflict*—and lesser issues are usually debated in terms of their relationships to the central issue. For example, if the choice of a capital formation strategy were to become the central issue of conflict in 1980, we could anticipate that closely related, as well as seemingly distant, issues would be debated in terms of their implications for capital formation. (Failure to grasp this fundamental principle would not necessarily cause one to be surprised by debate about the mechanization of agriculture in terms of its implications for capital formation, but it would tend to make one miss the significance of a debate over US-USSR competition in Africa in terms of its implications for Chinese capital formation.) From time to time, the central issue itself changes; however, the *concept* of a "central issue," as a foundation for a model of factional conflict, exercises an organizing influence on a body of disparate commentary which, if not recognized as the arguments of opposing factions, can only be seen as evidence of the rational actor's advanced schizophrenia.

Observers of Chinese politics will readily recognize "unity of action," "contention vs. collusion," "the inevitability of superpower war," and "few vs. many nuclear weapons in the hands of the superpowers" as *central issues of conflict* at various times over the past 15 years. At any given time, references to these central issues were so numerous in the media, and they appeared

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in conjunction with such a striking variety of lesser issues, as to suggest that some sort of encoded word game was being played out before our eyes, but beyond our vision. The analogy of an *encoded game* is a useful one, if it is not misunderstood as diminishing the importance of the "central issue of conflict" as a real political issue of substantial importance to Chinese on every side. Disagreement on the "central issue" amounts to the single deepest cleavage within the Chinese leadership during any given period of time; other issues and constituencies vie for priority yet remain secondary in their importance.

Another key principle worth underscoring is that a given position on the central issue implies a specific set of positions on secondary issues. A Chinese politician, like his American counterpart, would find that in taking a stand on the central issue of the day, he automatically tends to become identified with a whole platform of consistent positions on a wide variety of issues. To be sure, the extent to which this tendency operates varies with the ferocity of disagreement over the central issue. From time to time, ranks may be relatively closed or open in the camps that confront each other across the issue. During periods of intensity, however, the phenomenon is notably similar to the "with-us-or-against-us" style of confrontation politics in the United States in the 1960's.

There are other, instructive comparisons with the "style" of American politics. American spokesmen are experienced in the use of "codewords" in their political remarks and communications. These are the words whose mere mention implies a clearly defined set of positions on other issues. "Fiscal responsibility" is a codeword, and its mention in political speech identifies the speaker with a logically consistent set of positions on a wide range of issues—none necessarily concerned with fiscal policy. In strategic debate, codewords such as "essential equivalence" and "minimum deterrence" are the banners under which consistent sets of positions, on dozens of defense issues, are paraded.

What does all this mean for our understanding of Chinese political behavior? At a minimum, it suggests that a more mature appreciation of that behavior is available to the analyst who discards the unitary actor model and takes just *one step* toward greater analytical sophistication. For the central issue model outlined here is but one step up the ladder of analytical sophistication. By taking just that one step into the complexity of Chinese politics, by viewing the leadership as divided into only two or three major camps (and then only along the most conspicuous lines of cleavage), one may understand infinitely more things than are understandable to one who sees China as a unitary rational actor.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Ultra-Left in India

By Ouseph Varkey

BIPLAB DASGUPTA. *The Naxalite Movement*. Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1974.

MANORANJAN MOHANTY. *Revolutionary Violence: A Study of the Maoist Movement in India*. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1977.

ASISH KUMAR ROY. *The Spring Thunder and After: A Survey of the Maoist and Ultra-Leftist Movements in India, 1962–75*. Calcutta, Minerva Associates 1975.

AN EDITORIAL entitled "Spring Thunder Breaks Over India" in the July 5, 1967, issue of the Chinese Communist Party's *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) reported with exultation that the peasants of Naxalbari in Darjeeling, India, had risen in violent revolution and predicted that this was a prelude to revolution in all of India—a "spark" that would start a "prairie fire" that would keep the vast expanses of India ablaze.[1] There was no prairie fire in India. But the spark in Darjeeling did kindle some ultra-leftist revolutionary movements in the country, and these have received extensive—even excessive—attention from journalists and academics.[2]

The three books under consideration here are part of this outpouring of literature. Dr. Dasgupta provides a comprehensive and lucid account of the development of ultra-leftist movements in India. Dr. Mohanty analyzes their ideology, organization, and strategy, and the environment in which they function. And Dr. Roy explains them with the help of concepts of political sociology. Each volume enhances our understanding of the Naxalbari revolt and its aftermath.

NAXALBARI, in fact, is a small area in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. Militant peasants there had been planning a struggle under Communist leadership, and the emergence of a united front government in West Bengal in March 1967, with both major Indian Communist parties included,[3] emboldened the peasants to launch their revolt. They demonstrated against landlords and moneylenders, seized food supplies, and occupied fallow land. When the struggle turned political shortly afterward, the leaders of the uprising declared the Naxalbari area a "liberated zone" (in late May) and advocated a popular seizure of power in India by armed struggle.

The proximity of Naxalbari to the Chinese border gave special, national significance to these developments, and the united front government of West Bengal finally decided it had no alternative except to suppress the revolt. More than 1,500 policemen moved into Naxalbari on July 13, 1967. The rebels offered no resistance. The police arrested about 250 persons, and by the end of the month most of the leaders of the revolt were in jail. The revolt, in which a total of 18 persons were killed—nine by police, six by the rebels, and three by landlords—ended in complete failure. But Naxalbari became the symbol of armed peasant uprising and of Maoism in India, so much so that the word "Naxalism" is often used in India today as a synonym for ultra-leftism.

The Naxalbari revolt evoked admiration from some persons, mostly more militant members or supporters of the CPI(M). These individuals were outraged by their own party's immersion in electoral politics and its interest in the fractional share of power which minority participation in coalition governments at the state level offered. They believed that "political power grows out of the

1. For the text of this editorial, see Appendix 1 in the Mohanty volume under review.

2. Aside from the three books under consideration here, at least three others appeared in the early 1970's: Sankar Ghose, *The Naxalite Movement*, Calcutta, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1974; J.C. Johari, *Naxalite Politics in India*, New Delhi, Research ICPS, 1972; and Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India*, New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971.

3. The country's two major Communist parties are the Communist Party of India, or CPI, and the Communist Party of India Marxist, or CPI(M).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

barrel of a gun" and considered parliamentary practice a façade. As a result, they accused the CPI(M) leadership of compromising the revolutionary purity of the party by deciding to join the coalition governments of Kerala and West Bengal, in both of which "revisionist" and "reactionary" parties also participated.

Some of these dissenters within the CPI(M) decided to form a new revolutionary party guided by Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Zedong, and at a mammoth May Day rally in Calcutta in 1969, Kanu Sanyal, hero of the Naxalbari revolt, announced the birth of the party. He proclaimed to the audience that by the year 2000, the whole world would be liberated from all exploitation and would celebrate the victory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. The new party was called the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(ML). Charu Mazumdar, mastermind of the Naxalbari revolt, became its first General Secretary and, soon afterward, its chief theoretician and strategist. Most Maoist groups in the country rallied to the new organization.

The program of the party characterized India as a semicolonial, semifeudal country where power belonged to the comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie and to wealthy landlords, and where both of these groups served the interests of Western "imperialists" and Soviet "social-imperialists." India could only be liberated, according to the program, by means of war, and the party recommended the creation of small bases of armed struggle—i.e., guerrilla warfare—all across the nation. The program mirrored Chinese views on India,[4] and Beijing gave profuse publicity to the party and its activities.

Spurred on by the dynamism of the new party, its supporters, now generally called "Naxalites," moved to establish "red" bases in rural areas. Armed with machetes, knives, and other such village weapons, and with the battle cry "he who has not dipped his hand in the blood of the class enemy can hardly be called a Communist," the Naxalites conducted a ferocious campaign of killing directed at landlords, rich peasants, moneylenders, and police informers. In the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh, which Mazumdar hoped would become the Yenan of India, Naxalites murdered about 150 persons. Victims were often sliced into pieces, and their heads stuck onto the gates of their houses. But the Naxalites were unable to arouse the masses to action, and the police crushed all the local uprisings within a few months.

The final phase of Naxalite activity in India prior to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's declaration of a state of emergency in 1975 took place in Calcutta, where Naxalite ranks were swelled with school dropouts, delinquents, and other antisocial elements. The CPI(ML) first staged a "cultural revolution" by raiding colleges and disfiguring statues of national leaders. Then they turned to urban guerrilla warfare. They murdered scores of CPI(M) supporters and established a few "liberated zones" in the city. As in the countyside, however, when the government acted firmly, Naxalite resistance crumbled.

By the time Mazumdar died in 1972, the Naxalite party had split into several factions, and most of their leaders had been killed or arrested. The government banned the Naxalites altogether following the declaration of the state of emergency, and the suspension of fundamental rights in the country gave a free hand to the police to enforce the ban as they saw fit. They hunted down members of the CPI(ML) and terrorized their supporters, often with the connivance of state executives. In Andhra Pradesh alone, the police executed more than 350 Naxalites and passed off the killings as "deaths in encounter."[5] Elsewhere, the situation was similar.

MOST JAILED ultra-leftists were freed after the restoration of full democracy in India in 1977. Currently, there are sporadic reports that Naxalites are active in some parts of India, especially in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal, though it is not yet clear whether they share the goals of or are related to the original Naxalites.[6] In either case, the intellectual elements of the Indian ultra-Left, who formerly saw Mao as the savior and China as the paragon of socialism—witness the slogan "China's chairman is our chairman; China's path is our path"—may now experience a crisis of faith. How can they feel, after all, when they read that the heirs of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution are thirsting for Coca Cola and are avid to send their best students to American universities? Who can assure them that the next congress of the "great, glorious and correct" Chinese Com-

4. See Mohanty, Appendix 1.

5. *The Overseas Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), May 4, 1978.

6. Before the Emergency, Naxalites was a term used to refer to the supporters of the Naxalbari uprising and of the CPI(ML). Today, it has become synonymous with all ultra-leftists in India who advocate armed struggle. It is in this broader sense that the term is used in the discussion which follows.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist Party (CCP) will not be comparable to the 20th Congress of the CPSU?

There are indications that some Naxalite groups had begun to reconsider their role and their approach to politics even before dramatic changes in Chinese policy occurred in the wake of Mao's death. Still, R. P. Saraf, the leader of one group, in 1978 could denounce the CCP as revisionist and reject the possibility of any guiding center for world communism in the future.[7]

More significant, however, was the course adopted by the group under Satyanarayan Singh. This group took up the challenge of electoral politics and contested three seats in the West Bengal state assembly in the 1977 election. One of its candidates, Santosh Rana, who had led a Naxalite uprising before the Emergency, was elected. But electoral participation has not fundamentally metamorphosed this group. The group rejects the Chinese contention that parliamentarism is the "opium used by the Indian ruling classes to paralyze the Indian people,"[8] but it continues to share the Chinese view that India is a semicolonial and semifeudal country. The group's goal is to build a people's democracy through "protracted people's war," and only then to advance to socialism.[9]

The acceptance of parliamentarism by Singh's group has brought it closer than other left extremists to the CPI(M), but the gap is still very wide. Neither the CPI nor the CPI(M) mentions armed struggle in its program as necessary for the achievement of its goals. Each asserts that the party "strives" to achieve its goals through "peaceful means," though each also warns that it should "always be borne in mind" that the ruling classes will not voluntarily relinquish their power and that the party therefore must always be ready to "face up to all contingencies." Implicitly, this position represents an acknowledgment that the need for armed struggle does not exist in India today—so long as the ruling classes observe the rules of parliamentary government.

The political behavior of the CPI and CPI(M) shows that they have concentrated their efforts on winning elections and that they use peaceful mass struggle to broaden their bases of support. The smashing victories of the CPI(M) in the last state elections in West Bengal and Tripura[10] would seem likely to further deepen at least that party's commitment to electoral politics. West Bengal and Tripura today confirm what was demonstrated in Kerala 20 years ago, namely, that where there is political democracy, power grows out of ballot boxes.

DO COMMUNIST victories in Tripura and West Bengal refute the Naxalite thesis that armed struggle is indispensable for the establishment of communism in India? In the opinion of this writer, they do not. Under prevailing conditions in India, it would be impossible for Communists to gain *complete* political power through peaceful, parliamentary methods, and current conditions are likely to continue in their essentials for many years to come. In such a situation, Indian Communists are cribbed by a variety of factors.

First, Communist strength in India is confined geographically to three states and scattered districts in a few of India's other 19 states. The total population of the three states with Communists in the state governments—Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura—is a small fraction of India's total population, and at the national level, in fact, Communists got only 8 percent of the vote and 28 seats in the 542-seat Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) in the last election. Even if they adopted a united front strategy, the Communists could not sufficiently increase their votes and seats at the national level to give them a parliamentary majority. Moreover, the process of making and maintaining united fronts would necessitate the dilution of conventional Communist goals. Thus the Communists seem limited to having full power in only three states for some time to come. They may have a fractional share of power through united fronts and coalition governments in a few other states, but they will pay a price for this.

Second, the powers of state governments in India are very limited. The federal government has very effective legislative, administrative, and financial controls over the states and can even dismiss elected state executives and directly administer the states if it has cause to do so. Hence, even if Communists were to take over a greater number of state governments, they would remain subject to severe controls from the center.

7. *The Overseas Hindustan Times*, June 8, 1978.

8. See Mohanty, Appendix 1.

9. *The Overseas Hindustan Times*, Mar. 23, 1978.

10. In both states, the CPI(M) won an absolute majority and is in power now. The CPI(M) also won an impressive victory in the elections to local government bodies held in 1978 in West Bengal. See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Politics and the Communist Party (Marxist)," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third, since the Indian Constitution embodies liberal-democratic values which are incompatible with some traditional Communist goals, attempts by a state government to bring about a Communist transformation of society would involve violations of the Constitution, which the state governments are bound to obey. Such action would invite the rapid dismissal of the state government by the federal government.

Fourth, the higher bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the press of the country are generally unsympathetic to a number of Communist goals. They can thus be expected to act as constraints on Communist state governments.

Fifth, powerful religious and communal interests which are opposed to radical change exist in many states. Their hostility can be fatal to state governments, as the Communist government in Kerala learned in 1959.[11]

Under such circumstances, Communist state governments will perhaps be able to achieve a few radical reforms, but no revolution. Communist leaders know this—some, like the present General Secretary of the CPI(M), E.M.S. Namboodiripad, who was head of the Kerala Communist government in 1959, from unforgettable personal experience.[12] This explains why the CPI(M) criticizes the present constitution of India so vehemently and presses so persistently for changes in existing federal-state relations that would substantially increase the powers of state governments. Prospects for the sort of radical revision of the Indian Constitution that would facilitate the achievement of Communist goals, however, are exceedingly limited.

There are indications that the CPI and CPI(M) are losing their ideological fervor in the face of such obstacles. The CPI has been a revisionist party from its inception. Its record in Kerala, where it has been in government via coalitions since 1967, shows that it has become a party of reform and has compromised all revolutionary goals. Electoral politics and the responsibilities of governing have also generated revisionist sentiments in the CPI(M). Many statements of Jyoti Basu, West Bengal's CPI(M) Chief Minister, indicate that public policy in that Communist-governed state is shaped by pragmatic considerations which often conflict with ideologically more acceptable Communist goals and aspirations. It is possible that external developments such as the emergence of Eurocommunism, Soviet and Chinese overtures to Western capitalists, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea will further strengthen revisionist forces in these two Communist parties. But even if no external forces come into play, the political transactions of both parties are likely to increasingly involve compromise and conciliation. For these reasons, the success of the Indian Communist parties, if and when it comes, will not be a triumph for orthodox communism.

THUS, THE CLAIM of the Naxalites that only their path—i.e., the path of armed struggle—will lead India to pure communism seems valid. But the Naxalites of the late 1960's and early 1970's were naive in assuming that India was ripe for armed struggle. Early Indian Communists had tried armed struggle—both urban uprisings led by industrial workers and rural uprisings led by peasants—in the late 1940's, when India was in its infancy as a nation and the government was faced with a flood of problems caused by the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Even then, the government had easily suppressed the rebels. By the 1960's, the government's capabilities—to govern and to repress—had increased enormously, but support for communism had not.

The first question which Naxalites must ask themselves today is how many Indians want orthodox communism, for without widespread popular support, protracted guerrilla warfare, which the Naxalites advocate for India's "liberation," would be suicidal, today as in the past, in a country where the police and the armed forces stand solidly behind the government. Election figures give enough clues to permit one to answer this question. Even in Kerala, where Communists have been active and effective for more than 30 years and where political consciousness is highly developed, Communist electoral support has never exceeded 40 percent of the total vote cast. Communist voting strength at the national level shrinks to 10 percent. Clearly, the vast majority of Indians does not yearn for communism.

This should not be taken to mean that most Indians are satisfied with their own or their country's current condition. "There is latent anger among them," Professor F. Tomasson Jannuzi has written of the Indian peasantry, which constitutes the majority of the country's population, "and promises of future benefits, future improvements in income and

11. Opposition from the churches and the communal Nair Service Society resulted in the dismissal of the state government by the federal government.

12. Mr. Namboodiripad had problems with the federal government again in 1967, when he headed a coalition government in Kerala.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quality of life cannot be counted upon for long to contain their anger."[13] And the same might be said of several other segments of Indian society as well, particularly the harijans (untouchables), the tribals, the unemployed, and the underemployed. But Indian society is hardly ripe for spontaneous armed insurrection to be unleashed by a few revolutionaries acting as midwives. If there is to be an induced revolution in India, it will be possible only through the political education and organization of the masses, a task which the Naxalites have almost totally ignored. For the present, it would take the armed forces—or at least substantial support from them—to impose revolution on India.

The most fatal failure of the Naxalites has been their repeated inability to understand the political environment in which they operate and the political outlook of their own people. India's political environment includes governments legitimated through democratic processes, stable and functioning bureaucracies, developed communications networks, strong police forces, and a powerful army loyal to the government. All these elements make India very different from Kuomintang China of the late 1940's and make the Maoist model of revolution irrelevant. Furthermore, the largely peaceful nature of India's struggle for independence and the folklore which has developed around the figure of Mahatma Gandhi have helped to create a popular belief in India in the possibility of peaceful change—a belief that was reinforced recently by the replacement of the Congress party with the Janata party through the ballot box. The CPI and CPI(M) have been sensitive to this aspect of India's political culture and have adjusted their politics accordingly. They will not establish orthodox communism in India, but their work in government and their presence in state and federal legislatures and in the countryside may help eliminate age-old economic and social evils in India. Naxalism, in contrast, has been little more than a grotesque form of protest against those same evils.

WHAT HAVE the Naxalites achieved in over a decade of tumultuous activity? Very little indeed. Before the Emergency, they compelled the nation to focus its attention on a wretched peasantry hidden in rural remoteness. But their methods were ignoble—not so much because they were violent as because they were often sadistic. They confused revolutionary activity with terror and individual murder. They even killed active members of the CPI(M) and slandered that party's reputation, thus retarding the growth of the most radical political force in the country capable of actually helping the common man. Today, the Naxalites of the pre-1975 period evoke in most Indians only a sense of horror and revulsion.

It is too early to assess the role and status of the Naxalites in post-Emergency India. They are engaged in an agonizing reappraisal. They can look back only in shame and sorrow. Their ranks have been thinned by the brutal police repression of the Emergency. They are ideologically adrift, Maoists stunned by the specter of revisionism that is now haunting China and shocked by the social-imperialism of Vietnam that manifested itself in Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea. They are perplexed by the vitality of Indian democracy, which survived two years of dictatorship. The Naxalites are at a crossroads.

Some of them may defect from the ultra-Left to the relative moderation of the CPI(M). Others may combine parliamentary activity in state capitals with militant struggle in rural areas. Yet others may cling to their old faith, easier to practice and propagate now that India has returned to democracy. The present-day Naxalites will make a few converts, particularly from among India's peasant masses, most of whom are still oppresed and exploited and still hungry for bread and land, and from among the millions of educated unemployed whose despair may deteriorate into nihilism. But it is an impossible dream for the Naxalites to establish a Yenan anywhere in today's India. Naxalites may make headlines by occasionally raiding police stations or by brutally murdering some hapless landlord. If that is what revolutionary action is, then revolutionary sparks may fly high now and then, here and there in India. But a few scattered sparks do not make a prairie fire.

13. F. Tomasson Jannuzi, *Agrarian Crisis in India*, Austin, TX, University of Texas Press, 1974, p. x.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

MORE ON PARTICIPATION IN CHINA

TO THE EDITORS: To continue the discussion on the importance of limited political participation under authoritarian rule (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1979), I would like to add a few points in defense of Mr. Falkenheim.

While I think Mr. Cohn's specific methodological criticisms are quite important, if rather obvious, Mr. Falkenheim himself would agree with most of them. All of us who have interviewed 25–100 Chinese émigrés in Hong Kong are aware that we are creating little competition for the Michigan Survey Research Center. Our object rather is to add whatever we can possibly add to the strictly documentary and short-visit data upon which most analyses of contemporary China are based. Actually, compared with other writers in the China field, Professor Falkenheim goes to great lengths to inform his readers about the details of his methodology. I would agree with Mr. Cohn that drawing conclusions from subsets of 5 or 6 respondents is statistically meaningless. But at least we know just how flimsy the groundings are for these particular conclusions. Most scholars in the field are less willing than Mr. Falkenheim is to air their tattered linen in public.

I think a useful "comment" might be leveled at the modern China field in general for its methodological looseness and vagueness. But I do not see why Mr. Cohn would want to single out for criticism a scholar like Mr. Falkenheim who has been unusually diligent and cautious in his statistical inferences. It is important at some juncture to know that "N = [only] 7". I know then that the conclusion is merely suggestive, and must await better documentation to be accepted with any confidence. I am very surprised that such a sincere and responsible effort to upgrade a primitive subfield of social science would provide Mr. Cohn with the most effective comic relief he has ever found in a scholarly journal. It is sad but true, I think, that scholars who are the most explicit about their methods and logical steps draw the most fire, if only because they have erected the clearest targets.

On the subject of methodology, Mr. Cohn seems to hold in high regard the many contributions of Ivan and Miriam London. This baffles me even more since the Londons have no methodology at all. Working through interpreters (neither speaks Chinese), they invite small numbers of émigrés to their suite in Kowloon's posh Peninsula Hotel and probe for tales of the seamy side of life in China. Predictably, they discover that begging, prostitution, and other deplorable social practices still exist. What is the point? That *Beijing Review* is biased? This intellectual exercise has all the scientific force of interviewing a few welfare mothers in Watts, Los Angeles, and concluding on the basis of their statements that America is a much more awful place than one would imagine from reading the *Los Angeles Times*.

This might be true. But it only *adds* a perspective to the more optimistic *Times* coverage, it does not *replace* it. In a similar vein, Mr. Falkenheim does not deny the reality of dictatorship in China. He argues, very explicitly, that in the overall context of the single-party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party, there remain a few identifiable channels of genuine political participation. His findings accord with Mr. Cohn's references to Germany in the 1930's. And they correspond in interesting ways to the findings of others who have attempted to study political participation under authoritarian regimes (I have recently been reading the work of Henry Dietz and Wayne Cornelius on patterns of participation among the urban poor in Lima, Peru).

Finally, Mr. Falkenheim's objection (and my own) to the concept "totalitarianism" is that it tends to blot out such questions as how Bettelheim could persuade that reasonable SS guard, or how those goy wives could make legitimate appeals on behalf of their pariah husbands. China *is no democracy; it is a very* authoritarian, bureaucratic society. Even granting that, Mr. Falkenheim's conclusions about limited opportunities for mass participation may prove to be correct.

GORDON A. BENNETT
University of Texas
Austin, TX

SOVIET DIPLOMACY OF FORCE

TO THE EDITORS: Messrs. McConnell and Dismukes correctly point out in "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1979, p. 21) that a "decision in late 1965" appears to have been taken in the Kremlin to revise Soviet local-war doctrine in a more militant direction. I would like to add that the expression "offensive against the positions of imperialism" also appeared at this time—nearest kick-off date being in the text of the November 1965 International Communist Duty Manifesto (*Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1965). This a far more revealing phrase than the weaker-worded one quoted by the authors: "international mission" of the Soviet armed forces. Even earlier, Leonid Brezhnev told the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party on July 20, 1965: "Some years ago, the Communist Parties drew the conclusion that the correlation of forces in the world arena had steadily shifted in favor of Socialism. The time that has passed since then has seen the further increase in the might of *the world system of Socialism* and the further development of the national-liberation and workers' movement. *The progressive forces are now on the offensive* and the reactionaries, of course, will be unable to stop them."

The "offensive" line was to have its application in Southeast Asia as well as elsewhere in the Third World and the Middle East, as the authors well document.

ALBERT L. WEEKS
New York University
New York, NY

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49-65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02215

Infordata International, Inc.
175 Delaware Place
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10003

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, New York 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

ORDER FORM FOR PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

CURRENT PRICES. Annual subscriptions, US mailing address: $10.00 each. Single copies, US mailing address: $1.70 each. Annual subscriptions addressed outside the US: $12.00 each. Single copies addressed outside the US: $2.15 each. A 25% discount is allowed on orders of 100 or more subscriptions or copies mailed to a single address. For further information, see inside front cover.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, USGPO. Mail to: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402 (USA).

Publication: **PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM**
To be mailed to:
(Please print or type. Include zip code for US addresses.)

NAME _____

ADDRESS: _____

_____

_____

_____

ORDER: Annual subscription(s) of six bimonthly issues _____ How many _____

Single issue(s) designated by date _____ How many each _____
(Enclose separate sheet if more space is required.)

I enclose payment of _____ by check ☐ or money order ☐ payable to SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, USGPO.

[FOR USE OF SUPT. OF DOCS. Entered _____ Begins _____ Expires _____]

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED